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About the Reader Let’s start with you. The audience for this work is you, a stu-
dent in the social sciences. Many of the problems discussed in this book will prob-
ably be new to you, perhaps not entirely, but still. Yet, right from the beginning of 
your studies, you have been confronted with certain demands, regulations, and pro-
cedures, all driven by certain ethical considerations that you’re supposed to be 
aware of and adopt. You’re supposed to be trustworthy, reliable, honest, impartial, 
and objective if you want to call yourself a researcher. Ah yes, but how? It seems 
you’ve got some catching up to do.
Some, such as Steneck (2006), argue that responsible research conduct requires 
you to learn and follow established protocols and procedures. Others, such as Sim 
Electronic Supplementary Material: The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/ 
10.1007/978-3-030-48415-6_1) contains supplementary material, which is available to autho-
rized users.
Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969, p. 77)
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et al. (2015), insist that your level of engagement and motivation play a role in how 
you learn and understand research ethics.
In either case, because the rules and regulations of research ethics may appear 
‘vague’ at best, or feel ‘beyond your control’, we feel that it is important that you 
are offered an opportunity to see those rules and practices ‘in action.’
This book is designed to empower you, to help you grasp research ethics in the 
most practical sense. By providing you with concrete examples of cases and dilem-
mas, and confronting them with real questions, we believe you will become more 
sensible to these problems and will be able to respond to these issues more readily.
Aims and Purpose of This Book Problems regarding research ethics and integrity 
began to dominate the agenda of social scientists at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. Of course, there have always been ethical considerations, but today, more 
than ever before, we seem aware of the many pitfalls, obstacles, and dangers attached 
to our research procedures. There are several reasons why this awareness came about 
in such a relatively short amount of time.
For one, a number of highly controversial cases of scientific fraud within the 
social science emerged in the early 2000s (among which Diederik Stapel was prob-
ably the most prominent). Many of these were widely reported on and helped raise 
awareness of the dangers of scientific misconduct.
Additionally, and simultaneously, questions were raised regarding what is often 
referred to as Questionable Research Practices (QRPs), which revealed the social 
sciences’ susceptibility to more subtle forms of data manipulation, affecting the 
field in an unparalleled fashion.
Finally, legislation in many European and North American countries has changed 
(and continues to change), putting more emphasis on protecting participants, guard-
ing confidentiality, and demanding stringent data management plans.
In the meantime, several outstanding books have been published on research ethics 
and integrity (see; Resnick 2005; Israel 2014; Koepsell 2016), however, a textbook 
specifically designed for students in the social sciences remained elusive. When we 
took it upon ourselves to fill this gap, we reasoned two stipulations needed to be taken 
into account.
Firstly, if we wanted students to ‘get the message’, meaning their perspective 
should be included as much as possible. Secondly, students should be given ample 
opportunity to ‘experience’ ethical issues in science as real-life questions or prob-
lems, and not so much as abstract rules or guidelines.
This then defines the two goals of this book:
• Inform students about research ethics and raise their overall interest in it.
• Create opportunities for students to engage with ethical problems and dilemmas, 
allowing them to define their own position.
Educational Plan In each chapter, we introduce the student to the fundamental 
dilemmas, problems, and choices that one may encounter when doing research. We 
will focus as much as possible on research conduct, and not on the underlying phi-
losophies of ethics (except briefly in the introductory chapters), or on the ethics of 
professional conduct (interaction with clients, organizations, etc.). While these sub-
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jects fall outside the scope of this work, we will provide introductions for them in 
subsequent chapters.
Most importantly, we do not offer a ‘how-to-do guide.’ Instead, the emphasis is 
on a combination of practice-based and problem-based learning (as opposed to 
strictly theory-based learning). Our approach rests on the assumption that the stu-
dent benefits from concrete examples of problems embedded in location and situa-
tion specific contexts. Along with a basic understanding of the most important 
principles and rules that need to be applied, one can acquire this knowledge.
All chapters are written in accordance with the following three-step educa-
tional design:
Step one is to identify a particular ethical issue as concisely and clearly as possible. At the 
beginning of each chapter, short informative sections allow the reader to familiarize them-
selves with basic concepts, theories, viewpoints, and perspectives.
Step two consists of developing substantiated approaches to specific problems or issues. 
How should one address the issues discussed, resolve the dilemmas involved, or avoid get-
ting caught up in them? Short, concrete cases give direct access to the problems at hand 
without providing moral judgements.
Step three is the accounting or justifying of moral decisions to others. All chapters contain 
real-life case studies that can be used in class or in tutorials to discuss and probe the choices 
and decisions.
Structure of This Book We have divided this textbook into four sections that, 
more or less, represent the various ‘orientations’ in research ethics, namely a focus 
on theory, fraud, trust, and formalities, respectively. The division is as follows:
Part I: Perspectives (Chaps. 2 and 3)
Part II: Ethics and Misconduct (Chaps. 4, 5 and 6)
Part III: Ethics and Trust (Chaps. 7, 8, and 9)
Part IV: Forms, Codes, and Types of Regulations (Chap. 10)
The first section presents a brief overview of what science is and what discus-
sions exist in the field of research ethics. There is a short section on what character-
izes science, what its outlining principles are, and on different perspectives of ethics. 
We will focus on three views, each with different assumptions regarding what con-
stitutes moral behavior. The defining question of this section is: Which perspectives 
are relevant for the social sciences researcher?
The second section discusses classical forms of fraud; Plagiarism, Fabrication, 
and Falsifying (PFF). Related to these issues are concerns about cheating, free rid-
ing, paper mills, and other fraudulent practices. The defining question here is: How 
do forms of fraud impact the social sciences, and why should it be of concern to us?
The third section deals more broadly with defined issues of research ethics, such 
as those relating to trust, concerns over confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and 
questions concerning science and politics. The defining question in this section is: 




In the final section, which consists of only one chapter, we present a general 
review and step-by-step discussion of relevant procedures within university codes 
of conduct, informed consent forms, and other types of regulations found in the 
social sciences today. The defining question here: How to design a proper research 
application?
A Note About Shaming Over the course of this book, we will discuss ways to tackle 
ethical issues, sometimes by example of the individuals who chose the  incorrect path. 
This raises the following question: In a book about ethics, is it appropriate to mention 
the names of those who’ve crossed the line, committed fraud, or misbehaved in one 
way or another? Should they be ‘named and shamed,’ or would it be better to discuss 
their cases in a more anonymous manner? This is in itself an ethical problem.
We’ve adopted a pragmatic approach to this question. In some cases, the indi-
vidual has come to exemplify the problem, such that it would only create an unnec-
essary distraction were mention of the persons involved avoided. This is true, for 
example, of the cases of Diederick Stapel, Brian Wansink, and Cyril Burt, among 
others, which are discussed at some length here. However, if it was at all possible to 
protect privacy, then we have done so, believing that this principle should prevail.
A Note About Our Referencing Policy It may strike the reader that the authors in 
this book refer to themselves as a collective ‘we’ throughout the entire volume, even 
though only three chapters are authored by multiple writers and two of the case 
studies were written by different authors, with the remaining majority authored by 
a single author.
Apart from the fact that it is much more consistent to refer to a single author- 
identity throughout, there is another reason to speak in the ‘majestic plural’: all 
chapters have been read and critiqued by so many different people, who contributed 
in so many ways, adding so many valuable insights, that it would be almost pre-
sumptuous to consider any one chapter the product of a single mind. For this reason, 
we gladly revive this respected but somewhat forgotten practice.
When referring to unidentified others, we adopt a different policy. At one point it 
was common practice to use ‘he’ throughout and forewarn the reader in a footnote that 
they should understand this as referring to both male and female persons. Later the 
formula ‘he or she’ of even ‘s/he’ was adopted. Today, in accordance with the style 
and grammar guideline in the APA Publication Manual, singular ‘they’ is used when 
referring to a generic person whose gender is unknown or irrelevant to the context. 
We’ve decided to follow this recommendation, as you have perhaps already noticed 
when in the sentence above we spoke of ‘the reader… they’ (see Lee 2019 for a dis-
cussion this policy).
Beginning, Not the End This book will provide an introduction into research eth-
ics and integrity, but not much beyond that. This is just a beginning, but with two 
important considerations in mind. First, one will find that many of the questions we 
carefully separated in this book are anything but separated in real life, and that try-
ing to answer one question has consequences for many other related parts. Ethical 
questions in real life are rarely simple.
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Secondly, one will find that many of the issues discussed in this book are still 
being debated, and our views on them continue to develop, in part because science 
itself is in continuous development. Additionally, the fact that science’s place in 
society is changing, how we perceive of ethical questions changes with it.
So, there remains work to be done even after the reader has finished this book. 
We understand that this may sound somewhat discouraging, but please remember 
what poet Wislawa Szymborska (2002) wrote in ‘A Word on Statistics’:
Out of a hundred people
those who always know better:
fifty-two
Unsure of every step:
nearly all the rest.
This book is dedicated to ‘nearly all the rest’, namely all those students out there 
who struggle to do the right thing. We hope this book will help them know how to 
get there.
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2.1  Introduction
2.1.1  Our Moral Duty
If you’re reading this book, its likely you’re a social sciences student. Perhaps 
you’ve only recently embarked upon your journey through the land of the learned 
and the learners, or perhaps you’re well into your undergraduate education, with 
graduate school or the job market waiting just around the corner. All the same, we 
hope you’re just as excited about becoming a scientist as we were when we embarked 
upon our own scientific careers.
Your immersion in science is, as you surely know, part of a larger, collective 
human endeavor – understanding and explaining the world in a scientific way. As 
such, you must approach your work academically, without prejudice or bias and as 
free from preconceived ideas as possible. The problem being  – this is not 
self-evident.
Science in general is about great ideas and technical innovations, but it comes 
with a moral duty; to be thoughtful and critical of your own and other people’s 
ideas. The motto of the British Royal Society, founded in 1660, captures this con-
cept well: Nullis in verba (take nobody’s word for it).
It is Nullis in verba, the skeptical and self-critical approach of the scientific com-
munity, that we turn in this book. It is what we, the authors of this volume, but also 
the academic community at large, consider the moral duty of any scientist (Fig. 2.1).
2.1.2  Understanding of Ethics
In the chapters that follow, we offer an introduction into the ethics of social science 
research as an instrument to systematically explore this moral duty of skepticism 
and self-critique. We probe the most common moral dilemmas that social scientists 
encounter while conducting research, and we discuss several possible solutions to 
them, although often no one solution satisfies completely.
Many of the dilemmas discussed in this book are not specific for the social sci-
ences and the questions they raise are common across many disciplines. Different 
disciplines struggle with questions regarding how to treat participants in research 
with respect, how to ensure that data is collected and stored safely, or how to deal 
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with deception. However, the way these questions are understood and explored may 
be different from one field of expertise to the next.
To mention just one example in somewhat more detail: intrusive research is a 
concern for many scientists. But what is considered ‘intrusive’ in the social sciences 
(something that arouses in the participant unpleasant, even painful experiences or 
memories) does not compare with its meaning in the medical sciences (something 
that jeopardizes the integrity of the participant’s body).
In short, to properly understand the ethical questions of a particular field, we 
need to have a grasp of certain ‘qualities’ within that field. By qualities, we mean a 
(historic) understanding of what science and scientific knowledge means to them, 
what the aims of their scientific research is, what rules they follow, and if there are 
particular questions, discussions, and issues that they are particularly sensitive to.
The purpose of the present and subsequent chapter is to explore the first part of 
these ‘qualities’, while the particular ‘sensitivities’ will be the subject of discussion 
in later chapters.
In this chapter, we briefly explore both the history of science, with a particular 
focus on the social sciences, and examine differing perspectives on knowledge. In 
the next chapter, we explore a number of important perspectives on ethics, and we 
outline several important principles thereof, including a discussion of modern 
‘codes of conduct’. What these chapters do not offer is an extensive introduction 
into the history and philosophy of social science, nor do they extensively discuss 
ethics from a philosophical point of view. For a more exhaustive exploration of 
these topics, we gladly refer the reader to the ever-expanding lexicon of fascinating 
literature on these subjects (see Suggested Reading).
Fig. 2.1 Motto of British 





2.2.1  The Beginning
Europe’s first universities date back to the twelfth century, but they were not the first 
to be founded. Already in the fifth century, ancient universities flourished in India. 
In Nalanda, for example, the ruins of one of the first great universities in recorded 
history can be found. It once attracted thousands of students and is believed to have 
housed a library with over nine million books.
The function of these early universities was principally scholastic, focused upon 
the articulation and defense of clerical dogmas. However, in a period now known as 
the ‘Scientific Revolution’ (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), the work of 
knowledge-producing university scholars changed dramatically in Western Europe 
(Fig. 2.2).
It was as if the human imagination had been liberated. From this period onward, 
natural philosophers (the precursor to ‘scientists’, a term first used in the nineteenth 
century) were allowed to ‘wonder’ without dogma – performing experiments con-
ceived first in the mind and controlled through rationality. The mystery of the cos-
mos offered more than a feeling of awe and amazement, becoming a backdrop for a 
cascade of questions: Why do the celestial bodies move in the way they do? What 
makes them move? What are they even? What is light? What are the ‘natural forces’? 
Fig. 2.2 University of Nalanda. (Source: Wikicommons)
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How large is the universe? How old is it? Where does humanity fit into it all? How 
do we think? Why do we think? What am I? I think therefore I am – right? Minds 
were being blown, one question at a time.
These broad questions that helped form the basis for what we today call ‘science’ 
have kept generations of scholars busy ever since. But what do we mean exactly 
when we talk about ‘science’?
A common characterization of science is that it’s an attempt to explain reality 
and offer knowledge that can help predict or prepare for future events. But is this 
unique to science? Note that there are other organized systems of though (such a 
world religions) that aim to do the same.
A more elaborate answer would be that science (a) produces a body of robust 
knowledge by way of (b) a certain methodology, and it does so within (c) an infra-
structure of physical institutions (such as universities, laboratories, etc.).
These three dimensions of science (knowledge, methods, and infrastructure) pre-
suppose a fourth dimension, which is particularly relevant in the context of this 
book. Knowledge, methods, and infrastructure require (d) a set of moral values, 
embedded in our academic way of thinking. Moral values structure the scientists’ 
activities. Producing robust knowledge within the framework of an institution 
means you must adhere to certain rules, regulations, and appropriate 
methodologies.
On one hand, the procedures governing the act of actually ‘doing’ science are 
institutionalized in the regulations and protocols of each discipline – a moral com-
pass defined on paper. On the other hand, they are more implicit, with greater reli-
ance on the moral virtues of the individual researcher and are thus more difficult to 
identify (more on this in Chap. 3). Both ways of considering the set of moral values 
in science, institutionalized and implicit, are played out on the center stage of this 
book, representing the ethics of scientific research and the integrity of the researcher, 
respectively.
In the next section, we briefly outline the above-mentioned dimensions of sci-
ence – knowledge, methodology and infrastructure – as framed against the back-
ground of the developing social sciences as they emerged in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.
2.2.2  A Very Brief History of the Social Sciences
Before the social sciences entered the academic arena in the nineteenth century, the 
‘project of science’ was closely connected to the natural sciences. From Newton’s 
law of gravity to x-rays, and from gun powder to penicillin, science was all about 
great discoveries. Even the idea of ‘discovery’ is connected to science: the very 
concept did not exist before the Scientific Revolution (Wootton 2015).
Powered by science and its instruments, such as compasses, canons, and cartog-
raphy, Western countries set their sights on world domination and established, 
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largely during the long nineteenth century of colonialism, their global empires. The 
scientists themselves were predominantly white males from a privileged background.
From the mid-nineteenth century onward, several disciplines professionalized 
and institutionalized into different subdisciplines. For each separate field of scien-
tific inquiry, particular methodologies were prescribed, and dedicated societies and 
journals were founded. Astronomers built telescopes and observatories to study the 
stars and began to develop theories on the origin of life; biologists probed the world 
unseen by human eyes with microscopes and developed specializations such as 
botany and zoology. Nearly every other knowledge producing discipline followed 
similar patterns and scientific inquiry developed in divergent directions.
Within this large network, most of the actors shared the positivistic ideal, mean-
ing they believed that progression in science is understood as an accumulation of 
true and empirically confirmed, factual knowledge. Science had become not only a 
new arbiter in matters of truth and falsehood, but it was also seen as a strong instru-
ment for improving the human condition. It had taken up a position which was 
previously, and rather exclusively, the realm of religious systems.
It was during the nineteenth century that the social sciences stepped foot on the 
stage. The social sciences first emerged in the shape of political economy, sociol-
ogy, and what was then called the ‘moral sciences’ (an early form of psychology). 
Early social scientists sought to transform the rising nation-states of the world into 
stable, governable economies.
The second half of the nineteenth century revealed a need for analytical insights 
into the inner-workings of capitalism, the state, and its growing bureaucracies. The 
quest for this knowledge laid the foundation for the modern-day social sciences. In 
order to quantify human behavior and to get a grip on the emerging patterns in mod-
ern societies, they employed their own discipline specific tools, such as statistics, 
which proved to be a valuable instrument for their cause.
By the early twentieth century, social scientists were already studying a multi-
tude of topics, spanning a wide-breadth of human-related matters; from perception 
and consciousness, psychopathology, and public administration, to problems of 
recruitment and selection, the mysteries of religion, and the supernatural. From 
these different areas of interest, a variety of new disciplines, subdisciplines, and 
schools of thought emerged.
For example, within psychology in the 1920s alone, there were Gestalt psycholo-
gists, behaviorists, experimental psychologists, industrial psychologists, even ‘para-
psychologists’ (who studied the spiritual dimension of life), not to mention 
psychoanalysts (who had their roots in medicine). All these subdisciplines and their 
corresponding schools of thought developed their own institutions, established their 
own journals, and formed their own methodologies.
Similar developments took place in sociology, anthropology, and economics, as 
well as in philosophy, history, and theology, all disciplines that were then still con-
sidered bastions of the social sciences. A number of subdisciplines that formed dur-
ing this time, such as what we would now call clinical psychology and 
neuropsychology, were not yet regarded as a part of the social sciences, but rather 
part of psychiatry. Educational studies were only in their infancy, and political 
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science, gender studies, and interdisciplinary studies would not emerge until much 
later, generally after World War Two (Repko et al. 2014). Which disciplines belonged 
to the social sciences and which did not has long been a subject of debate, raging 
still today. This illustrates the fact that the social sciences as a whole are still a col-
lection of rather loosely connected fields of developing knowledge.
By the second half of the twentieth century, two developments further shaped the 
field of social science. For one, the social sciences had become regarded as an inde-
pendent ‘discipline’ and was no longer considered the offspring of other disciplines 
(almost all early psychologists trained in the nineteenth century were physicians, for 
example). While the methods and corresponding ‘objects of knowledge’ the social 
sciences sought were situated between the natural sciences (explaining the world by 
means of natural laws and experimentation, resulting in objective knowledge) and 
the humanities (understanding the world with ideographic methods, resulting in 
more subjective narratives), their object, human behavior, was unique.
Secondly, a strong impetus towards independence came via a post-war surge of 
popularity in the social sciences. There had been only a handful of students inter-
ested in psychology or sociology in the years prior to 1940, but this dramatically 
changed in the 1950s, ramping up further from the 1960s on. Thousands of students 
began enrolling in social science disciplines like psychology, sociology, educational 
sciences, and political science to meet the growing demand for social scientists. 
Applied science became one of the social sciences’ most valuable additions, deliv-
ering an innumerable number of new therapists, educationalists, human recourse 
managers, test psychologists, and policy makers every year.
This rapid influx allowed the social sciences to establish itself firmly in the post- 
war framework of modern universities, which persists today. Scores of professor-
ships were created, large research institutions were established, and considerable 
sums of money began flowing into the social sciences. These processes of institu-
tionalization and professionalization went hand in hand with the formalization of 
research procedures, reflected in stricter and more formalized views on ethics, 
exemplifying an increased concern with scientific misconduct (discussed in Chaps. 
4, 5 and 6).
Approaching the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first, 
new developments set in motion a series of changes that transformed the outlines of 
the social sciences once again. Neoliberal politics caused budgets to dwindle, 
forcing social scientists to collaborate with other disciplines, cross-pollinating their 
work. Many strove to ‘valorize’ their work, emphasizing its commercial value and 
thus allowing others to influence their research agendas, intentionally or not.
These tendencies, though grossly oversimplified here, clearly reflected on the 
social sciences’ fundamental commitment to understanding the world. While some 
argued that the social sciences were acquiring a newfound importance in society, 
others doubted that the knowledge it produced was capable of withstanding tests of 
validity, and in response a ‘replication crisis’ was declared, a charge many sought to 





2.3.1  The Role of Universities
If science’s most important task is the production and reproduction of knowledge by 
use of certified methodologies within a structural framework of institutions, then 
how should universities prepare students for this feat?
Gabelnick (1990) proposes that we should view universities as learning com-
munities. Universities are institutions populated by professors, teachers, research-
ers, staffers, managers, and of course students, who are all committed to the same 
objective – the accurate production and reproduction of knowledge.
The perspective that universities are learning communities takes for granted that 
academic institutions are bureaucratic organizations seeking cost-efficiency. In 
order to do what they must do, they should have strict curricular structures, consist-
ing of well-defined teaching programs with formal learning objectives, prescribed 
assessment criteria, and quality control agencies. Such environments strive for pro-
ductivity as their goal, allowing for little deviation from the norms they put in place. 
Box 2.1: ‘What Do Social Sciences Study?’
The Study of Humans Debates about the validity of social science knowl-
edge exemplify the challenges in the scholastic study of humans. One of the 
oldest and arguably most notable disciplines in the social sciences, sociology, 
focuses on collective human activity, social relationships, and social interac-
tion. As it is situated at the interplay between social structure and individual 
agency, one of its most fundamental issues lies in the existence of social struc-
tures and how they objectively influence our lives.
Psychology, on the other hand, often seeks to understand and predict indi-
vidual human behavior in a way resembling the ‘hard’ (natural) sciences. The 
working of the mind, cognitive processes, and functionality of the brain have 
all been the subject of psychological research. Subdisciplines such as neuro-
psychology, developmental psychology, social psychology, and clinical psy-
chology are all devoted to different dimensions of individual behavior.
Taking a longer view, anthropology studies the rituals, values, and prac-
tices of human societies and cultures, forming subdisciplines in cultural, 
social, medical, and linguistic anthropology. Because cross-cultural analysis 
plays such an important role in the study of anthropology, questions regarding 
cultural relativism (to what extent are someone’s values to be understood as a 




Indeed, modern teaching programs at universities often wield knowledge as their 
instrument and regard students as passive consumers of it.
Dissatisfied with such a restricted view of the student’s role in the university, 
Etienne Wenger proposed an alternative perspective. His work has been influential 
in higher education circles since the 1990s. Instead of regarding learning as a for-
malized activity, carried out by isolated members of an institution, Wenger pro-
posed that learning is a shared and situated activity that requires communities of 
practice.
In communities of practice, people are actively engaged with each other, con-
structing knowledge together. Participants in these communities ‘share a concern, a 
set of problems, or a passion about a topic, and deepen their knowledge and exper-
tise in this area by interacting on an ongoing basis’ (Wenger et al. 2002, p. 4).
Participation, sharing, and interacting in communities of practice are essential 
elements in learning, since it is through participation that identity and practices 
develop. Participants in communities of practices ‘learn by doing’ (instead of learn-
ing by absorbing or consuming knowledge).
In this book, we too adhere to such a constructivist perspective, and we invite the 
reader to be actively involved with the normative questions raised here, developing 
their own solutions to moral dilemmas. Of course, books are interactive in only a 
limited sense, but hopefully the case studies offered in the following chapters, along 
with the corresponding exercises that accompany the chapters, enable students to 
become involved in these debates. We want them to be able to discuss their ideas 
and engage with classmates, co-constructing their own solutions to the problems 
posed here (Fig. 2.3).
Fig. 2.3 Communities of practice
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2.3.2  Knowledge Construction
If your role at university is to ‘co-construct knowledge’, then what exactly should 
you develop? What does true knowledge consist of?
Fundamentally, knowledge is simply any information about the world (i.e. 
‘Moscow is the capital of Russia’, ‘Water consists of two components of hydrogen 
and one component of oxygen’). In an academic context, however, knowledge is 
more precisely defined as (a) a body of discipline-based theories, concepts, and 
methodologies, and (b) any number of practical generalizations and principles that 
apply to fields of professional action (Eraut 1994, p. 43).
Thus, what psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists claim to know is a 
result of how they define the world and of how they operate in their fields of research. 
Accordingly, not just their view of the world, but the properties they ascribe to the 
world or in the universe may differ radically from one discipline to the next.
Acquiring knowledge implies much more than simply learning a set of theories 
and concepts. Being immersed in academic education, you’ll follow a process of 
gradual mastery.
At first, learning is about understanding the fundamentals of a field of knowl-
edge. At this stage, little ownership is involved. Research procedures are learned, 
reporting preferences are practiced, and the existing historiography is read.
Quickly thereafter, these fundamentals need to be applied to practical situations, 
and the knowledge of other disciplines becomes indispensable. An increased sensi-
tivity to the explicit and implicit norms and expectations across disciplines becomes 
a tool for collaboration. Despite a sharp learning curve, by the end of your educa-
tion, you are expected to display analytical skills, propose your own ideas, and 
develop insights in your own right. Only then have you become a trusted and pro-
ductive member of the academic community, a co-constructor of knowledge.
Benjamin Bloom’s taxonomy of cognitive knowledge-based learning attempts to 
grasp this gradual development (see Figs. 2.2 and 2.4).
2.3.3  Risk and Reflexivity
A key factor in becoming a ‘trusted and productive member of the academic com-
munity’ is reflexivity: the ability to critically reflect on the responsibilities of both 
yourself and others.
Reflexivity isn’t just some invitation to be cautious or thoughtful. We are living 
in an age of increased accountability, meaning that more than ever, there is an obli-
gation on individuals, businesses, and institutions to explain and justify the choices 
they make. For scientific researchers, this means that you can and will be held 
accountable, or even be liable, in a case of wrongdoing, intentional or not.
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The monitoring of risk is therefore a crucial aspect of reflexivity (Giddens 1991). 
Risk assessment is no longer an individual responsibility, but a collectively carried 
burden, and this reality had grown in significance over the years.
Much of this collective responsibility has been written into regulation at an inter-
national level. In Europe, for example, the General Data Protection Regulation (or 
GDPR for short; see Box 2.2), constitutes a set of binding directives that protect the 
rights of human participants in research, ensuring that researchers and research 
institutions actively assume responsibility.
At the level of local institutions, special independent controlling bodies have 
been installed to coordinate the ethical dimensions of research. Most universities 
and research institutions today require that researchers submit their proposals to 
these Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), who demand strict procedures when con-
sidering research applications. Funding agencies will often demand compliance 








Fig. 2.4 Revised 
taxonomy of Bloom’s 
knowledge-based learning. 
(In Anderson et al. 2001)
Box 2.2: ‘GDPR’
Under the European General Data Protection Regulation, individuals have 
the right to access their personal data, the right to be informed and/or forgot-
ten by those who use their data, the right to object or restrict (further) use of 
their data, and the right to be notified in case a data breach has taken place.
GDPR requires that concrete and appropriate procedural and technical 
measures be taken to protect these rights. Enacted in May 2018, it has far- 
reaching consequences for all institutions (including universities) that use 
personal data. Institutions are required to:
• Create a comprehensive privacy policy;
• Appoint data protection officers and representatives;
• Adopt specific codes of conduct;




2.4.1  Science’s Ethos
We started this chapter with the observation that science’s mission is to understand 
the world systematically and methodically, while being as unbiased as possible. 
Furthermore, every scientist has a moral duty to be skeptical and critical. We now 
return to this grounding principle and ask: Are there any general guidelines that 
scientists must follow that allows them to be both critical and methodical? Yes, 
there are.
One of the first demands scientists must meet is the need to remain autonomous. 
It has been long advocated that universities should safeguard their independence. 
They must seek objectivity and establish as much self-regulation as possible. 
Science is not to serve interested parties; either influenced by ideologically, politi-
cally, or commercially inspired motives.
Another important principal is that scientists must fulfill their tasks carefully and 
reliably. The methods and procedures of science should be transparent, its studies 
replicable, and its results accessible to all. This open character of scientific knowl-
edge is pivotal to its mission.
In his now famous 1942 article ‘A Note on Science and Democracy’, American 
sociologist Robert Merton formulated several essential principles which, if fol-
lowed, he argued would ensure science a secure and autonomous place in society. 
He wrote this at a time when Western civilization was at the threshold of being radi-
cally transformed politically, culturally, and economically, with the free exercise of 
science all but self-evident. As such, Merton (1942) proposed four ‘imperatives’ 
that make up the ‘ethos of science’ (Fig. 2.5).
 1. Communism, later dubbed communalism. Because knowledge is the product of 
collective effort, substantive findings of science are assigned to the community. 
They constitute a common heritage and therefore ‘property rights’ are held down 
to a bare minimum.
 2. Universalism. The acceptance or rejection of scientific claims should not depend 
on any personal or social attributes of the researcher. Only pre-established, 
impersonal criteria should be used to determine a truth claim.
 3. Disinterestedness. Scientists should act for the benefit of a common scientific 
enterprise, not for their own gain. Self-interest should play no part in science.
 4. Organized Skepticism. Scientists should be skeptics, suspending judgement until 
the facts are at hand. Logical and empirical criteria allow for a detached inspec-
tion of any claims, which are exposed to critical scrutiny before being accepted.
 5. Later a fifth imperative was added: Originality. Researchers must create new 
scientific knowledge, and not just reproduce established findings (Ziman 2000).
These five imperatives are known by its acronym CUDOS. These imperatives 
have found their way into various ‘codes of conduct’ (to be discussed in the next 
chapter) and existing scientific practices and procedures (see the last chapter of this 
book for a detailed discussion).
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The principle of communism, for example, is accomplished through the practice 
of academic publishing, which allows researchers to share their findings. The prin-
ciples of universalism and disinterestedness then, are grounded in the widely 
accepted practice of ‘peer review.’
The all-important practice of peer reviewing (which means that authors submit 
their work to a forum of experts before it gets published) was not yet utilized during 
Merton’s time, but gradually became standard practice in the decades after World 
War Two. From then on, it was the reviewers who decided whether or not a paper 
met accepted standards. Reviews are as a rule ‘blind’, which means the identity of 
the author remains unknown to the reviewers, ensuring fair judgement. Peer review-
ing itself is considered part of one’s ‘academic duty,’ and the imperative of orga-
nized skepticism, for reviewers don’t get paid (Box 2.3).
2.4.2  Ethos or Arena?
The question that emerges at the end of this chapter is whether these Mertonian 
guidelines (communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, organized skepticism, 
and originality; CUDOS) still meet our expectations. As we indicated in our brief 
history of the social sciences, much has changed in the past two or three decades. So 
then, what is the value of scientific knowledge, however ‘true’, if it isn’t supported 
by politicians, policymakers, or other stakeholders?
Social science in the early twenty-first century feels like a battle in an arena. And 
this arena is anything but a level playing field. It is populated not only by 
Fig. 2.5 Robert 
K. Merton, at Leiden 
University, the 
Netherlands, at the 
occasion of receiving an 





Box 2.3: ‘Climate Change or Nudging. A Dilemma’
Since the early 2000s, climate change – and the totality of challenges associ-
ated with climatic variability and change – is recognized among scientists as 
an indisputable fact, even though there may be debate among researchers 
about specific causes, implications, or future scenarios.
In an attempt to anticipate some of the most pressing issues related to cli-
mate change, scientists have proposed a wide range of ideas and solutions that 
could be implemented by policymakers. Social scientists have also contrib-
uted their fair share to these solutions. The challenge they face is in finding 
ways to alter human behavior on a massive scale. In response, the UK-based 
Behavioral Insights Team (BIT) was founded in 2010. One of the solutions 
they developed were small, low-cost ‘nudges’ that focus on making subtle 
changes to people’s environments. For example, loft insulation helps reduce 
energy waste, but few people were installing it. When provided with low-cost 
labor to clear their lofts, however, the number of loft insulation installations 
increased fivefold.
Nudges may only impart a slight change in human behavior, but they 
are cheap to implement and when used on a large scale, can still have a signifi-
cant impact. Nudges are contrasted with traditional government levers for 
behavior change, that include vast mechanisms for interfering in economic 
and ecological systems, many of which are much more resource and cost 
intensive.
Recently, Irish Prime Minster Leo Varadkar adopted the ‘BIT approach’ 
and argued that the government’s pathway to zero emissions by 2050 was to 
‘nudge people and businesses to change behavior and adapt new technologies 
through incentives, disincentives, regulations and information’ (The Irish 
Times, June 17th 2019).
We may all agree that climate change is real, and that ‘something needs to 
be done’ about it, but the question here is: what role should social scientists 
play in this discussion, and whether or not they should get involved with 
politics.
Proponents could argue that the social sciences have a moral obligation to 
invent instruments that help drive human behavior in the right direction. 
Opponents could argue that nudging does not involve consent – people are 
‘gently pushed’ in a certain direction and may not even be aware of it. They 
may contend that it’s not up to the social sciences to invent instruments that 
steer the behaviors of people, it should be up to each individual to make their 
own decisions.
Where do you stand in this debate?
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professional and highly competitive scientists, but also by networks of stakeholders, 
financers, managers, journalists, and career officers, all operating with their own 
interests in mind.
These developments, while grossly oversimplified here (we offer greater atten-
tion to some of them in later chapters), clearly threaten to undermine science’s fun-
damental commitment to an unbiased, systematic, and methodical understanding of 
the world.
True, science’s mission has remained largely the same throughout the past few 
centuries, but that doesn’t mean its mission ever was nor is self-evident today. To 
accomplish its goals, science must relate to society, adapting to its needs and wants, 
its political, and even commercial pressures. At the same time, it must seek to retain 
its integrity and autonomy. And for this, we need ethical reflection.
2.5  Conclusions
2.5.1  Summary
This chapter started out with a definition of science’s original mission: to under-
stand the world without prejudice or bias, free from preconceived ideas or dogmas. 
From this, an accompanying obligation was derived, to be skeptical towards one’s 
ideas and the ideas of others.
A brief summary of the history of science and the history of the social sciences 
outlined a picture of a field still in development. A view of universities as learning 
communities was contrasted with one of universities as communities of practice. 
Furthermore, a constructivist perspective, in which students are regarded as active 
co-constructers of knowledge, was proposed. It was argued that being immersed in 
academic education implies a process of gradual mastery and increasing ownership, 
in which reflexivity plays a crucial role.
Finally, Merton’s ‘institutional imperatives’ CUDOS were discussed: universal-
ism, communism, disinterestedness and organized skepticism, later extended with 
originality, and how they extend into scientific practices such as peer review 
procedures.
2.5.2  Discussion
We investigated the ‘parameters’ of scientific practice, and we questioned the condi-
tions that enable it. We found that universities as institutions have changed since 
their early days, though at its core the mission of the scientist has remained the 
same: to understand and explain the world, free from bias and dogmas. We further 
identified one value that we considered pivotal for science to fulfil its mission: to 
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remain autonomous, at least to some degree. One question we did not ask: how will 
science succeed in remaining autonomous? The answer can be found in the subject 
matter of this book: its ethics.
 Case Study: Max Weber and the Calling of Science
In a 1917 lecture before a group of politically left-leaning students, sociologist Max 
Weber spoke on the particularities of a career in modern science. What should stu-
dents expect to find in academia and what is expected from them, what should 
motivate them, what shouldn’t, and what responsibilities do they have? (Fig. 2.6).
In this lecture (published in 1919 as ‘Science as a Vocation’) Weber first used the 
expression ‘disenchantment of the world,’ which roughly points to the process of 
rationalization and simultaneous erosion of the sway religion and superstition held 
over humanity since the Enlightenment. It is a process, says Weber, to which sci-
ence (understood in the broad sense, as both the natural sciences, the social sci-
ences, and the humanities) acts as ‘a link and a motive force’ (Weber 1991, p. 139). 
Science is thus both a product of rationalization and a driver of it as well.
What is the task of a scientist in the ‘modern’ (early twentieth century) world? 
Weber discussed several dimensions. For one, science depends much less on 
Fig. 2.6 Photo Max 




creativity, ‘enthusiasm’ (passion), and inspired ideas than it does on hard work, and 
above all, specialization. ‘A really definitive and good accomplishment [in science] 
is today always a specialized accomplishment’ (p. 135). The difference between a 
creative outsider and a scientist is not who generates good ideas, it’s that the scien-
tist has a ‘firm and reliable work procedure’ that the creative outsider may not.
Indeed, the positive contribution of science in one’s life consisted of: (1) the 
production of knowledge, (2) by use of reliable instruments (such as the experi-
ment) and sound methodology (logic), (3) to create clarity, (4) in an attempt to serve 
the truth. Science is a ‘vocation’, Weber insisted, ‘organized in special disciplines in 
the service of self-clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift 
of grace of seers and prophets dispersing sacred values and revelations […]’ 
(p. 152).
Science does not, therefore, dabble in interpretations of ‘meanings’, neither of a 
political or religious nature. A scientist is a researcher and a teacher, not a ‘spiritual 
leader’, and although they may hold certain convictions, they should not be com-
municated in class. ‘The true teacher will be aware of imposing from the [univer-
sity] platform any political position upon the student. […]’ (p. 146).
Furthermore, Weber spoke of ‘disinterested science,’ the imperative that scien-
tists should act not in their own self-interests, but for the benefit of a common sci-
entific enterprise, and that the scientist is just a part of a larger quest for knowledge. 
A quest in which all its products (knowledge) have a short shelf life. Every scientist 
knows that their work will be outdated in 10 or 20 years. It is the only way to make 
progress. That is science’s fate, or better yet, its very meaning.
Whether science as a ‘vocation’ is worthwhile under such circumstances is a 
question that cannot be answered, because it implies a values judgement, and sci-
ence does not play those games. However, at the onset of his lecture, Weber made it 
quite clear that the career prospects of a young scholar in the early twentieth century 
were not very good. Comparing Germany with the US, Weber identified that the 
career of a German scholar depended on luck and savvy networking, not ability. In 
the US on the other hand, academic careers were subjected to bureaucratic proce-
dures that created less uncertainty, but also offered less academic freedom. In both 
cases, young academics had to work long hours, receive meager salaries, and were 
anything but certain whether they would be promoted. ‘Academic life is a mad haz-
ard’, Weber mused (p. 134).
Over a century has now passed since Weber’s lecture. The academic world, and 
indeed the world at large, has since changed. Do the conditions for aspiring scien-
tists mentioned by Weber still apply today, and are the values he professed still 
recognized? Hackett (1990) probed this question in 1990, contending that the cir-
cumstances at universities have changed dramatically, and that as a result, several 
major underlying values have changed too. Let’s briefly look into his argument.
Hackett argues that (a) universities have become increasingly dependent on 
recourses from the private sector, which has caused universities to closer resemble 
the private sector, and (b) universities have become increasingly dependent on 
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 government agencies, causing universities to behave more like bureaucracies. 
These ‘isomorphic forces’ (constraining processes that force one organization to 
resemble another) have shaped and structured university cultures in significant 
ways, creating ambivalence and value conflicts. Hackett claims that these conflicts 
may lead to social disorganization and even scientific misconduct (1990, p. 249). 
Drawing on interviews with scientists, chair holders, academic administrators, and 
other officials, Hackett points out a series of ‘value tensions’, of which we will dis-
cuss three:
 1. Academic freedom and autonomy versus accountability. In Weber’s time, aca-
demic freedom was still more or less guaranteed, but in the 1990s, academic 
scientists became ‘more accountable to and directed by their research sponsors’ 
(p.  266). This reflects in their choices of research problems and publication 
practices.
 2. Research versus education. Principles and practices that the scientist as mentor 
would prefer (to stimulate free and independent inquiry) have become inconsis-
tent with the needs of the scientist as employer (to ‘produce’ research for a 
market).
 3. Efficiency versus effectiveness. Pressure to perform within tight budgets and 
schedules undermine the scientist’s ability to deliver quality work. Measurable 
standards of performance and detailed accounting strip science of the aura of 
expertise (p. 269).
Weber predicted that universities would follow the American path, towards 
bureaucratization, and from Hackett’s observations, it seems he was right. 
‘Universities, scientists […] and graduate students are assembled in a cascade 
of dependence, which sharply contrasts with the ideal of independence in 
 science and academe’, Hackett notes (1991, p. 270). In Chap. 9, we continue 
this discussion.
 Assignment
 1. Consider the major differences between university life for a student at the begin-
ning of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. What has changed, and what has 
remained the same?
 2. What does ‘academic freedom’ mean to you? How important is it, and how much 
freedom do you have to pursue your interests?
 3. What are your motivations for pursuing an academic education? Which values 




The Cambridge History of Sciences, vol. 7 (2003, edited by Roy Porter) offers an 
excellent collection of short but insightful essays on the history of the various disci-
plines in the social sciences. For an exploration of the philosophy of the social sci-
ences, we recommend the accessible Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science 
by Brian Fay (Fay 2005) and for a more critical perspective, Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences by Alexander Rosenberg (Rosenberg 2008). For an introduction 
into theories of knowledge, we recommend Duncan Pritchard’s What Is This Thing 
Called Knowledge? (Pritchard 2006).
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After Reading This Chapter, You Will:
• Better comprehend what research ethics is about
• Understand why research ethics is an integral part of doing research in the social 
sciences
• Be able to distinguish between research ethics and professional ethics
• Develop a general knowledge of the three most important theories of ethics
Keywords Board of complaint · Code of conduct · Consequentialism · 
Deontology · Deplorable practices · Ideal practices · IRB · Integrity · 
Ombudsperson · Principled sensitivity · Professional ethics · Questionable research 
practices · Research ethics · Shared values · Ideal research behavior · Deplorable 
research behavior · Questionable research practices
3.1  Introduction
3.1.1  Worst Case Scenario
In August 1971, Stanford University psychology professor Philip Zimbardo was 
running just the first week of his grand ‘Prison Experiment’, and participants were 
already behaving according to the roles assigned to them. The twelve ‘prisoners’ 
were becoming passive, subordinate, almost inert, while the twelve ‘guards’ were 
behaving more and more like bullies.
The prisoners and guards, who were all male students at Stanford University and 
voluntary participants in the experiment, were assigned their respective roles ran-
domly at the offset. Zimbordo’s goal was to research the psychological effects of 
perceived power. In particular, he was interested in ‘deindividualization’ and ‘dehu-
manization’ (loss of personhood).
There was a major problem developing: the experiment was quickly getting out 
of hand. The ‘guards’ began to behave callously, and the ‘prisoners’ were beginning 
to actually suffer. After some deliberation, Zimbardo decided to discontinue the 
experiment.
The Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) has been the subject of heated debate to 
this day (see Haslam and Reicher 2012; Haslam et al. 2019). In a reanalysis of the 
original data, Le Textier (2018) found that Zimbardo’s narrative of the experiment 
was flawed in a number of respects. Le Texier found that the data presented by 
Zimbardo was incomplete and biased towards dramatization and did not disclose 
that the guards acted on precise instructions from Zimbardo, whose ‘experiment’ 
seemed to be designed more as a demonstration than a scientific study. Bartels and 
Griggs (2019) concluded from these criticisms that textbooks should revise and 
repurpose the coverage of the Stanford Prison Experiment. Textbook authors should 
use the SPE as a case to teach students the importance of critical thinking, and the 
value of self-correction in science.
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Indeed, the educational value of historical cases such as these lies less in their 
isolated ethical and methodological shortcomings, of which Zimbardo seemed 
acutely aware. Rather, their value resides in understanding how our moral beliefs 
have changed over time. What are our ethical presumptions, and by which norms do 
we live?
Getting an answer to these questions is the purpose of this chapter. In order to 
answer them, we need to begin at what ethics are and why they are important. To do 
this, we will explore the various approaches to ethics.
3.1.2  What Are Ethics?
Peter Singer (2001), professor of bio-ethics at Princeton University, notes that peo-
ple often like to believe that ethics are just ‘an annoying list of things you are not 
allowed to do, so you can’t have fun.’ Rather, he says, that’s not the case. Ethics are 
an inquiry into what is right and wrong, and what is valuable and important. It 
attempts to answer the question of what you ought to do.
When performing research, you are inevitably going to make decisions that will 
affect others, and you need to know which of the available options is the best course 
of action. Which one to choose is not always immediately clear. Here are a few 
examples:
• Suppose you want to know a respondent’s view on a particular subject, but 
directly asking about it would likely influence the respondent. Is it therefore 
acceptable to mislead the respondents so the information you receive is more 
valid? Or should you be honest and open about your intentions, which would 
require fully informing the participant and possibly affecting your data?
• Suppose you want to investigate certain behaviors, and to do so, your respon-
dents need to perform a task that carries a small risk about which the respondent 
is fully informed. Do you still have a responsibility for the safety and well-being 
of the respondents even if they are fully informed about the risks? If so, how far 
does that responsibility reach? Does it end with the experiment or should you 
provide care afterwards?
• Suppose you have made a discovery that could benefit some, but harm others. 
Should you publish the results or not? How should you reach your decision and 
on what criteria?
The answers to many of these questions have already been formulated, either in 
the form of general principles to be followed (‘codes of conduct’), or in the form of 
very specific rules that apply to certain situations or conditions (‘do’s and don’ts’), 
to which we turn later in this chapter.
However, the strictest of rules leave room for interpretation, and even in the most 
clear-cut cases, there may be more than one solution available.
Thus, knowing what to do requires a degree of principled sensitivity, meaning 
researchers should be sensitive to the rights of others and their well-being. Many 
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argue, furthermore, that this sensitivity does not stop at individuals; it stretches into 
communities, animals, and even the environment at large.
3.1.3  Three Cases
Before we go into detail on the ethical approaches in research, let us first examine 
three concrete examples that will allow us to appreciate the various dimensions of 
ethics in a broader sense.
First, consider the horrendous hypothermia experiments carried out by Nazi doc-
tors on prisoners during the Second World War. Prisoners were strapped naked to a 
stretcher in the Polish winter or immersed in ice-cold water while data on their 
bodily response was meticulously collected. The Nazis used this data to determine 
how much cold a human body could endure, arguing that it would come in handy on 
the Eastern Front (Berger 1992).
About a third of the prisoners did not survive the experiments. Post-war abhor-
rence for these types of experiments led to the ‘Nuremberg Code of Ethics’, on 
which our present-day ethical codes are based.
The question here is obviously not whether there is an ethical dilemma about the 
experiment’s procedures. The question is: could the data still be used? This question 
has been subject of an ongoing post-war debate (Schafer 1998). In a discussion on 
this issue, David Bogod (2004, p.  1156) contends that unethically acquired data 
should never be used. That being said, he does acknowledge that others would argue, 
‘if some general good can come of the most evil acts, then those who suffered and 
died might not have done so entirely in vain.’ However, this quickly leads to a follow-
up question: when you honor that argument, aren’t you assuming that the subjects are 
providing a posthumous consent? The very first principle of the Nuremberg Code 
outlines that ‘voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.’
Second, consider the well-known 1961 obedience studies conducted by Yale psy-
chologist Stanley Milgram. Milgram (1963) led his subjects to believe they were 
taking part in an experiment on learning. In their role as a ‘teacher’, the participants 
were to administer electric shocks to a fellow participant, the ‘learner.’ The shocks 
supposedly increased in severity over the course of the experiment, and the response 
from the learner became ever more volatile. What the subject didn’t know was that 
in reality, the learner was a stooge, an actor hired by Milgram to feign pain, never 
actually receiving the electric shocks.
Milgram rationalized ‘obedience’ as the willingness to ‘carry out another per-
son’s wishes.’ He wanted to know whether his research participants would continue 
participating in his study, and at what point would they decide that their collabora-
tion was no longer justifiable. However, when his subjects voiced doubts and pro-
posed to stop, the researcher answered with a line from a script: ‘The experiment 
requires that you continue…’ (see Perry 2013) (Figs. 3.1 and 3.2).
Milgram’s work has been widely criticized, especially on ethical grounds. The 
controversy even affected his professional career (he was denied tenure at Harvard, 
see Miller 1986). Did his subjects know what they were in for? Had they been 
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subjected to a tolerable level of pressure? Were they properly debriefed afterwards 
and was there any form of care offered if needed? The answer to most of these ques-
tions is ‘no.’ For that reason, the Milgram studies, even more so than the Stanford 
Prison Experiment, stand out as a landmark of unethical research.
Our third example questions research on the origin of sexual orientation, specifi-
cally homosexuality or ‘same-sex sexual orientation.’ Homosexuality has long 
been, and in certain societies still is, illegal. This is justified because it was (or still 
is) considered an aberration of the norm (Greenberg 1988).
Research into the ‘origin’ or ‘cause’ of homosexuality has by and large adopted 
this perspective of ‘abnormality.’ Thus, psychoanalytic theorists proposed that 
homosexuality may be caused by ‘arrested psychosexual development,’ often in the 
context of a dysfunctional family constellation. Forms of psychotherapy, it was rea-
soned, ought to be based on the idea that it could and should be possible to shift the 
sexual orientation back to ‘normal’ (Halderman 1994).
With the gay rights movement of the 1960s and 70s, the official view changed. 
Homosexuality would no longer be considered an abnormality. Interestingly, 
researchers continued to search for the cause of homosexuality, though now in 
(socio)biological terms (notably genetic, hormonal, and environmental influences). 
This suggested that at its base, homosexuality was still something ‘unnatural’ and in 
need of an explanation. The underlying ethical consideration here is voiced by 
Schüklenk et al. (1997, p. 10): ‘Why is there a dispute as to whether homosexuality 
is natural or normal? We suggest it is because many people seem to think that nature 
has a prescriptive normative force such that what is deemed natural is necessarily 
good and therefore ought to be.’
From these brief cases we extract two provisional observations:
First, ethics in science is a complex and multifaceted issue. It is not just about 
setting up proper research protocols or treating subjects respectfully (though that is 
certainly important). It is also about the types of questions asked, the (implicit) 
presuppositions made, and the ways data is analyzed and communicated. This 
includes the impact scientific research may have on society and the responsibilities 
researchers have towards individuals and communities.
Second, norms and values are not fixed objects. Although there is universal con-
sensus on certain basic values (‘do not harm’, for example), sensitivity to other 
Fig. 3.1 The Milgram 
Experiments. Subject in 





Fig. 3.2 The Milgram Experiment. Left: Advertisement in the New Haven Register June 18, 1961. 
Right: Subject in the study © Yale University Manuscripts and Archives
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values may change over time and can differ from society to society. For example, 
we have witnessed over the past several decades an increased concern with data 
manipulation and data storage, while the emergence of the internet has given rise to 
new questions regarding confidentiality. These concerns have led to stricter regula-
tions in many countries. However, value differences mean the policies deployed to 
handle these considerations differ between China, the US, and many European 
countries, and this may complicate data sharing in the future (Box 3.1).
Box 3.1: The Ethics of Eating Disorder Research
The case detailed below, borrowed from Wassenaar and Mamotte (2012), 
questions the ethics of an eating disorder study conducted by a researcher 
from South Africa. The South African researcher in question was interested in 
establishing the cross-cultural validity of the Eating Disorder Inventory (EDI), 
developed and standardized in the United States.
The EDI consists of 64 questions, clustered into eight subscales, that all 
relate to the psychological conditions of anorexia nervosa and bulimia, seek-
ing to determine the degree of their disorder. They sought to answer: does the 
EDI work in ‘developing countries’ as well?
To probe this question, the researcher aimed to have some 500 female uni-
versity students fill out the EDI.  They then sampled high and low scoring 
participants who would be subsequently interviewed by skilled clinicians on 
a blind basis (neither the participant nor the interviewer would know the par-
ticipants’ EDI score).
The aim of the study was to determine whether high and low EDI scores 
correlated with the clinician’s estimate of the severity of the participant’s eat-
ing disorder. Participants would be compensated with ‘study credits’ (points 
awarded to students for participating in research).
Though the wish to establish the cross-cultural validity of the EDI is legiti-
mate, Wassenaar and Mamotte voiced several ethical concerns with this 
research project, three of which are highlighted below:
• First, the community in which the research was conducted (university cam-
pus) had not been informed of nor approved of the study. Research must 
respect community cultures and values, and therefore the researcher should 
have formed collaborative partnerships with women’s health groups on 
campus or with class representatives before undertaking the study.
• Second, the participants had not been fully informed about the risks involved. 
Indeed, research on emotionally and socially sensitive topics like eating dis-
orders can potentially induce harm, such as anxiety, painful self- discoveries, 
stress, indignation, and secondary traumatization. The ethical review board, 
whose task it is to oversee these potential dangers and who had approved of 
the research, underestimated the potential for emotional distress.
• Third, there is the issue of dependency. Students are in an unequal power 




3.2  Conceptualizing Research Ethics
3.2.1  Responsible Research Conduct
From our previous discussions, we have learned that some researchers ‘play by the 
book’; they follow procedures and aim to make the right decisions based upon con-
ventional wisdom. Others, however, break from these conventions and make the 
wrong decisions; and they risk being accused of fraud. Following Steneck (2006), 
we will call the research practices of the former ‘ideal,’ and those of the latter 
‘deplorable.’
Ideal research behavior takes into account existing norms, institutional stan-
dards, and international legislation. Deplorable research behavior violates these 
norms deliberately. These practices come in the form of Plagiarism, Falsification, 
and Fabrication, or PFF (see Chaps. 4, 5 and 6 in this book).
It is assumed that deplorable research behavior is rarer than ideal behaviors, but 
there are more forms of research behavior than just ideal and deplorable. In between 
these extremes there exists a rather large ‘grey area,’ or behaviors that are neither 
ideal nor deplorable, but rather ‘questionable.’ Questionable Research Practices 
(QRPs) violate the established norms, but not enough to qualify as ‘fraud.’
In later chapters we explore questionable practices in greater detail. For now, we 
observe that these practices confront us with a challenge: we need to answer the 
question where to draw the line. What do we find acceptable, what do we reject, 
and why?
3.2.2  Research Ethics and Integrity
How do we distinguish between ideal and deplorable research practices? To answer 
this, we need to acknowledge another distinction, namely between research ethics 
and integrity.
participate can lead to disapproval, or that they are not free to withdraw their 
collaboration. Wassenaar and Mamotte suggest that a structured assessment 
instrument be used to evaluate the participant’s ability to consent to research 
and understand the voluntary nature of their decision to participate.
In conclusion, Wassenaar and Mamotte determined that there is a ‘need for 
special ethics scrutiny of mental health related research proposals involving 
students as research participants.’
Do you agree with this conclusion? Or do you believe that students do not 
differ from any other research population, and thus need no special ‘ethics 




First consider integrity, which we understand to be the quality of having strong 
moral principles, like honesty or compassion. Macrina (2005, p. 1) notes how this 
term raises an ‘image of wholeness and soundness, even perfection.’ Integrity is 
often used as an adjective, mainly to describe one’s behavior as being integrous. 
Accordingly, research integrity can be defined as ‘the quality of possessing and 
steadfastly adhering to high moral principles and professional standards, as outlined 
by professional organizations, research institutions and […] the government and 
public’ (quoted in Steneck 2006, p. 55). In research, questions of integrity often 
relate to methodological and procedural issues.
Next consider ethics. Compared to integrity, ethics has to do with moral princi-
ples and questions of fairness and even justice. In research ethics, we are concerned 
with moral problems related to the practice of research involving living participants 
(animals as well as humans, individuals as well as groups, and even entire societ-
ies). The focus here is more on protecting participants, ensuring their interests and 
rights, and on assessing risks and protecting confidentiality, among other issues.
Though both concepts emphasize different aspects of normative behaviors, what 
they have in common is:
• some concept of (contested) normative rules;
• some notion of communality;
• some sense of (individual and collective) moral responsibility;
• and some connection to behavior.
In this book, we investigate the dimensions of responsible research conduct; both 
the procedures and the principles, the abstract norms, and the concrete behaviors 
(Fig. 3.3).
Fig. 3.3 Some idea of moral responsibility
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3.2.3  Research Ethics and Professional Ethics
A final distinction that needs a brief exposition is that between research ethics and 
professional ethics.
Research ethics has to do with norms, values, and practices concerning the 
 collection, analysis, and dissemination of scientific findings about the world. 
Professional ethics has to do with norms, values, and behaviors concerning the 
work of a practitioner (i.e. a therapist, counselor, educator, policy maker, etc.) who 
intervenes in the world.
As a researcher, you are concerned with asking relevant questions, using  validated 
methods, obtaining reliable data, and drawing logical conclusions. As a practitioner, 
you are concerned with making correct diagnoses, finding effective treatments, and 
measuring the effectiveness of intervention (among others).
Both roles involve different sets of (normative, or standard) rules and 
principles that outline desirable and undesirable behaviors. But this sharp division 
of labor does not always represent reality. Here are two examples where a 
strict interpretation of a researcher or practitioner’s responsibility becomes 
problematic.
First, consider that researchers should be, by default, committed to the principle 
of anonymity, which means that data cannot be traced back to any individual. Then 
what should be done with unexpected findings that could be of great importance to 
the participant? Say, for example, that a researcher uses fMRI scans to investigate 
certain brain activities and by accident finds that one of the participants may have 
developed a tumor. Should the researcher break from the normative rules of research 
ethics like anonymity and assume some form of professional ethics in order to refer 
the participant to a specialist? Doing so would lead them to intervene in the world, 
as if they were a practitioner. Is this acceptable? Similar questions can be raised 
when there is suspicion of child abuse or marital violence (these questions on con-
fidentiality are addressed in Chap. 7).
Second, consider the responsibilities of a researcher who collaborates with a 
third party (for example a governmental body, a professional organization, or a spe-
cial interest group). While on one hand the researcher needs to maintain scientific 
objectivity, they may also need to take into account some of the concerns specific to 
that field or those of a specific organization, which can lead to conflicts of interest 
(this will be addressed in Chap. 8).
While this book will focus on research ethics time and again, we will 
find that cases overlap with aspects of professional ethics, and that in our deli-




3.3  Codes of Conduct
3.3.1  Guiding Principles
Ethics (in a prescriptive sense) is reflection on what actions or behavior might be 
justified. This reflection can and often does result in normative rules or principles. 
Nevertheless, there is not one specific set of well-defined rules that specifies exactly 
which behavior qualifies as ethical.
First, a list of rules covering all possible ethical decisions across every possible 
situation would be endless.
Second, even if we had such a list, real life situations are complex and ambigu-
ous, and can rarely be governed under just one principle or one rule.
Fortunately, there are guiding principles that can help us navigate our way 
through normative issues. These guiding principles are called ‘codes of conduct.’
Today, all universities require that its members (staff as well as students) adhere 
to such a code of conduct, often modelled after similar codes first introduced in the 
medical professions.
Codes of conduct can differ from discipline to discipline and even from culture 
to culture, though all share a number of notably important principles (see Box 3.2 
for a list of shared values often found in academic codes of conduct).
Box 3.2: Shared Values in Scientific Research
Accountability: Be reliable and responsible with your research, from idea to 
publication.
Animal Care: Show proper respect and care for animals when using them in 
research. Do not conduct unnecessary or poorly designed animal 
experiments.
Carefulness: Try to avoid careless errors and negligence. Keep good records 
of your research activities, research design, and correspondence with agen-
cies or journals.
Competence: Maintain and improve your own professional competence and 
expertise through lifelong education and learning. Take steps to promote 
competence in science as a whole.
Confidentiality: Do not disclose the personal information of research sub-
jects, nor their identities. Protect sensitive information.
Honesty: Convey information truthfully. Honor commitments. Do not fabri-
cate, falsify, or misrepresent data. Do not deceive colleagues, research 
sponsors, or the public.
Human Subjects Protection: When conducting research on human subjects, 
minimize harm and risks, and maximize benefits. Respect human dignity, 
(continued)
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privacy, and autonomy. Take special precautions with vulnerable popula-
tions. Strive to distribute the benefits and burdens of research fairly.
Legality: Know and obey relevant laws, institutional codes of conduct, and 
governmental policies.
Non-Discrimination: Avoid discrimination of anyone on the basis of sex, 
race, ethnicity, or other factors not related to scientific competence and 
integrity.
Objectivity: Strive to be impartial and avoid bias and self-deception. Disclose 
personal or financial interests that may affect your research practice.
Openness: Share your data, results, ideas, tools, and resources. Be open to 
criticism and new ideas.
Respect for Intellectual Property: Honor patents, copyrights, and other 
forms of intellectual property. Do not use unpublished data, methods, or 
results without permission. Give proper acknowledgement when 
credit is due.
Responsible Publication: Publish in order to advance research and scholar-
ship, not only to advance your own career. Avoid wasteful and duplicative 
publication.
Social Responsibility: Strive to promote social good and prevent or mitigate 
social harms through research, public education, and advocacy.
[Adapted from Shamoo A. and Resnik, D. (2015). Responsible Conduct of 
Research, 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.]
Box 3.2 (continued)
In Europe, universities have largely committed to the European Code of Conduct 
for Research Integrity (3rd revised edition, published in 2017). In just a few pages, 
the European Code of Conduct outlines the four most basic principles researchers 
should adhere to: reliability, honesty, respect, and accountability. It also outlines a 
general sense of ‘good research practices’ regarding (among other things) training, 
supervision, and mentoring of researchers, as well as how to establish sound 
research procedures.
Many European countries have created their own codes of conduct on top of the 
this code, defining in somewhat greater detail what is required of their researchers. 
For example, every university in the Netherlands has accepted the Netherlands 
Code of Conduct for Scientific Integrity (last updated in 2018), a 30 page document 
that details its founding principles, specifies the norms of ‘good scientific research 
practices,’ and stipulates the universities’ obligations with respect to issues such as 
training, supervision, data management, and procedures regarding scientific mis-
conduct. Most universities, though not all, have created a special student version of 
their code of conduct designed to outline proper behavior in class and on campus.
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Promoting ethical policies and codes of conduct has become a major task of 
specialized bodies within institutes (see Iverson et al. 2003). In compliance with 
international regulations, most universities have established special Institutional 
Review Boards (IRBs) to safeguard ‘research ethics,’ about which we write in 
greater detail in Chap. 10. Furthermore, they have assigned ombudspersons (inter-
mediaries between an institution and the government) and boards of complaints 
designed to safeguard ‘research integrity.’
Often these specialized bodies have statutory and disciplinary powers, meaning 
they can and will take action in case ethical integrity has been violated (rights of 
participants, or research subjects). Failing to comply with a code of conduct may 
indeed carry disciplinary action against the offender, differing from an official slap 
on the wrist or being put on probation, to even discharge from one’s position (staff 
member) or removal from the institute (student). Note how ethical consideration 
thus carry legal consequences. Although this aspect of research ethics is not elabo-
rated upon further in this book, it is an important reality to carry with you. In the last 
chapter of this book though, we will return to the task of IRBs.
3.3.2  Key Imperatives
Codes of conduct generally outline the subjects or issues that we should pay 
 attention to. They do not give us precise guidelines, as the task of ethics is not to 
specify exactly which behaviors are desirable and which are not. However, there are 
a few exceptions – certain behaviors that the scientific community agrees are desir-
able (and where the opposite behavior is undesirable). These are called the impera-
tives of science. An imperative is a rule or principle considered to be crucial or 
decisive. It tells you where to draw the line. In the social sciences (and indeed in 
science more generally), the following imperatives have been universally accepted 
as fundamental to the practice of research and can be found referenced in any text-
book on ethics:
• Avoid harm and do good. Researchers have an obligation to improve, promote, 
and protect the health of people and their communities. They must furthermore 
seek to avoid any harm done to human participants, or to animals, and must seek 
to minimize the risk thereof.
• Respect for persons. Researchers must protect the autonomy of research partici-
pants. This imperative implies recognition of persons as autonomous, unique, 
and free subjects. It also means that researchers acknowledge that each person 
has the right and capacity to make their own decisions, including the right of 
non-participation.
• Protect confidentiality. Participants must be sure that their data is processed 
anonymously (unless there is a reason not to, and the participant is notified 
thereof). No participant should suffer consequences from having participated in 
any research because certain personal information is made public.
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• Avoid deception. Participants may not be deceived, misinformed, or misled by 
researchers (unless there is good reason to, and the deception is debriefed after-
wards). In line with the imperative of autonomy, human research participants 
should be considered capable of deciding whether they consent and to what it is 
they are consenting (Box 3.3).
3.4  Fundamental Dilemmas and Ethical Theories
3.4.1  The Need for Ethical Reflection
Thus far, we have discussed normative rules and moral principles, some shared 
values and ethical norms, and various imperatives that are intended to guide scien-
tific research. But how should we understand the role of these norms, rules, and 
principles? Are they set in stone? Where do they derive from? What if they clash or 
fail to give adequate guidance?
Box 3.3: Bothersome Research: A Dilemma
You are conducting clinical research for which you need a lot of patients. 
Some of the patients are very ill and it becomes clear they would prefer to not 
participate in the research at all. You respect this and conduct the research 
with healthier participants. After all, you deduce, there is a certain amount of 
stress involved without evidence of benefits. A couple of days later, you 
receive an email from your professor in which he makes it clear that you are 
behind schedule and should collect the data of at least ten new patients before 
the end of the week. This would mean that you must include the very ill 
patients, despite their wish to not be included. Things are not going well with 
your professor because you failed to come up with any significant results in 
your last research project. What do you do?
 (a) Go back and thoroughly explain the importance of the research to the 
patients, asking again if they would participate.
 (b) Explain the patients’ situation to the professor and emphasize that they do 
have the right to refuse to participate.
 (c) Ask the professor to extend the period of data collection so you have time 
to search for other patients. You know he will not be pleased with the 
request.
 (d) Discuss the issue with the medical personnel, and request that they ask 
the patients again on your behalf.
[Case adapted with permission from Dilemma Game: Professionalism and 
Integrity, Erasmus University Rotterdam].
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For a start, it is important to recognize that even in a discipline that is governed 
by widely accepted norms and principles regarding research, researchers may find 
themselves confronted with ethical dilemmas. What, for instance, about the impera-
tive to avoid harm and do good? These are in fact two imperatives that in certain 
cases may prove mutually exclusive. Sometimes, it seems, some (potential) harm 
must be done to a research subject in order to do good overall.
For example, an intensive care unit at an academic hospital may drastically 
improve the quality of its care and the survival rate of its patients by gathering 
extensive data from critically ill patients. It is not, however, able to ask permission 
from these patients and therefore gathering and using the data violates the usual 
norms and guidelines regulating consent. Or what about a government-run statisti-
cal service, that may, by gathering traffic data, be able to help improve the efficiency 
and safety of the transport infrastructure. Here, too, the people whose data is gath-
ered could not possibly be asked for consent, which the statistical service’s code of 
conduct requires. Does the (potential) good achieved in these cases outweigh the 
harm done by gathering and using people’s data without consent?
Even more complex questions may arise. What, for instance, should we consider 
harm in the first place? Being manipulated to make a different choice than one 
would have otherwise made goes against autonomy, which many consider an impor-
tant value. But what if this alternative option is objectively better for the research 
subject concerned, for instance because it is healthier or more cost-effective? Does 
the manipulation still count as harm? Or is it actually an example of doing good?
As these brief examples show, even when clear norms and principles are avail-
able for a research field, ethical questions still arise. Moreover, beyond ethical 
dilemmas stemming from incompatible or insufficiently clear guidelines, ethical 
reflection on norms and principles is important because we cannot blindly assume 
that all existing guidelines will always remain, or indeed are currently, ethically 
justified. Standards from the past have been revised in the light of new insights or 
developments and there is no reason to think that our current standards will suffice 
for the decades to come.
For all of these reasons, it will be important for any researcher to be able to con-
nect critically to the norms and principles of their own discipline. But where can 
someone looking for ethical guidance beyond established norms turn? This question 
pushes us deeper into the domain of ethics in the sense of reflection on what actions 
might be justified. Obviously, the scope of this chapter does not allow for an in-
depth discussion on ethical theories. However, a first sense of some of the approaches 
that inform research codes of conduct, norms, and principles might be useful.
3.4.2  Deontology Versus Consequentialism
Many principles in research codes of conduct follow (in terms of ethical theory) a 
deontological approach. In order to understand what this approach entails, it is help-
ful to contrast it with its main rival: consequentialism. According to 
3.4  Fundamental Dilemmas and Ethical Theories
44
consequentialists, we must judge rules or particular actions by the specific conse-
quences of these rules or actions. Many consequentialists in addition hold that the 
way in which we ought to judge consequences is by the question of how much good 
(or well-being) the action or rule would produce for all involved parties combined. 
In other words: the best (or even the only justifiable) action or rule would be the one 
that results in the most good overall. A consequentialist might therefore, to give an 
extreme example, judge that the right thing to do is to sacrifice one person in order 
to save or help many (assuming that this sacrifice would indeed result in the most 
good overall).
In contrast, one of the core convictions of deontologists is that there are certain 
things we must always or may never do, regardless of whether deviating from these 
norms might have the best result in a particular situation. This conviction is some-
thing that is quite easily recognizable in many of the norms, rules, and imperatives 
discussed above. Informed consent must always be obtained, regardless of whether 
your results might be better if you didn’t. Research subjects must always be 
debriefed, even if this makes it harder to do a second run of the same experiment. 
You may never break confidentiality, even if disclosing the personal data of your 
research participants to a third party would enable you to generate extremely inter-
esting results.
The use of ‘always’ and ‘never’ conveys a close alignment with the deontologi-
cal approach. You might think, however, that the fact that research codes of conduct 
are (superficially) deontological in character ultimately is (or should be) the result 
of a consequentialist kind of reasoning: if every individual researcher were to set 
their own rules based on their own judgement, this would lead to a mess, public 
distrust in science, or other unfavorable results. The conviction that a discipline 
ought to abide by strict norms and imperatives for its research conduct can therefore 
be motivated by either deontological or consequentialist approaches.
Furthermore, you might think that strict adherence to a set of imperatives is nei-
ther helpful nor desirable. You may, for instance, wonder whether it may sometimes 
be right to forgo informed consent if the expected consequences of doing so prom-
ise to be very good and the harm seems relatively small (such as in the example of 
the intensive care unit above). This is the sort of reflection that can be helped by a 
better grounding in ethical theory.
Both consequentialism and deontology have a wide following amongst ethicists. 
Important to remember for the purposes of this chapter is that there is not only sig-
nificant discussion on whether our ethical decisions should follow deontological or 
consequentialist principles, but also on which actions these sets of principles would 
call for. Should deceiving a research participant in all forms and circumstances be 
prohibited, according to deontology? It’s an open question. Should a consequential-
ist accept medical interventions on a test subject against their will if this is very 
likely to improve the life expectancy of many others? It’s debatable. These theories 
are helpful instruments in considering such questions, but they do not settle the 
questions definitively in any simple way.
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3.4.3  Virtue Ethics
Finally, it is worth looking briefly at a third approach, known as virtue ethics. Virtue 
ethicists offer a different perspective on research ethics, for they might say that 
instead of relying too much on codes of conduct and lists of rules, it is important for 
researchers to cultivate relevant virtues such as honesty, reliability, humility, and 
conscientiousness. There are different reasons for this, but a central one is that, as 
we have seen, norms and imperatives can clash and often do not determine exactly 
what is required in any given situation. For this reason, virtue ethics places a strong 
emphasis on judgement and so-called ‘practical wisdom,’ which allows one to 
decide exactly what action the set of virtues calls for in a specific context. So, unlike 
a researcher merely abiding by lists of rules who is stumped whenever that list does 
not suggest a clear and definitive course of action, a virtuous and practically wise 
researcher would be able to judge what their virtues require of them in specific situ-
ations. The downside of this approach is that cultivating such virtues and the practi-
cal wisdom to apply them is not an easy thing to do  – it is a long and difficult 
process that involves a lot of practice. Virtue ethicists correspondingly would attach 
great importance to education in these virtues and good examples being set by other 
members of the profession.
3.4.4  Ready-made Solutions?
From our discussion, it has become clear that ethical questions may arise in any 
research context and that codes of conduct, lists of values, or imperatives do not 
provide any ready-made answers. While ethical theories can help to reflect on the 
arguments and considerations underlying possible courses of action, they do not 
solve the ethical questions all by themselves. Codes, rules, and procedures provide 
us with indications, and in some cases strong indications of what to do. However, at 
the end of the day, there rests a moral responsibility on the shoulders of the researcher 
to justify their actions (which choices they made and on which grounds) and explain 
them to others (other researchers, participants, the community). This task becomes 
increasingly more important when society demands accountability.
3.5  Conclusions
3.5.1  Summary
In this chapter, we have familiarized ourselves with research ethics in a general 
sense. We have come to understand it as the application of normative rules or prin-
ciples, such that you know how to behave in a responsible way. We distinguished 
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between ‘ideal’ and ‘deplorable’ practices in research and differentiated between 
research ethics proper (which applies to norms, specifically with regard to working 
with living participants) and research integrity (which is defined as maintaining 
high moral principles and professional standards).
We have learned, furthermore, that research ethics require sensitivity and respon-
siveness on the part of the researcher, who must be wary that the ethical dimensions 
of their work can be highly contested.
We have also established that ethics implies an obligation on the part of the aca-
demic community to provide the guiding principles and institutional imperatives 
that allow research to take place at all. These guiding principles translate into spe-
cific codes of conduct that aim to formalize desirable behavior and prevent undesir-
able behavior.
Finally, we discussed the unavoidability of reflecting on ethical questions sur-
rounding research conduct. We established that neither codes of conduct, disciplin-
ary norms, or broadly shared imperatives, nor fundamental ethical theories provide 
ready-made answers. Both leave us with the responsibility to develop our own 
stance. In short, and returning to where we started, there is a profound message in 
the observation that ethics pose a significant challenge, for which we must prepare 
ourselves.
3.5.2  Discussion
Two issues have remained unresolved in this chapter. One is the ratio between indi-
vidual responsibility and institutional responsibility. Where does your personal 
responsibility end, and where does that of your institution begin? The other is prac-
tical. How do you develop this sense of responsibility? We hope to help you answer 
these two questions in the remaining chapters of this book, when we discuss the 
most important ethical considerations of research practices step by step.
 Case Study: The Ethics in Suicide Prevention Research
In 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) called for a worldwide escalation 
of suicide prevention efforts, with further systematic research into the effectiveness 
of suicide prevention therapies deemed necessary. However, research into such ther-
apies is often hampered by the fact that individuals perceived to be at risk of suicide 
are, as a rule, excluded from participation in research on the grounds that death or 
self-injury may occur during trials.
Perhaps the most pressing dilemma in the study of suicide prevention is how to 
ensure that ‘good quality, ethically sound research’ is fostered in a way such that 
‘we can better understand, appropriately respond to, and reduce the incidence of 
suicide’ (Fischer et al. 2002, p. 9).
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There are a number of questions that should be taken into consideration: (a) as 
researchers have an obligation to ‘do good and prevent harm,’ they must thoroughly 
assess any risks for the participants involved, and therefore also consider liability 
and responsibility (both of the researcher and the institution); (b) furthermore, with 
regard to respecting participants’ autonomy, great care must be taken that consent 
and confidentiality are guaranteed, and that a participant’s beliefs (religious, philo-
sophical, and otherwise) are respected; and (c) researchers have to carefully distin-
guish the role of researchers from that of care giver, and ensure that participants do 
not confuse the two (Fig. 3.4).
It is the task of ethics committees, institutional review board (IRBs), and other 
legislative bodies to examine research applications, and to determine whether or not 
an application meets their minimum requirements. In approving or denying such 
research, these bodies will rely on a series of procedures that check for a number of 
‘core principles’ outlined elsewhere in this chapter.
These procedures provide general guidance in making assessments. In practice 
though, they cannot prevent that the same situation is assessed differently by differ-
ent members of these bodies. There is, after all, not a single generally accepted 
moral truth to refer to (Hom et al. 2017).
How do different IRBs regard different risks, possible harm, and other ethical 
issues in these research proposals? Lakeman and FitzGerald (2009) surveyed 125 
members sitting on human research ethics committees across five Western coun-
tries, and queried them about their experiences in assessing suicide prevention 
research protocols. From this survey we draw several ‘areas of contention’ which 
we grouped into three categories:
Fig. 3.4 Respecting others and offering help
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Vulnerability A major concern in suicide prevention research is that respondents 
might be susceptible to becoming more suicidal as a result of bringing attention to 
their suicidal thoughts and feelings. It may be harmful to discuss distressing mate-
rial, or inadvertently confirm the insolubility of their problems. Therefore, some 
feel the need to protect vulnerable participants from themselves, especially because 
people with severe depression may be perceived as not competent enough to partici-
pate. In their distress, it is sometimes believed, they may not comprehend what is 
asked of them or do not know they can refuse cooperation. Both are essential condi-
tions of research with human participants. Others, however, argue that assuming 
disability on these grounds is a violation of their autonomy; it means denying them 
the right to self-determination.
When confronted with this dilemma, several ethical committee members pointed 
out that ethics committees have a tendency to be too conservative in this respect. 
They expressed the opinion that it is unlikely that a researcher would make someone 
suicidal by merely allowing them to talk. One committee member stated, ‘In my 
experience, my fellow members of the committee can be too cautious and protective 
of these subjects, who may often be very keen and willing to talk to a researcher.’ 
However, another ethicist with many years of experience disagreed, stating: ‘these 
people need treatment first and foremost, not study’ (Lakeman and FitzGerald 
2009, p. 15).
Responsibility Researchers who collect data on a vulnerable population have to 
make an assessment whether the potential research benefits (furthering knowledge, 
possible self-knowledge of the participant) outweigh the cost of intrusion on the 
participant. Should the answer be ‘yes,’ then a second concern should be raised. If 
during the course of research, problems are uncovered that cannot adequately be 
dealt with by mainstream services, then the researcher may develop a ‘duty of care’ 
to the participant, to provide or facilitate access to help’ (p.16). Does the researcher 
have a dual role here? Do they have to provide care if necessary, or at least be ade-
quately trained to work with clinically depressed people?
How do ethics committee members see this question? One member observed that 
conducting research ‘increases the onus on the researcher to be able to source/pro-
vide an appropriate suicide risk assessment, safety plan, and treatment as necessary’ 
(p. 15). Others suggested that ‘not having the resources to provide help to people is 
a serious ethical problem particularly in terms of raising people’s expectations that 
help will be provided’ (p. 16). This calls forth yet another question. Are there any 
hazards involved for the researcher themselves? If the researcher is not adequately 
trained or does not receive adequate support, is there a risk of harm in the form of 
distress, guilt, or even liability?
Confidentiality Research with human participants takes place on the condition of 
anonymity, which means that the privacy of the respondent must be respected and 
that their identity remains undisclosed. This can pose a problem when a participant 
3 Perspectives
49
expresses suicidal thoughts, but the researcher has assured full confidentiality. 
Should the researcher notify a professional regardless? Should family members be 
alerted? How do ethics committee members look at these questions?
Respecting privacy on the one hand, while also offering help or reporting 
suicidal ideation poses particular dilemmas, according to Lakeman and Fitzgerald 
(2009, p.  16). Should family members be alerted in case of impending suicidal 
behaviors, or should the principle of privacy prevail? One of the respondents 
stated that family members are not informed by health care professionals. 
Exemplifying the varying degrees of this debate, another member stated that 
‘Whatever moral beliefs the researcher has about suicide should be suspended and 
it must be respected that the suicidal person has the right to take their own life if 
they so wish’ (pp.17–18).
 Assignment
 1. Where do you stand on the issues of vulnerability, responsibility, and confidenti-
ality? What are your ethical considerations?
 2. Among the recommendations given for ethical research with people who are 
suicidal, Lakeman and FitzGerald (2009, p. 18) propose that researchers ‘pro-
vide full information to participants about the consequences of their participa-
tion and the boundaries of confidentiality.’ As a researcher, what would you 
consider an acceptable ‘boundary of confidentiality’?
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4.1  Introduction
4.1.1  The Unoriginal Sin
René Diekstra was a psychologist and tenured professor at Leiden University in the 
Netherlands, and a celebrated author of many popular science books. In 1996, a 
weekly magazine unearthed details of plagiarism in one of his books. This revela-
tion prompted an official investigation, and as a result, he had to step down from his 
position (see case study for further discussion). A decade later, two German minis-
ters (Annette Schavan and Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg), both of whom held doctor-
ate degree, were accused of plagiarism within a few years of one another. After an 
investigation into the matter, both were stripped of their academic title and had to 
hand in their notice (The Guardian, 2. 9. 2013).
High-profile cases of plagiarism with dramatic consequences such as these are 
by no means exceptions, nor is plagiarism a recent phenomenon. Some of the earli-
est reported cases of plagiarism go all the way back to the beginning of the 
Enlightenment. That is, back to the birth of modern science itself, and involved a 
few recognizable individuals, namely Newton, Leibnitz, and Erasmus (see 
Wootton 2015).
Though not exceptional, do these cases point to an underlying structural prob-
lem? While its prevalence is difficult to estimate, plagiarism has been found among 
tenured professors, but especially among students (Walker 2010), and some believe 
it’s a rapidly growing problem. Neil Selwyn (2008, p. 468) found that nearly three 
in five students admit to copying a few unattributed sentences into an essay or 
4 Plagiarism
57
assignment. Even further, one in three concede to copy-pasting a few paragraphs 
and just over one in ten to ‘borrowing’ upwards of a few pages.
Of course, there are vast differences between students, between disciplines, and 
between cultures (more about that later). Regardless of these differences, plagiarism 
in academia is an issue that cannot be chalked up to ‘cultural differences’ and 
deserves careful scrutiny. In this chapter, we explore the problem in more detail. 
What exactly is plagiarism, and how do we distinguish it from legitimate uses of 
reference literature? How does it affect our work, and which consequences does it 
have? Finally, we ask what factors contribute to its continued occurrence? (Fig. 4.1).
4.2  Plagiarius’ Crime
4.2.1  A Working Definition
‘Plagiarism’ derives from the Latin noun ‘plagarius,’ meaning kidnapper. Plagiarism 
is understood as literary theft, namely the act of appropriating the work (or ideas) of 
others and passing it off as your own. As such, it stands apart from the appropriate 
uses of other people’s work, which includes the discussion or critique of certain 
viewpoints, summarizing and paraphrasing of particular ideas, and the use of quo-
tations. These all require the original source or author to be clearly identified. When 
plagiarism takes place, this is not the case (see Box 4.1).
Fig. 4.1 Plagerius’ Dilemma
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4.2.2  Why Is Plagiarism a Problem?
Before we go into any further detail, let us first ask why it matters if you ‘borrow’ 
(appropriate) a few well-worded sentences from a source rather than crafting your 
own. Apart from issues of legality (making money off someone else’s work), there 
are two moral problems attached to plagiarism: (1) Taking credit for work you have 
not done is deceitful; (2) science’s reputation is built upon trust and accountability. 
Plagiarism violates the first principle and undermines the second.
There is another reason why it matters. Plagiarism may be both the smallest and 
the most unprofessional form of scientific misconduct, but in the eyes of the public, 
it is often met with more indignation than greater forms of fraud, such as data falsi-
fying (about which we write in the next chapter). Possibly this is because it is such 
a noticeable form of misconduct that stands as a sharp contradiction to the high 
aspirations of science.
Box 4.1: Spot the Plagiarizer!
In The Cultural Nature of Human Development, Barbara Rogoff (2003, 
p. 183) writes: ‘Worldwide, child rearing is more often done by women and
girls than by men and boys (Weisner 1997; Whiting and Edwards 1988).’ 
Here are several examples of students referencing the passage above:
Student 1: According to Rogoff (2003, p. 183), childrearing is done mostly by women 
and girls.
Student 2: All over the globe, childrearing is often done by women and girls and not by 
men and boys (Weisner 1997; Whiting and Edwards 1988).
Student 3: According to Rogoff (2003, p. 183), ‘childrearing is more often done by 
women and girls,’ but her evidence is slim.
Student 4: Many believe that childrearing is a matter for women.
Student 1 Paraphrase: This statement contains a clear reference to the origi-
nal source (correctly identified) but it is not a direct quote, hence no quota-
tion marks are needed.
Student 2 Patch-writing: The wording does not exactly follow the original, 
but the structure of the sentence is almost identical to it, and the references 
to Rogoff’s sources suggest the statement is based on this literature, rather 
than on Rogoff. Without reference to the original source (Rogoff), this 
sample borders on plagiarism.
Student 3 First quotes then critiques: Quotation marks are in order here as 
well as a clear reference to the original source.
Student 4 Gives a general opinion: This opinion needs no references; it could 
be said by anybody.
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4.2.3  What Does Appropriation Entail?
By definition, whenever an author inserts a certain amount of text they didn’t write 
themselves, and they don’t adequately acknowledge the original source, that author 
has committed plagiarism.
This may seem clear enough, but several questions remain unanswered. When is 
a source acknowledged adequately? Is it sufficient to simply add a reference to the 
original text in the bibliography or is there more to it than that? Does copying just 
one sentence count as plagiarism? What about just half a sentence? In other words, 
is there a certain threshold after which copy-pasting counts as plagiarism? And what 
about translations? Suppose the original text is written in one language and you use 
your own translation – is that plagiarism too? And what about situations where you 
don’t copy the original source exactly, but your work closely resembles the source 
in terms of structure, following the line of argumentation step by step – is that con-
sidered plagiarism as well?
In general, the answer to all these questions is: Yes – that counts as plagiarism. 
However, we will return to these issues in greater detail later in this chapter. For 
now, we suggest that you should view every text you write as a complex, layered 
structure, consisting of a mixture of voices: your own voice (your arguments and 
interpretations) and those of the people you’ve referenced (their arguments and 
interpretations). The whole point being, any reader of your text must know whom 
they are hearing from at all times. Every time the voice of someone else is bor-
rowed, used, commented on, or invoked in your work, it is imperative that it be 
identified properly.
In any given discipline, there are specific methods for how to credit your sources. 
The social sciences often use the American Psychological Association (APA) cita-
tion format, whereas the humanities tend to use the Modern Language Association 
(MLA) format. There is no space here to discuss these methods in any detail, but 
we encourage you to further familiarize yourself with them (for example, see the 
Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association 2010, or the 
American Sociological Association Style Guide 2014).
4.2.4  The Question of Authorship
Failing to acknowledge referenced material is serious misconduct that can create 
even legal consequences when copyrights are infringed upon. This is not to imply 
that plagiarism can only occur with texts that are protected by a copyright, it can 
occur in any situation. The unacknowledged use of texts that are not under copy-
right, or the use of documents that have not even been published can similarly pose 
problems (see Saunders 2010).
Here is an example. Suppose you talk to a friend about the content of a paper you 
have written but not yet published, and that friend in turn uses some of your ideas in her 
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work. Perhaps they even get their paper published before you. Would you consider that 
fair use? Or imagine a situation where a researcher works with a paid assistant who 
produces a text for them (say a short note on a particular issue). If the researcher includes 
these texts (in whole or in part) in their work, must they attribute each and every sen-
tence to the assistant? Should the assistant even be recognized as a co-author of the 
work? What about a situation when multiple students work on a document collectively 
and then proceed to use portions of it in their individual papers? When they upload their 
work into the digital course environment, they may find that the plagiarism detection 
software marks their papers as being plagiarisms of one another!
Part of this problem can be resolved by referring to official (institutional) guide-
lines. But part of the problem surrounds group work itself, and in some of these 
cases plagiarism cannot be resolved simply by referring to official guidelines. Then, 
a resolution depends on specific arrangements being made between the parties 
(researcher and assistant, teacher and students, etc.) as to whom takes credit and 
how the work will be cited (Box 4.2).
4.2.5  When Do Intentions Come into Play?
Everybody knows it’s wrong to copy-paste a certain amount of text and present it as 
their own. At the same time, honest mistakes happen. Tenured academics and stu-
dents alike collect literature during their research, they print out articles that they 
believe are interesting, and they make notes on them before they start writing. 
Sometimes slip ups occur.
Imagine you are writing an article, the deadline is rapidly approaching, and in the 
final stretch you unintentionally neglect to cite a number of references. Will that be 
considered plagiarism? It was never your intention to plagiarize, of course!
Intentions do play a role in ethics, and they will often be factored in if plagiarism 
is suspected, but intentions (either good or bad) are difficult to prove, and good 
intentions do not absolve you from your duty to ascribe proper credit.
Box 4.2: ‘Pawn Sacrifice’
Trick employed by an advanced plagiarist. A (smaller) part of a text is refer-
enced correctly. However, a larger part of the same text is subsequently pla-
giarized (that is: used without acknowledgement). Benjamin Lahusen, in an 
article entitled ‘Goldene Zeiten’ [Golden Times] gives several examples 
thereof, employed in a 2005 legal textbook. The plagiarist employed the trick 




4.3  Copy-Paste Much Eh?
4.3.1  Patch-Writing
Earlier, we asked what it means to ‘appropriate’ a text. We found it entails the 
acknowledgment of the original source, and suggested that you ‘identify the voice 
of the other.’ Let us explore this a bit further. At which point do you still have to 
reference someone else’s voice? At what point does it becomes your voice?
An instructive example is given by Rebekka Moore Howard in Standing in the 
Shadow of Giants: Plagiarists, Authors, Collaborators (1999, pp. 4–5). During an 
undergraduate course, Howard asked her students to read an excerpt from a particu-
lar source and reflect on it. In nine papers (out of a total of twenty-six) she found 
several sentences that had very similar wording. Here are three examples:
 1. ‘Specifically, “story myths” are not told for their entertainment value, rather they
serve to answer questions people ask about life, about society and about the
world in which they live.’
 2. ‘Story myths provide answers to philosophical questions about life, society and
the world.’
 3. ‘Davidson explains that story myths provide answers to questions people ask
about life, about society and about the world in which they live.’
All three of these sentences lead back to the same source, which goes as follows:
‘Such “story myths” are not told for their entertainment value. They provide answers 
to questions people ask about life, about society and about the world in which they 
live’ (Davidson quoted in Howard 1999, p. 5).
Howard’s assignment was for her students to use this particular source, and these 
students had clearly failed to properly identify or acknowledge the original author 
(although some included a footnote with a reference to it). Howard’s verdict was 
strict: all nine students received an ‘F’. They were lectured on proper citation and 
documentation and subsequently had to revise their paper.
Commenting on this case, Howard observed how students tried to cut corners by 
appropriating phrases and even whole sentences from the original source. In the 
process, they had deleted what they considered ‘irrelevant’ and inserted whatever 
they though was appropriate. They even changed the grammar and syntax of the 
original sentence, ‘substituting synonyms straight from Roget’s Thesaurus’ (1999, 
p. 6). But she also noted that, to a certain degree at least, ‘patch-writing’ is a matter
of style. Even renowned scholars have been observed using ‘patchwork methods,’ 
albeit in a more sophisticated manner. In fact, the very sentence on patch-writing in 
this paragraph could be considered an example of patch-writing! This is all to say 
that the parameters distinguishing ‘plagiarism’ from questionable forms of ‘borrow-
ing texts’ move on a sliding scale.
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4.3.2  Translations as Plagiarism
Translations are not always recognized as sources of plagiarism. Consider the case 
below (observed by the author of this chapter). A student was caught plagiarizing 
when they translated a number of paragraphs originally written in English into 
Dutch without providing any references. Note that in the excerpt below, taken from 
the case, the sentence syntax and grammar are slightly altered. Furthermore, a cru-
cial concept (‘predisposition’) is mistranslated (as ‘factor’), and the meaning of the 
sentence became vaguer when it was cut into two (what does ‘this’ refer to in the 
second sentence?). In spite of all this, the original is still clearly identifiable:
Original biological predisposition is not ignored, but the focus is placed on an individual’s 
development through interaction with other people in a certain cultural context.
Student version (Dutch in original, translated back into English) biological factors play a role, 
but the focus is placed on individual development. This is shaped through interaction with other 
people in a cultural context. 
[Biologische factoren spelen een rol, maar de focus wordt gelegd op de individuele 
ontwikkeling. Deze krijgt haar vorm door interactie met andere mensen binnen een culturele 
context.]
As in the above case, ‘translation plagiarism’ appears often in a ‘high-to-low 
form,’ meaning a text originally published in a ‘dominant language’ (such as 
English) is translated in whole or in part into a ‘smaller language’ (say Dutch, 
Polish, or Italian), where it is presented as original.
Another example is found in the work of psychologist Alphons Chorus, whose 
Foundations of Social Psychology (orig. Grondslagen der sociale psychologie), 
published in 1953, contained a large number of passages lifted from a well-known 
introduction into social psychology by Kretch and Crutchfield, published only 
5 years earlier. Though Chorus wrote in the introduction of his book that he had 
‘relied on Kretch and Cruchfield,’ he had actually translated numerous passages 
word for word without providing quotation marks or references to the original. 
When two colleagues confronted Chorus about this, he admitted that his referencing 
was ‘incomplete’ and he omitted some 100 pages from the next edition (for a dis-
cussion of this case, see; Chorus 2019).
By today’s standards, a direct translation that lacks quotation marks is consid-
ered plagiarism even if it contains a footnote identifying the original source.
4.3.3  Self-Plagiarism
A special case deserves our attention: using our own work without acknowledgement. 
This practice is known as ‘self-plagiarism,’ and notably is not often taken into account 
within the codes of conduct of most universities. Is self-plagiarism unethical? Some 
argue it’s not. You can’t, after all, ‘appropriate’ what is already yours. Others argue it 
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is, as we will soon explore. At its core, it is important that readers are made aware that 
previously published work is recycled, even if it’s the author’s own work.
A differentiation must be made between ‘duplication publication’ (complete 
republication without attribution of the original), ‘text recycling’ (reuse of portions 
of one’s own writings), and ‘secondary publication’ (republication with permission 
from the original publisher). An element of redundancy and wastefulness is persis-
tent in all three forms, and in as much as they distort meta-analyses, they are all also 
unethical. By most accounts, text recycling and duplication publication are consid-
ered ‘questionable,’ though not misconduct, except when copyrights are infringed 
(see Habibzadeh and Winker 2009).
To showcase the sensitivities surrounding text-recycling, take the case of Peter 
Nijkamp, professor of economics at Amsterdam University [VU]. Throughout his 
career, Nijkamp was a prolific author producing at one point an astonishing output 
of some 50 publications a year.
In 2013, Nijkamp was accused by an anonymous whistleblower of ‘excessive 
recycling’ of his own work. A university integrity commission investigated the 
charge in 2014 and found that he had indeed often re-used parts of his works with-
out proper acknowledgement. The commission condemned the practice, labeling it 
‘questionable research practices,’ though not plagiarism (Zwemmer et al. 2015). In 
newspaper coverage, the scientist was accused of ‘self-plagiarism’.
Nijkamp was outraged. ‘Self-plagiarism is a bogus reproach’, he responded. He 
did not see any harm in the practice of re-using one’s own work. He had always 
acted in good faith, and had never transgressed any code of conduct, he maintained 
(Nijkamp 2014, p. 24). Calling the anonymous complaint a ‘witch hunt’, aimed at 
destroying his reputation, Nijkamp filed a counter charge, arguing that the com-
plaint should not have been admissible, and that his name should be cleared (Sahadat 
2015). He won the case.
While self-plagiarism may not be a transgression of a code of conduct for aca-
demic authors, this would not hold for students, who hand in their own work twice 
for different assignments. This is not accepted. Credits earned for assignments are 
given for original work only.
To check for originality, most universities utilize plagiarism detection software. 
This software has access to not only web publications, but also to large databases 
containing previous submissions, and will likely spot any similarities between two 
texts (see the next section for further examples).
4.4  In Other Words or in the Words of Others?
4.4.1  Stealing into Print
Many universities strongly encourage students to work together, to discuss each 
other’s work, and give ‘peer feedback.’ This is aligned with the standing practice in 
academia to discuss unpublished work with colleagues at conferences as well as 
submitting manuscripts to academic journals for (anonymous) peer reviewing.
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Peer reviewing is thus at the heart of academic work, but it has invited forms of 
plagiarism that we need to address. Submitting an unpublished manuscript or a 
grant proposal for review involves the risk that others will make use of it. If not by 
plagiarizing it, then certainly by ‘stealing’ valuable ideas (Lafollette 1992, p. 127ff).
Although it is unclear how often it happens, it is known to happen. In 2017, the 
news section of the Annals of Internal Medicine revealed a recent case of ‘reviewer 
misconduct.’ Michael Dansinger, the lead author of a paper that was rejected by the 
Annals, discovered that his paper appeared in a different journal a few months later, 
but with the names of the authors removed and replaced by the names of others. His 
paper had clearly been stolen by a peer reviewer of the Annals.
Dansinger revealed his discovery, which led to the retraction of the stolen article. 
But he did not want to publish the name of the plagiarist because he was not out for 
revenge. Instead, he wrote about the case to illustrate how and why things go wrong. 
Perhaps the pressure to publish was intense, Dansinger conjectured, or maybe the 
culture was relatively permissive such that plagiarism was not taken seriously, or 
maybe it was simply a matter of believing the plagiarist would not get caught. 
Whatever the reasons, there is an incredible risk involved in this kind of misconduct, 
and by revealing it, Dansinger hoped it would help deter the this kind of misconduct 
(Dansinger 2017, p. 143).
Community members of ‘Retraction Watch,’ a website dedicated to ‘academic 
misconduct, were far less forgiving. Ralph Giorno commented: ‘The repercussions 
need to be that ALL authors are summarily fired, then pursue libel charges. None of 
these people should ever practice medicine anywhere, including in a private setting.’ 
Another commented: ‘This is why review should not be anonymous’ (see Retraction 
Watch, thread: ‘Dear peer reviewer, you stole my paper: An author’s worst night-
mare’, 12.12.2016).
4.4.2  Authorship
While plagiarism is unethical, even worthy of punishment, a more subtle problem 
lies underneath. This relates to different views of authorship and text ownership.
Typically, in Western societies, scientists are looked at from a somewhat para-
doxical view. While on one hand they are considered to be autonomous authors, 
solely responsible for what they write, they are simultaneously expected to act as 
selfless parts of the ‘academic community,’ whose aim is the extension of our col-
lective knowledge.
Accordingly, in the West, texts are viewed as ‘private property,’ while ideas are 
more or less considered ‘common goods’ (for further discussion, see; Marsh 2007). 
However, a nearly inverse relation exists in other parts of the world. In China, col-
lectively accepted knowledge is associated with authorities and individuals of high 
esteem, and ‘copying’ (plagiarizing) these authors without credit can be seen as 
‘paying respect’ to them rather than stealing (see Bloch 2007; Hsu 1981).
As a result of its recent rise as an economic superpower, China’s output of scien-
tific publications has increased immensely, but so has its number of retracted 
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articles. Often due to plagiarism, these retractions have tainted the reputation of 
Chinese research. Authorities in China began to recognize this problem and are now 
implementing strict plagiarism policies (for a discussion, see; Gray et al. 2019).
4.4.3  Two Cases
Plagiarism software is good at spotting similarities between texts, not at identifying 
who plagiarized whom. Consider these two cases of suspected plagiarism reported 
at Utrecht University (in the Netherlands).
In the first case, the plagiarism detection software revealed the following simi-
larities between the papers of two undergraduate students:
• Identical title
• A match of 66% in the second sentence
• Identical quotation [source correctly identified]
• A match of between 66 and 77% in the following three sentences
• 100% match in next sentence
• A match of 82% in the subsequent sentence
• A match of 90% in the main question
• 4 more sentences paraphrasing another source, with a 100% match between the
two papers
• Several more sentences matching between 75 and 100%
• In the conclusion two sentences had a 70–80% match (Fig. 4.2)
Fig. 4.2 Teacher’s view of student submissions to a plagiarism detection software as presented in 
Blackboard. The names of the students are redacted. The two middle columns give percentages of 
‘matching texts’. In this sample they range between 4 and 10%, indicating very low or no occur-
rence of plagiarism in the submissions
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In sum, the two papers had an overlap of 20%, enough to be flagged as suspected 
plagiarism. The case was brought before the board of examination who, following 
Utrecht University procedure, requested the students to respond. The first student 
stated that, ‘I am quite startled by your request, because I am not aware of any 
wrongdoing. I wish to state that I have shared my paper with two of my fellow stu-
dents for review, and it may be that they have copied parts of it.’ The second student 
replied, ‘I assume that my paper is coupled with that of [Student 1], who is not to be 
blamed. She sent her finished work to me and I may have focused a bit too much on 
her paper, by free riding on it.’
The second student was found guilty of plagiarism. This student received an 
official reprimand; her exam was annulled and she was removed from the course for 
the duration of a year. No action against the first student was undertaken however, 
even though she had actively made plagiarism possible by sending her paper to the 
other student, and the code of conduct of this university rules that ‘inciting of pla-
giarism’ is also punishable.
In a second, somewhat less clear-cut case, the plagiarism detection program 
again revealed substantial overlap between two papers, and even to a much higher 
degree (49%). Suspicion of misconduct was raised. Again, the students were 
requested to respond.
When they appeared before the board of examination, they declared that the 
overlap between their papers could be explained in part because they had worked in 
close collaboration with each other, and in part because they had shared a document 
on Facebook, co-authored by the two of them. Neither had plagiarized the other, 
they claimed.
In this case, the board ruled that as far as their close collaboration was concerned, 
it could not be considered plagiarism, but rather ‘inadequate course preparation’ 
(they were supposed to write an individual paper). As to sharing a document, it was 
ruled plagiarism because ‘no adequate references to the source were given.’ The 
students were not removed from the course but both received an official reprimand 
and had to rewrite the paper (Box 4.3).
4.4.4  Priority Disputes
Another form of appropriation demands our attention. It is commonly referred to as 
a ‘priority dispute.’ Typically, in such cases, one author accuses another of stealing 
their pre-published ideas or discoveries, claiming priority over the idea in dispute. 
The history of science is full of these disputes. We shall briefly examine one such 
example below.
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, years before he became a household 
name as the founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud befriended a Berlin otolar-
yngologist (ear, nose, and throat specialist) by the name of Wilhelm Fliess. Fliess 
advocated for the idea that all human beings are bisexual in nature. Furthermore, he 
proposed that the major events in life are ‘predetermined’ by two biological cycles, 
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one lasting 23 days, the other 28. Fliess discussed these ideas with Freud but failed 
to publish them until much later, when their friendship had already withered away.
In 1903, psychologist Hermann Swoboda, published a book on a distinctly 
Fliessian notion of ‘periodicity,’ and a year later philosopher Otto Weininger pub-
lished a highly successful book that discussed, among other things, bisexuality. 
Fliess recognized these as his unpublished ideas, and he suspected foul play.
In a letter dated July 20th, 1904, Fliess demanded that Freud explain himself. In 
a response sent on July 27th, just a week later, Freud sheepishly admitted to having 
discussed Fliess’ ideas with Swoboda, who had subsequently passed on the infor-
mation to his friend Weininger. He acknowledged Fliess’ ‘priority rights’ with 
respect to bisexuality, but he denied that he had given any detailed information to 
Swoboda (Masson 1985, pp. 462–8). In other words, both Swoboda and Weininger 
had merely acted upon a hint and worked out the rest on their own. This did not 
convince Fliess, who published an angry pamphlet accusing Freud of betrayal for 
giving away vital information that belonged to him.
Had Freud been careless with his former friend’s ideas? Was he responsible for 
the ‘theft’ (or plagiarism) of Fliess’ intellectual property? In a paper discussing the 
case in detail, Michael Schröter (2003) compared the content of both Swoboda and 
Weininger’s books and found that they both contain ideas resembling Fliess’ work. 
That being said, Schröter noted that Swoboda’s work contained notable differences 
as well, and Weininger’s ‘appropriation’ of Fliess’ ideas were few and far between, 
effectively as little as a mere sentence. However, Schröter does admit that Fliess’ 
accusations, although exaggerated, do contain ‘a kernel of truth.’
Box 4.3: ‘Appropriation, but not Plagiarism’
Melanie has had great difficulties finishing her BA thesis. Her teacher has 
already pointed out several flaws in the first version and warned her that unless 
she substantially changes the design, she will fail. With the deadline looming, 
Melanie doesn’t know what to do. She considers the following strategies:
Strategy 1: She’ll ask a fellow student to discuss the thesis with her and help 
her identify its weaknesses. Melanie will cook dinner while her friend 
reads the draft. During dinner they’ll discuss any possible changes and 
revisions.
Strategy 2: She’ll ask to look at the theses of two of her friends who have 
already finished to see what they did differently.
Strategy 3: She’ll pay for the services of a professional agency. They say the 
work is produced by certified teachers and charge a fee of 250 Euros. They 
promise to rewrite her thesis in a week, based on her first draft.
Strategy 1 is entirely legitimate and should in fact be encouraged. Strategy 2 
is also legitimate, provided Melanie doesn’t copy these theses. Strategy 3 
is cheating.
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Fliess’ priority claim (right of intellectual property) stands as an example of how 
the majority of priority disputes occur. Seldom do we see the theft of a final product. 
More often, authors find themselves grappling with similar ideas at the same time as 
one another, and subsequently accusing the other of stealing their ideas. Historians 
argue that, in these types of cases, the ideas were essentially up ‘in the air.’ Does that 
mean priority disputes aren’t ‘real’ disputes? No. As with other forms of plagiarism, 
priority disputes point to the fact that ideas cannot develop in isolation; they need 
other ideas to develop, and often competition plays a major role in these develop-
ments (for further discussion, see Michael White’s 2002 book Rivals). Conscientious 
authors give credit where credit is due – not merely out of politeness or to avoid 
unpleasant priority disputes, but precisely because acknowledging contributions 
allows them to establish their own claims (Fig. 4.3, Box 4.4).
4.5  When Do Intentions Come into Play?
4.5.1  Intentions Matter
Not everyone who commits the ‘unoriginal sin’ of plagiarism does so on purpose. 
Some don’t fully grasp that what they’re doing is wrong and when caught plagiariz-
ing, their defense often reads like this: I may have been sloppy, but I did not intend 
to plagiarize. Well then, let’s explore a few examples (drawn from Kolfschooten 
2012) to see whether that defense holds any water.
Fig. 4.3 Freud (left) and 
Fliess (right), here still 
friends, ca. 1895. (Source: 
Ernst Freud 2006, p. 156)
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4.5.2  Plain Sloppiness or Culpable Carelessness?
Our first example is focused on a senior lecturer that contributed several chapters to 
a handbook that was flagged for possible plagiarism. The lecturer maintained before 
the integrity commission that he had relied on the help of a student who, it turned 
out, had copied parts of a text verbatim, without reference. When questioned, the 
student admitted to having been ‘sloppy.’ Was it then the student’s fault? The com-
mission determined that because the chapters were published under the lecturer’s 
name, the lecturer was responsible, not the student. The author was found guilty of 
plagiarism because they should have checked the student’s work. Ultimately, the 
case was ruled ‘nonintentional’ and therefore held less culpability.
The next example followed a junior researcher who submitted a paper to a con-
ference. A reviewer detected ‘significant similarities’ between the junior research-
er’s paper and a paper published by a senior researcher the year before. After an 
investigation, it was determined that the junior researcher had indeed copied por-
tions of the other’s work. Despite asking the senior researcher for permission to use 
certain tables, the junior researcher failed to identify the source properly. The junior 
researcher’s contract was subsequently terminated on the grounds of ‘unsuitability, 
in casu plagiarism.’ The senior researcher thought it wasn’t a case of willful plagia-
rism, but a case of ‘bad citation by a rookie.’
Box 4.4: ‘Plagiarism, but not Intentional’
Oddly enough, Freud almost committed plagiarism himself with respect to 
Fliess’ ideas on bisexuality. It happened during a discussion when they were 
still friends. Freud explained to Fliess that he believed that the problem of 
neurosis could be resolved if the individual’s bisexuality were taken into 
account. Fliess allegedly responded matter-of-factly: ‘That’s what I told you 
two and a half years ago, but you would have none of it then’ (Freud 1901/1960, 
p. 144).
Have you ever had a seemingly novel idea or solution to a problem sud-
denly come to mind? Of course. Have you ever then remembered, or been 
informed, that the idea or solution was in fact something you had previously 
heard? The answer is likely yes. The act of forgetting something that you’ve 
heard and the subsequent reappearance of that memory believed to be your 
own idea is known as cryptomnesia, and it may cause inadvertent plagiarism.
In a series of psychological experiments, researchers were able to produce 
cryptomnesia in a group of students. The participants were tasked to take 
turns spontaneously generating lists of items in specific categories such as 
‘sports’ and ‘animals.’ When asked to recall the items they had listed before 
adding new ones, subjects would ‘appropriate’ items others had produced ear-
lier during the session, and presented them as their own (see; Brown and 
Murphy 1989).
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The final example followed ‘an Egyptian serial plagiarizer.’ In 2003, a mathema-
tician learned through a colleague that one of his papers had been plagiarized by a 
mathematician in Egypt. When the journal was alerted, the fraudulent paper was 
quickly withdrawn. Further investigation into the Egyptian mathematician exposed 
routine plagiarism. Their articles were withdrawn and they were put on the publica-
tion blacklist (Fig. 4.4, Box 4.5).






• Illustrations (including photographs, scans, and figures);
• Lecture notes and PowerPoint slides;
• Lecture summaries;
• Exams.
Note that lecture summaries, PowerPoint slides, and exams, all content
university students regularly encounter, are specifically included in this list. 
Students have the right to inspect exams and use slides and summaries as 
reference material, but to plagiarize their content is considered misconduct in 
most universities.
Notably not on this list are particular expressions which are often too well- 
known to be considered plagiarizable – for example expressions like ‘resil-
ience’ or ‘unconscious.’ However, if these expressions relate to specific 
authors, they would need referencing. For example: ‘paradigm shift’ (Kuhn), 
‘survival of the fittest’ (Darwin), or ‘unintended consequences’ (Merton).
Additionally, ‘reference lists’ are not considered plagiarizable because 
typically such lists are supposed to act as a safeguard against plagiarism. 
Thus, when a classroom of students work on an assignment comparing several 
articles, their bibliographies will be (nearly) identical. Plagiarism detection 
software will still spot these ‘similarities,’ but a teacher will recognize that 
they aren’t ‘matches’ for plagiarism. It’s a different story, though, if two stu-
dents work on an open-ended assignment and their bibliographies come back 
identical; then suspicion may arise.
Intention to commit 
plagiarism




Stealing source material Faulty/sloppy referencing
Inadvertent plagiarism




Minor transgressions and 
irregularities, sloppy 
referencing
Fig. 4.4 Taxonomy of Plagiarism (after Walker 1998)
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4.6  Factors That Facilitate Plagiarism
4.6.1  Factors
The cases discussed in the previous sections reveal how different intentions play a 
role in plagiarism (and how these intentions are weighed into establishing a verdict), 
but also how specific scientific customs and traditions (such as the difference 
between US and Chinese citation practices) must be taken into account. In short, a 
variety of factors contribute to the occurrence of plagiarism and awareness is key. In 
this section, we briefly review relevant literature that points to the most important 
factors currently inciting students to commit plagiarism (or inversely keep them 
away from it).
4.6.2  Experience
A number of authors writing on the subject perceive there to be a higher prevalence 
of plagiarism among junior (first and second year) undergraduate students. They 
attribute this to a lack of experience in academic writing (Park 2003). The underly-
ing idea being that senior (third and fourth year) undergraduate students are sup-
posed to have developed better writing skills, and should therefore be better able to 
avoid plagiarism. Walker (2010), however, found just the opposite. Students 20 years 
and younger plagiarized significantly less than students 21–30 years of age. Walker 
reasoned this was likely due to feeling more pressure to perform.
Regardless of whether or not junior students plagiarized more than senior stu-
dents, the lack of experience may still elicit feelings of uncertainty surrounding 
issues of plagiarism. This uncertainty was expressed by a UK master’s student, who 
was interviewed on the prevalence of cheating and plagiarism, noting: ‘You don’t 
know what is cheating, if you’ve got an idea of an article, or if it is your own idea 
and you write it down in your own words’ (Ashworth et al. 1997, p. 191).
4.6.3  Externalization
Lack of academic experience and feelings of powerlessness and uncertainty may well 
contribute to an ‘externalizing’ of the problem. As some students expressed, plagia-
rism is something university professors find important, but isn’t something perceived 
to be ‘a real problem.’ Often, students consider plagiarism ‘a minor offence’ at best, 
even ‘no big deal’ (Park 2003). The concept of intellectual property is not (yet) com-
mon knowledge to these students; and as Power (2009) concluded following inter-
views with students on their perceptions of plagiarism, it is rather ‘imposed on them 
by authorities or other people in power outside of themselves’ (p. 654).
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4.6.4  Pressure to Perform
Most, if not all universities across Europe and the US have become very demanding, 
competitive institutions in the last few decades. Universities have begun nurturing a 
‘culture of excellence’ that requires students to hand in an abundancy of assign-
ments over short periods of time, further expecting a continuous performance at the 
highest level. As identified by Comas-Forgas and Sueda-Negre (2010), the three 
most relevant causes of plagiarism are: lack of time to carry out academic assign-
ments, poor time-management and personal organization, and performance pressure.
4.6.5  Availability
The internet allows access to a seemingly infinite number of sources. Copy-pasting 
from internet sources (cyber-plagiarism) has become almost too easy – were it not 
for plagiarism detection software. Inversely, it is becoming difficult to not rely on 
internet sources, and considerable effort gets put into hiding that fact. As one stu-
dent put it: ‘Things are a lot easier to get away with on the internet if you wanted to 
(give false information for example). But copying work without sourcing it is easier 
from books in my opinion, as universities have methods of screening essays for 
plagiarized works through the internet’ (Selwyn 2008, p. 473). The lesson to be 
drawn from this is that acquiring good writing skills should be a priority, since poor 
writing has become both easy and dangerous.
4.6.6  Faulty Teachers
Some students blame their teachers, or the educational system as a whole, for failing 
to properly define the difference between legitimate use of source material and pla-
giarism: ‘[Teachers] just say “Don’t plagiarize.” But they never tell you what to do 
to not plagiarize’ (Power 2009, p. 655). There may be more to this than a simple 
justification of laziness, as another student explains: ‘Well, listen, I’m terribly con-
fused what it actually means – I mean that might sound stupid: there’s a policy 
that… the wholesale copying is obviously quite obvious, but there’s a hell of a lot 
of grey area in between that I really don’t even understand’ (Gullifer and Tyson 
2010, p. 470).
4.6.7  Cultural Expectations
In Sect. 4.3 of this chapter, we touched upon the different cultural perceptions of 
authorship, particularly between Western (in our case, the US and Europe) and 
Eastern (in our case, China) societies. 25  years ago, Deckert (1993) found that 
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Chinese students enrolled at an English college in Hong Kong hardly had any notion 
of what plagiarism was at all, and held a very a different view on authorship com-
pared to American students. Walker (2010) confirmed what others have since 
observed, namely that international students at Western universities show higher 
rates of plagiarism (and more serious forms as well).
Of course, these (isolated) findings should not be taken as incitements of cultures in 
general, but rather of different norms and expectations with regard to publication 
behavior and source refencing. Indeed, Hu and Lei (2015) acknowledge that Chinese 
student often have limited knowledge of Anglo-American intertextual conventions, and 
emphasize the need to develop effective instructional strategies to master these literary 
practices, and help ‘raise international students’ awareness of cross-cultural differences 
in intertextuality. Further, the need to equip them with the requisite skills and strategies 
to engage in legitimate textual appropriation’ (2015, p. 255) (Box 4.6).
Box 4.6: ‘Who’s to Blame? A Dilemma’
Jack and Jill are third year sociology students. They have been working inde-
pendently on an assignment about the prisoner’s dilemma game. When the 
deadline comes, Jack is the first to upload his paper, followed by Jill a few 
minutes later.
While Jack and Jill put a great deal of effort into their papers, the plagia-
rism software detects a 58% match – meaning there are many examples of 
nearly identical sentences, and the two papers even have a matching structure. 
It appears obvious that one has plagiarized the other. The question is: who did 
the copying?
When asked for clarification, both Jack and Jill claimed priority and 
accused the other of being the plagiarizer. The teacher knows the two students 
well and is aware that Jack is a rather weak student. The paper appears almost 
‘too good’ for Jack, and seems much more at Jill’s level. But the teacher can’t 
prove this.
What should the teacher do? Of the three options presented below, which 
do you think is the most fair? Discuss your choice with your classmates.
 1. It may be likely that Jack and Jill have struck a deal to blame each other to
ensure the real offender goes unpunished. With no available proof of who
plagiarized whom, the teacher must accept the situation as it is and grade
both papers.
 2. There is undeniable proof that one student has copied from the other.
Although it cannot be established who is the plagiarizer, any participation
in plagiarism is considered misconduct and the teacher determines both
students are in the wrong and as such, both must do the assignment again.
 3. One of the papers is undeniably copied from the other. It’s much more
likely that Jack has plagiarized Jill. Therefore, Jack must do the assign-
ment again, with Jill is also reprimanded since she has allowed her paper
to be plagiarized. She gets a deduction in her grade. Instead of receiving an
A+, as she was initially assessed, the paper gets a B−.




In this chapter we have explored the litany of problems surrounding plagiarism, 
which we understand to be the appropriation of someone else’s work (or ideas) 
without appropriate referencing of the original sources.
We have learned to distinguish plagiarism from legitimate forms of referencing, 
including quotations, paraphrasing, and summarizing. There are ample publication 
manuals that contain detailed rules on how to properly reference your sources, be it 
written or oral communications, translations, and parts of or even whole sentences. 
The underlying principle to remember is that your reader must be able to identify 
the source of every piece of information you use.
While plagiarism is morally and often legally wrong, certain cultural or social 
circumstances allow for a nuanced view. Thus, different views on authorship and 
especially the role of intentions complicate matters to the point that cases of plagia-
rism must be judged on an individual basis, to establish what went wrong, who is to 
be blamed, and why. Cryptomnesia, a form of inadvertent plagiarism, serves as an 
interesting case in point here.
Of special interest are the forms of appropriation that involve stitching together 
a somewhat loose patchwork of source material called patch writing. Patch writing 
borders on plagiarism because it borders on copy-paste techniques. Patch writing is 
considered a ‘grey area’ (neither wrong, nor right), although it involves stylistic 
matters too.
Furthermore, we discussed priority disputes surrounding plagiarism and consid-
ered whether or not self-plagiarism can be regarded as bona fide plagiarism, or if it 
is actually a form of ‘passive self-citation.’
Finally, we explored the factors that facilitate plagiarism, including experience 
with writing (or lack thereof), externalization of the problem (perceiving plagiarism 
to be someone else’s problem), performance pressure, availability of sources (books 
vs. online), inadequate teachers, and cultural beliefs.
4.7.2  Discussion
The object of this chapter is to familiarize you with the problems surrounding pla-
giarism. By becoming aware of this issue’s many facets, we hope you will be able 
to act responsibly and avoid being caught in a situation like the ones we explored. 
Plagiarism can and must be avoided, but it takes training. Everyone has a responsi-
bility here, including you and your university.
Institutions and universities must, at a minimum, provide clear guidelines regard-
ing their referencing requirements, and stipulate the consequences of noncompli-
ance. Hopefully they’ll do even more, and allow you and your fellow students time 
to adequately train yourselves. Newton et al. (2014) found that even short-duration 
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plagiarism training programs significantly enhance students’ in-text referencing 
skills. Offerings such as this can allow you to better understand how to properly 
utilize the work of others and to feel better equipped to carve out your own niche in 
the scientific community.
There is no better time to start thinking through these issues than now. Begin by 
discussing some of the issues outlined in this chapter, in particular involving the 
problem of authorship. Who ‘owns’ texts and ideas and why is that? How private is 
your work? What steps must you take to become the ‘author’ of a text?
 Case Study: René Diekstra
René Diekstra, a professor of clinical psychology at Leiden University in the 
Netherlands, gained notoriety in the summer of 1996 after he was accused of plagia-
rism, and subsequently resigned.
The situation, described in detail by Frank van Kolfschooten (2012), meant the 
end of a highly successful academic career. Internationally recognized as a leading 
expert in suicidal behaviors, Diekstra was the founder of the International Academy 
of Suicide Research. He was also the founder of the scientific journal Archives of 
Suicide Research. He had been the manager of the ‘Psychosocial and Behavioral 
Aspects of Health and Development’ of the World Health Organization (WHO) 
program and was one of the first recipients of the Stengel Award, the world’s most 
prestigious honor in the field of suicide research.
When Diekstra lost his university position in 1996, he was ousted from his orga-
nizational positions and at least one of his awards was revoked. Effectively, he 
became a persona non grata. How did this fall from grace come to pass?
Being a prolific writer, Diekstra had written numerous scientific publications, as 
well as multiple popular science and self-help books. The publication that sparked 
his downfall was ‘No Stone Unturned’ (De Onderste Steen Boven, 1996), written 
for a large non-academic public. The charge of plagiarism had been levelled by two 
journalists of a local Dutch weekly newspaper. Allegedly, Diekstra had copied 
entire sections from How to Deal with Depression by Bloomfield and McWilliams 
(1994). The journalists responded with indignation: ‘Who is this Diekstra? And this 
man calls himself a professor!’ (quoted in Danhof en Verhey 1996) (Fig. 4.5).
Despite being on vacation, Diekstra quickly responded. He admitted to having 
copied roughly twenty pages from How to Deal with Depression, but he also placed 
some of the blame on the publisher, suggesting a possible lapse in communication. 
The scandal did not end there, though. When he returned from his vacation, a sub-
sequent publication in the same journal revealed further indications of plagiarism. 
Apparently, Diekstra had translated 26 pages from an unpublished manuscript by 
Gary McEnery and incorporated them into his self-help book ‘When Life Hurts’ 
(Als het Leven Pijn Doet), published in 1990.
While Diekstra was out on sick leave, an independent commission began inves-
tigating the case, and in that time, another allegation of plagiarism came to the 
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forefront. This time in a scientific publication, co-authored with a colleague. When 
called to testify, Diekstra admitted ‘carefree’ use of sources in ‘No Stone Unturned’. 
He denied, however, that he had plagiarized McEnery, who was credited as a co- 
author on the title page of ‘When Life Hurts’ (though the cover of the book show-
cased only Diekstra’s name). For the charge of plagiarism in the scientific article, he 
flatly denied having any knowledge thereof and entirely blamed his co-author.
By December of 1996, the commission concluded that the allegations of plagia-
rism in Diekstra’s self-help books ‘When Life Hurts’ and ‘No Stone Unturned’ 
were legitimate. Regarding the scientific article, the commission was convinced 
Diekstra was at least partly responsible and that his position as professor at Leiden 
University was compromised (Hofstee and Drupsteen 1996). As a result, Diekstra 
handed in his notice, though he disagreed that he had committed ‘scientific miscon-
duct.’ Rather, he felt he had been ‘sacrificed.’
Several of Diekstra’s colleagues at Leiden University came to his defense. They 
published a 272 page plea, arguing that the executive board of the university should 
Fig. 4.5 Media coverage of the Diekstra case. (Source: Leidsch Dagblad, August 29, 1996)
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reconsider the commission’s verdict. They stated that the report of the commission 
was sloppy and the punishment (dismissal) ‘disproportional’ (Dijkhuis et al. 1997). 
The following year, in 1998, Diekstra published an autobiographical account of the 
affair titled ‘O Holland, Land of Humiliation!’ (O Nederland, Vernederland!), 
which detailed his feelings of being wronged. He notes how the investigative com-
mission had acted in ‘bad faith’ and ‘twisted the facts,’ but that the damage had been 
done: he was ridiculed in public by his friends and his former colleagues turned 
their backs on him. Throughout it all, Diekstra maintained his innocence, and that 
the allegations of plagiarism were false (though he again admitted ‘carefree han-
dling’ of other people’s materials).
His self-defense strategy ran along the following three lines: (1) popular science 
books are exempt (at least to a degree) from the same standards as scientific publica-
tions; (2) the plagiarized parties had been offered financial compensation; (3) he had 
not intended to steal from others. Therefore, he argued, the accusation of plagiarism 
did not stand, and was at best simply ‘sloppiness.’
None of these arguments, nor his colleagues plea, were accepted, and the convic-
tion remained. Diekstra, however, continued to seek rehabilitation for many years. 
By 2003 he was still attempting to sue Leiden University, but to no avail.
In the years following 1997, Diekstra became the Director of the Center for 
Youth and Development in The Hague, the Netherlands and between 2004 and 
2011, was head of the Social Science Department and professor of psychology at 
the Roosevelt Academy in Middelburg. However, as he was reassembling his life, 
Diekstra’s past continued to haunt him. In 2004, his position as a professor at 
Roosevelt caused a stir because according to the responsible parties, his reappointed 
as a professor was unlawful.
Willem Koops, the acting Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Utrecht 
University during this time, strongly opposed Diekstra’s appointment at Roosevelt. 
He was quoted as saying: ‘Diekstra views himself as the victim instead of the 
offender (…) That’s why I think that Diekstra cannot be engaged as role model in 
the training of students and PhDs’ (Kolfschoten 2012, p. 78).
 Assignment
 1. Examine Diekstra’s three self-defense arguments. Do any of his arguments exon-
erate him (partially or fully) from the accusation of plagiarism? Does it make a
difference when a clear definition of plagiarism is lacking (as was the case
in 1996)?
 2. Diekstra felt that he was being ‘persecuted’ and treated ‘unfairly.’ He complained 
that the Dutch people were unwilling to forgive him, and that they would never
let the past go. To what degree (or for how long) should misconduct be consid-
ered a stain on one’s reputation? Is there a point at which someone found guilty
of misconduct should be allowed to start with a clean slate? What conditions
should this depend upon?
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 3. If someone accused of plagiarism were to ask you for advise, how would you
have respond? Would you recommend a different defense strategy?
 Suggested Reading
A very good introduction into debates surrounding plagiarism is offered by 
R.M. Howard, Standing in the Shadow of Giants: Plagiarists, Authors, Collaborators 
(1999). Another notable contributions comes from M.C.Lafollette, Stealing into 
Print. Fraud, Plagiarism, and Misconduct in Scientific (1992). Finally, we recom-
mend Ashworth et al. ‘Guilty in Whose Eyes? University student’s perception of 
cheating and plagiarism in academic work and assessment’ (1997) for an excellent 
overview of student perspectives on plagiarism.
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5.1  Introduction
5.1.1  The Expert’s Sin
If plagiarism is the crime of the novice, then fabrication is the expert’s specialty. 
Unlike ‘falsifying’ (the subject of the next chapter), which is the deliberate misrep-
resentation of data, fabrication involves the presentation and reporting of fake or 
non-existent research procedures, data, and findings. Fabrication is a form of cheat-
ing. It is about turning science upside down, it starts, rather than ends, with the 
answer to a question.
Fabrication probably occurs less frequently than plagiarism, but it is a much 
more serious form of misconduct. In a systematic review of the literature on the 
prevalence of scientific misconduct, Daniele Fanelli (2009) found that 2% of scien-
tists admit to serious forms of misconduct, such as fabrication or modifying data, at 
least once. Additionally, 14% of respondents observed this misconduct in col-
leagues. The discrepancy between these findings, in which people perceive them-
selves to be more honest than their peers, is known as the ‘better than average effect’ 
(see; Festinger 1954).
There is another bias in these figure. Self-reporting tends to underestimate the real 
frequency of scientific misconduct. The incidence of fraud may be higher than we 
know. This triggers one’s imagination, spawning a number of questions: How many 
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more cases actually exist that just haven’t been discovered yet? How likely is it that 
fabrication eventually comes to be discovered (unlike with plagiarism, there is no 
‘fabrication detection software’ available)? How vulnerable are the social sciences to 
this type of fraud? Or is it more inherent to certain research environments? As 
Jennifer Crocker (2011) notes, fraud ‘starts with a single step,’ an observation rele-
vant to the infamous case of Diederick Stapel, which we will discuss in our case study.
While the take-home message of this chapter is that we must arm ourselves 
against these forms of fraud, we should also realize that the dividing line between 
proper and fraudulent behavior can be thin. Many fraudsters start their criminal 
careers with small transgressions that gradually increase in scale, especially when 
no one stops them in their tracks.
In this chapter, we will explore three specific forms of fabrication: forgery, cheat-
ing, and ghostwriting. We will then discuss the factors that facilitate fabrication, 
concluding with an examination of institutional counterstrategies.
5.2  Forgery
5.2.1  The Manufacturing of Science
The invention of complete datasets, and the fabrication of entire cohorts of respon-
dents and their responses may be more difficult to accomplish than appears at first 
sight. A ‘successful fraud’ must not only know what ‘good results’ are but must also 
know how data convincingly corroborates conclusions. How does forgery work? 
What are its tell-tale signs? And what happens once the fraud is exposed?
5.2.2  Telltale Signs of Fraud
Diederik Stapel, a prolific writer and charismatic figure in social psychology in the 
Netherlands, succeeded in conning many of his colleagues with what is considered 
one of the greatest cases of fraud in the social sciences. He was exposed after three 
junior colleagues found his findings suspicious. The affair created a shockwave 
throughout the world of social psychology, leading to what is called ‘a crisis of 
confidence’ with the public.
Were there any tell-tale signs in Stapel’s publications that indicated fraud? A 
commission that later investigated his work found sloppy mistakes and ‘unbeliev-
ably high factor loadings’ (a statistical term understood as an indication of an item’s 
relative importance).
The question was raised as to why peer reviewers had never noticed his fraud. 
Interestingly, the tell-tale signs of fraud were revealed in a linguistic analysis of his 
work, in which Stapel’s fraudulent studies were compared with his genuine work. 
The fraudulent writing contained ‘significantly higher rates of terms related to 
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 scientific methods and empirical investigation,’ suggesting that fraudulent papers 
involve an ‘overproduction of scientific discourse’ (Markowitz and Hancock 2014, 
p. 2). In other words, Stapel’s studies were not only too good to be true, they were 
often also too wrapped up in scientific jargon to be true.
5.2.3  The Student Who Almost Got Away with It (Until Another 
Student Blew It)
The following story, reported by Jesse Singal in New York Magazine on May 29th 
2015, gives us insight into the case of a student involved in data fabrication, and of 
another student who blew the lid off.
Michael LaCour was a political science student at UCLA (University of 
California, Los Angeles), who rose to fame in 2013 when he discovered information 
that contradicted everything that was then known about ‘canvassing.’ ‘Canvasses’ 
are short conversations between people, with one person attempting to persuade the 
other, often occurring during political campaigns. Typically, these forms of contact 
are known to have little to no lasting effect on an individual’s political ideals. That 
is, until LaCour claimed to have found that brief talks (lasting roughly 10  min) 
about marriage equality, with a canvasser who revealed during the chat that they are 
gay, had a significant, lasting effect on the voter’s views (as measured by an online 
survey administered before and after the conversation).
LaCour managed to get his results published in the prestigious journal Science 
(with senior co-author Donald Green). It instantly attracted nationwide attention. 
When LaCour discussed his work with David Broockman, a third-year political sci-
ence grad student at Berkeley, the latter was so impressed that he sought to replicate 
the study. It wasn’t long before Broockman became suspicious. Not only did he fail 
to replicate the original findings, he also found irregularities in LaCour’s original 
data. They were ‘too orderly.’ When he subsequently contacted the firm that suppos-
edly performed the surveys for LaCour, he learned that they had undertaken no 
such survey.
Broockman discussed his misgivings with Neil Malhotra, professor at Stanford’s 
business school, who advised him not to blow the whistle to avoid possible reper-
cussions. Broockman decided to come forth with his findings regardless, contacting 
LaCour’s co-author Green. Green confronted LaCour, who failed to alleviate any of 
his doubts. Thereupon Green requested that their paper be retracted (against 
LaCour’s wishes).
The story ended badly for LaCour. An offer to become an assistant professor at 
Princeton was rescinded. But Green too suffered repercussions, seeing a fellowship 
worth $200,000 fall through. Broockman, on the other hand, got a tenured-track 
professorship at Stanford University.
With the event behind him, Broockman spoke with Jesse Singal, the journalist 
who covered the case, reflecting on his experience as the whistleblower. Broockman 
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compared it to what he went through when, as a teenager, he came out as a gay. ‘Part 
of the message that I want to send to potential disclosers of the future is that you 
have a duty to come out about this, you’ll be rewarded if you do so in a responsible 
way […].’ (quoted in Singal 2015).
5.2.4  Whistleblowing
Whistleblowers such as Broockman fulfill an important but often risky and thank-
less role in science. Unlike in Broockman’s case, the outcome for many whistle-
blowers falls far short of a happy ending. Perhaps this is because in many cases, 
whistleblowers are in a vulnerable position (which was why Malhotra advised 
Broockman against it).
Consider the case of Saskia Vorstenbosch, a PhD student at the Leiden University 
Medical Centre (LUMC) in the Netherlands (the following details are drawn from 
reporting by De Vrieze, 2017).
Vorstenbosch worked with a cell biologist in the early 2000s. One day, while 
preparing a presentation, she discovered anomalies in a number of experiments per-
formed by the biologist. She ‘started digging’ and found evidence that suggested 
some of the data had been ‘manipulated.’ After reexamining her findings, 
Vorstenbosch reported her suspicions to the head of the department, who was reluc-
tant to start an investigation. The department head only initiated an investigation 
after Vorstenbosch insisted she would report the case with or without him.
After an 18-month investigation, the integrity commission at LUMC indeed 
found irregularities, but only in one of the biologist’s papers. Dissatisfied with 
this outcome, Vorstenbosch took the report to the integrity commission of the 
Dutch National Academy of Sciences (KNAW), who researched the case more 
thoroughly and concluded that other forms of misconduct had taken place. The 
commission advised that four of the biologist’s articles be retracted. By this 
point, the researcher no longer worked in the Netherlands and managed to keep 
her name out of the press. No actions were taken against her, nor were any more 
of her publications withdrawn.
Tragically, Vorstenbosch, whose area of study was partly based on the biologist’s 
research, had only achieved in undermining her own work, because her data were 
now also contaminated. She withdrew from science altogether even though LUMC 
offered her a new PhD trajectory. Speaking with a reporter about her experience, she 
reflected: ‘People don’t seem eager to undertake action [against fraud] because it 
might damage their own name. It’s true that I too have been damaged, but should 
that have been reason for me to say: I’ll leave it like that, I’ll just keep silent? Sure 
enough [after fraud is discovered] publications are going to be withdrawn, but you 




5.2.5  Exposing Fraud
From cases such as these, two provisional conclusions can be drawn. The first is that 
scientific frauds oftentimes betray themselves, leaving traces of their misdeeds. 
That’s because fraudulent researchers mimic real research. However, since they 
work backward, from conclusions to data, their results are often unnaturally orderly. 
Ironically then, a successful fraud must build in imperfections and create small 
deviations from the expected outcome. This might actually involve more work than 
performing real research.
The second conclusion is that exposing fraud can prove to be surprisingly diffi-
cult. Fraudsters are often unwilling to hand in their material, so how is fabrication 
proven without this data? Regularly, when suspicion of misconduct does arise, 
seemingly valid excuses are produced to explain the lack of material: ‘it was a long 
time ago’; ‘the original data was destroyed’; or ‘my computer crashed’. These 
excuses are sometimes accompanied with authoritarian arguments, like ‘who are 
you to criticize a tenured researcher?’. Sometimes these arguments even resort to 
downright threats, along the lines of ‘this will destroy your career.’ Facing these 
types of situations undoubtedly makes whistleblowing an unattractive, if not risky 
undertaking (Box 5.1).
5.3  Cheating
5.3.1  Cheating: A Shortcut to Knowledge?
There is good reason to consider the practice of cheating on a test to be akin to data 
fabrication, rather than a form of plagiarism or falsification (although, admittedly, 
there is an overlap between these categories – see Chaps. 3 and 6).
Just as scientific claims need to be grounded in real research findings, the results 
of an exam must also be based on ‘real work.’ Thus, cheating as a ‘short cut to 




knowledge’ is nearly synonymous with presenting a conclusion based on fictitious 
data – whether the outcome is correct or not makes no difference.
What exactly is cheating? Lim and See (2001) offer a list that covers a wide 
range of betrayals to academic integrity. To name a few, cheating can come in the 
form of using unauthorized material, stealing exams, lying about circumstances (to 
get special consideration), allowing team members to do the bulk of the work, 
inventing data, listing unread or even nonexistent sources, copying from a neighbor 
during a test, or allowing a neighbor to copy from you.
A discussion of the many tricks used by students to cheat on exams can be found 
in Harold Noah and Max Eckstein’s instructive 2001 book Fraud and Education: 
The Worm in the Apple. The strategies they identified are far ranging and many 
involve a fair share of creativity; scribbling notes on their skin, tapping codes on the 
floor, stealing test papers, printing and attaching cheat sheets on the inside of a 
water bottle’s label, and even sending impersonators to take tests on their behalf.
Box 5.1: Self-Correction: A Dilemma
A student reaches out for help on ‘r/AskAcademia’, a discussion platform on 
the website Reddit. The student writes: ‘I graduated three months ago and 
now my teacher wants to publish the paper. While most of the data is accurate 
and real, for some of it I made an educated guess using some economic fore-
cast data. I was hoping I could postpone having it published until I find accu-
rate data, but because this is an economic topic that is so new I wasn’t able to 
do that. So what do I do? Is there a realistic chance of me being found out? Do 
I have him submit the paper?’
Of several dozen responses, here are four answers posted on the message 
board (paraphrased by us). Which one do you prefer and why?
 (a) Do not under any circumstance allow that paper to be published! You 
have somehow missed the point that it is your professor’s reputation on 
the line here.
 (b) For the university’s sake, tell your professor the truth. They will be so 
relieved that they didn’t publish fabricated data that they will forgive you, 
and possibly even praise and appreciate your honesty. Everybody screws 
up every now and then. But we need to try to fix our screw-ups when 
possible.
 (c) You should say something like: I revisited the analysis and I found out 
that I made a critical error. I’m sorry, I should have checked more com-
pletely before turning in the assignment but I’m glad I caught it before we 
published it.
 (d) I suggest you just keep quiet and let it publish. The Chinese GDP data and 
a lot of developed world data is made up, twisted, or seasonally adjusted. 
If concerned, build in an appendix explaining how some data was created 
as ‘line of best fit’ based on your assumptions.
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In the decades since Noah and Eckstein published their book, strategies today 
likely employ the services of the digital age, such as messaging apps, smart watches, 
and Bluetooth earbuds. Vincent Versluis and Arie de Wild (2015), of the Rotterdam 
University of Applied Sciences, investigated ‘digital cheating’ during exams in 
higher education and concluded that institutions seriously lag behind. Neither teach-
ers nor administrators seemed aware of the scale or magnitude of modern forms of 
fraud, let alone how to counter it.
5.3.2  Dealing with Deception
Before exploring the prevalence of cheating, we must first examine a few actual 
cases that have come before a university board of examination. What are the com-
mon forms of cheating that universities experience and how do they respond?
Cheat sheets Recently, a student at Utrecht University was caught using the old-
est trick in the book, a cheat sheet. They scribbled extensive notes and figures in 
their dictionary, and were caught during a routine patrol of the room. The case was 
reported to the board of examination, who decided to annul their exam. Furthermore, 
they received an official slap on the wrist that went into their record, and they were 
excluded from the course for a year (Figs. 5.2 and 5.3).
Falsifying grade lists A law student wanted to switch from Erasmus University 
to Leiden University and believed it would be necessary to falsify their grades 
before applying. In the process, they also forged the signature of a university 
employee. This was regarded as a criminal act when the forgeries were discovered, 
and the student ended up in court. Before the judge, they dramatically declared: ‘I 
saw no other way out. It felt like either a diploma or death.’ They received a sus-
pended jail sentence of 2  weeks and 60  h community service for the forgery 
(Bonger, 2015).
Scheming Two students at Utrecht University developed the following scheme. 
Both showed up at the same exam and when it was time for submission, they got up 
in unison, proceeded to the examiners table, and bumped into each other ‘by acci-
dent’ on the way before dropping their paperwork on the floor. While they scooped 
up their belongings, they swapped papers, thus allowing one to hand in the exam of 
the other. The other, never having enrolled in this class, slipped away in the confu-
sion unnoticed.
The scheme would have worked had two fellow students not witnessed the deceit 
and decided to report it to the teachers. The two were thereupon interviewed, but 
they categorically denied all allegations. A forensic expert was then consulted, who 
examined their handwriting and the allegations were confirmed. Both students were 
expelled from the university on account of severe academic misconduct (case 
reported to the author by a member of the board of examination at UU).
Photographing exams In 2012, at Tilburg University, a student was reported by 
several anonymous peers photographing tests with their cell phone at multiple 
exams, and placing the images on Facebook. When confronted with the accusations, 
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Fig. 5.2 Sheet sheet of a psychology student. Sample confiscated by a teacher and reproduced 
with permission of the UU board of examination
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Fig. 5.3 Cheat sheets. Sample found by the author between the pages of a second-hand book. The 
actual size of the sheets is about 3 x 4 cm.
5 Fabrication and Cheating
91
they confessed, maintaining that they ‘had not wanted to profit from the situation, 
financially or otherwise’. They said they merely wanted to be able to study the ques-
tions at home, although agreeing it was wrong. The teacher, however, suspected the 
photos were already put up on Facebook during the exam, and believed the student 
might have been soliciting help from the outside. This could not be proven though.
The board of examination ruled that for two of her exams, where fraud could be 
proven, the results would be annulled. The student was furthermore excluded from 
all courses for the remainder of the year, as well as the entirety of the next. The 
student appealed against the ruling, claiming that the sentence was ‘disproportional’ 
and that they would be unable to finish their BA in time, thus facing a significant 
financial drawback. They additionally could also lose their position in the master’s 
program the next year. The appeal was dismissed, on grounds of the fraud being 
‘extraordinarily serious’ (ruling 972 of the board of examination at Tilburg 
University 2012).
Logging in twice In April 2014, large-scale fraud was detected during a digital 
exam in a statistics course for business and economy students at Amsterdam 
University. Students would log into the exam twice, using two different browsers. 
The first browser was used to work on the questions. Once the questions were 
answered, the digital exam revealed the correct responses. Students would then sub-
mit the now-known answers into the exam open in the second browser. Some 400 
students passed the exam with abnormally high marks, which lead to suspicion of 
fraud. Closer inspection further revealed that the students had completed the test 
unrealistically fast. The exam was annulled for all 400 students (Anonymous, 2014).
Exams annulled In October 2016, some 100 pedagogy students at Salzburg 
University completed a test but never received the results. The entire examination 
was annulled after it was discovered that a number of students had discussed the 
multiple-choice questions used in previous exams in a closed Facebook group. 
Students protested against the ruling, and a discussion arose as to whether their 
behavior was in fact illegal. The vice-rector of the university said that copying ques-
tions and distributing them in itself wasn’t wrong as long as the answers were not 
included. The course coordinator discovered, however, that all of his examination 
questions (a total of 14 pages) had been photographed by students, including the 
answers, and hence the annulment remained (Anonymous, 2016).
5.3.3  Is There a Cheating Crisis?
In May 2016, the Irish Mirror, using the Freedom of Information Act, revealed that 
between 2012 and 2015, over 800 students had been caught cheating across seven 
universities in Ireland, and that only a few students had been reprimanded, with 
none being expelled. ‘Cheating’ was broadly understood here to cover a range 
of exam conduct violations, including plagiarism, impersonation, and ghost 
writing.
Just a few months earlier, English newspapers, taking advantage of the same 
legislation, reported that almost 50,000 students at British universities had been 
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caught cheating in the last 3 years. A disproportional percentage of whom, it was 
added, were international students from outside the EU. Similarly, in April 2016, 
The Adelaide Advertizer reported that more than 1800 students at Flinders and 
Adelaide Universities in south Australia had been caught copying one another’s 
work and cheating on exams since 2010.
Has dishonest behavior among university students reached endemic proportions? 
Current research on academic misconduct seems to support this dramatic conclu-
sion, at least to a certain point. Diekhoff et al. (1996) found a significant rise in 
(self-reported) cheating attitudes and behaviors between 1984 and 1994 in a group 
of students at midwestern universities in the United States. The prevalence of cheat-
ing behaviors (on exams, quizzes, or assignments) went up from 54.1% in 1984 to 
61.1% in 1994. Twenty years later, Vandehey et al. (2007) repeated the study and 
found a slight decrease rather than increase among a similar student demographic. 
Overall, they concluded that instances of cheating behavior dropped to 57.4%, but 
strikingly, was still represented in a majority of students.
Similar trends have been described by fellow researchers in the study of aca-
demic dishonesty. McCabe and Trevino (1996) observed that self-reported admis-
sions of academic misconduct (cheating on an exam, for example) saw a substantial 
increase from 39% to 64% between 1963 and 1993. While some researchers reported 
more conservative figures, others painted an even darker picture, claiming that only 
a small minority of students didn’t engage in some form of cheating (of note, it is 
difficult to assess how accurate these reports are; see Franklin-Stokes and Newstead 
1995). Following the findings of Anderson and Murdoch (2007), it can be safely 
said that cheating is both fairly common, and at the same time, seriously underesti-
mated by teachers.
Is the ‘cheating crisis’ perceived universally in universities around the world? 
This question is hard to answer. It has been reported that, for example, post- 
communist central eastern countries in Europe have a higher prevalence of cheating 
behavior than other European countries (Pabian, 2015), and that Hong Kong busi-
ness students are less likely to engage in cheating behavior than American business 
students (Chapman and Lupton 2004).
These isolated comparative studies of specific academic communities reveal 
little about the national character of academic (mis)conduct. Given the confusion 
over what exactly constitutes ‘cheating’ (see Box 5.2 for an overview of academic 
Box 5.2: ‘Classification of Forms of Academic Dishonesty’  
(List Compiled from Different Encyclopedic Works)
Cheating: Use of illegal tools, attempt to obtain external assistance during 
an examination, and use of unauthorized prior knowledge.
Deception: Providing false information to an instructor concerning a formal 
academic exercise—i.e., giving a false excuse for missing a deadline or 




dishonesty), the scarcity of studies into academic cheating, and the notorious unre-
liability of self-reporting, on which most studies are based, the exact magnitude 
and impact of the ‘cheating crisis’ will probably remain clouded for some time 
to come.
5.4  Ghostwriting
5.4.1  Ghost in the Machine
‘Ghostwriting’ is a practice that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. David Healy from 
University of Wales College in Medicine, UK described one of his experiences with 
the phenomenon. He once received an email from a pharmaceutical company with 
a paper attached, its premise based on Healy’s own published work. It looked as if 
he had written it himself; in fact, it was ‘a recognizable Healy piece’ (2005, p. 41). 
The paper was offered to him as an article he could publish under his own name. He 
declined on grounds that it’s unethical to publish papers you haven’t written 
yourself.
However, when a different company sent him a similar offer some 2 years later, 
he decided to see what would happen if he accepted but altered the content of the 
paper significantly. In spite of the assurance that he was ‘free to edit the original 
article,’ his changes were not accepted. Healy thereupon withdrew his name from 
the article. The paper, written for him but not by him, was eventually published 
under someone else’s name.
Horace Freeman Judson reveals in The Great Betrayal (2004) the motives behind 
this type of ‘ghostwriting’ (presenting finished manuscripts to acknowledged scien-
tists as a ‘gift’): they are created by large pharmaceutical companies to present their 
products in a favorable light. The ready-made ghostwritten papers invariably report 
positively on a specific product (a certain drug, therapy, or medication). These 
Fabrication: Presentation and reporting of fake or non-existent research 
data and findings.
Facilitation: Helping or attempting to help another commit an act of aca-
demic dishonesty.
Ghostwriting: Submitting work written by a third party.
Impersonation: Assuming another student’s identity with the intent to pro-
vide the student an advantage.
Plagiarism: Appropriation of someone else’s work (or ideas) and passing it 




papers could constitute a form of ‘product placement.’ They are well-written and 
mimic real tests and are therefore difficult to distinguish from proper research.
Ghostwriting has not only dramatically increased in frequency, it has also ‘pro-
fessionalized.’ Sismondo (2009) writes how pharmaceutical companies now plan 
publications strategically in advance of the actual research taking place. Companies 
map out key messages, determine information relevant to various audiences and 
journals, and identify potential authors for their papers. Once research becomes 
available, ‘publication planners’ hire writers, negotiate with potential authors, and 
‘shepherd the papers through journals’ submission and review procedures’ (p. 175).
This may seem shady enough, but defenders of this practice claim that science is 
a collaborative enterprise. ‘Jointly authored papers are the rule in science, not the 
exception, and medical writers often produce clearer, more readable papers than 
medical researchers themselves’ (Moffatt and Elliott 2007, p. 21).
On the other spectrum of authorship, there is a second form of ghostwriting that 
targets unsuccessful authors. Instead of getting compensated for having their name 
on a paper, these authors are offered an opportunity to pay for a ‘slot’ in a paper 
written by someone else. In a publish-or-perish culture, researchers are sometimes 
willing to go to great lengths to keep up with the pace. Science reported in its issue 
on January 10th, 2014 on how Chinese brokers sell ‘co-authorship’ in papers already 
accepted for publication. Fees range from $1600 to $26,300, depending on the 
impact factor of the journal (Fig. 5.4).
To be clear, journal editors and peer reviewers do not appreciate either form of 
‘ghost authorship,’ but are sometimes hard-pressed by industries and publishing 
companies to accept the practice as a fact of modern life. Thus, one publisher is 
quoted as saying in response to his editor’s opposition of ghostwriting: ‘Fine, you 
may have that view, but what you’re actually doing is driving it underground. It’s far 
Fig. 5.4 The Ghostwriter
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better to be transparent and get this out into the open’ (quoted in Sismondo 2009, 
p. 181).
Ghost authorship is more dominant in the medical sciences, where the interests 
at stake are far greater than anywhere else. Specialized agencies offer to write 
research proposals for researchers at a no-cure-no-pay basis. They claim a percent-
age of the grant money if the application is accepted. Few would consider this 
‘cheating,’ yet one must ask where the involvement of such ghostwriters will end. 
Should they be made responsible for the formulation of research questions or the 
development of instruments too? Wouldn’t this allow them to steer research in a 
particular direction? (Box 5.3).
5.4.2  Hiring a Helping Hand
At various stages in their academic careers, students are sometimes confronted with 
‘ghost authorship’ as well. Paid services offer a ‘helping hand’ in writing papers or 
preparing for exams by providing ‘exercise materials.’ In the last decade, commer-
cial ‘abstracting desks’ have materialized in and around universities, who advertise 
with summaries and abstracts of course books, practice questions, and even lec-
ture notes.
Most of these texts are written by students who get paid a nominal fee for their 
work, which is then offered for sale to other students. With little or no quality con-
trol, many of these texts are subpar. Despite this, there are students who claim to 
Box 5.3: ‘Putting the Supervisor First: A Dilemma’
You have just finished your master’s project and you want to submit your 
thesis as an article to a journal. Next year you plan to continue as a PhD stu-
dent at the same institution. The supervisor of your master’s project has 
announced that if you are accepted into the program, they will also be the 
supervisor of your PhD project. Additionally, they tell you that they want their 
name on your article as a first author, even though they contributed little to the 
project. This will improve your chances for the PhD position, they inform 
you. How do you respond? Choose one of the following options and prepare 
an argument defending your selection.
 1. Ignore the request and submit the paper in your name only, running the risk 
of not getting accepted to the PhD program.
 2. Accept the request and put forth the supervisor’s name as a first author.
 3. Report the incident as unethical behavior to the integrity officer.
 4. Go to the dean of the faculty and discuss it with them first.
[Adapted with permission from the Erasmus Ethical Dilemma game].
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have successfully finished courses relying solely on these commercially produced 
abstracts, without even so much as opening up the course book.
Some desks offer additional ‘writing guidance’ to students, assuming (part of) 
the task of teachers, in service of helping students improve their writing skills. 
Others go one step further. They are called ‘paper mills’ or ‘essay mills’ and offer 
fully formed essays for sale. The first practice (writing guidance) is wholly legiti-
mate, the second (paper mills) clearly isn’t (Dickerson 2007).
Are students aware of the ethical dilemmas attached to these services desks? 
Zheng and Cheng (2015), who themselves were students when they did research for 
their article, interviewed peers at the University of San Francisco on their perspec-
tives on hiring ghostwriters, and found to their surprise that a number of them (espe-
cially international students with English as a second language) did not see the 
practice as cheating, as long as it was only done once or twice. Some would argue 
that ‘ghostwriting is a cooperative form of work and both parties [i.e. the student 
who gets paid for his or her services and the one who pays] gain mutual benefits.’ 
Other students using ghostwriters agreed it was wrong but said in their defense that 
they did so because they were pressed for time, found the assessment too difficult or 
unclear, or just wanted a good grade.
When Zheng and Cheng subsequently interviewed a ghostwriter and asked how 
they felt about their work, the ghostwriter appeared not at all troubled by the ethical 
implications. Matter-of-factly, they remarked: ‘the good thing that I’ve gained from 
this job is not just money but also the writing skill’ (2015, p. 128) (Box 5.4).
Box 5.4: ‘Paper Mills’
‘Paper mills’ or ‘essay mills’ are sketchy organizations that claim to offer 
‘original’ and even ‘custom-made’ essays on any topic, at any level. Allegedly, 
they work with authors who have earned a PhD degree, or possess otherwise 
respectable credentials. However, many of these agencies operate in the shad-
ows, and some are downright swindlers.
Paper mills could pose a greater threat to academic integrity than plagia-
rism (Thomas, 2015), and the production quality of these organizations often 
leaves much to be desired, at least judging from one of the clients, who goes 
by the nickname ‘Thanatos’ and has a complaint about a company called 
‘IVY dissertations writing services’:
I used IVY thesis recently and not only did they send me a paper copied and pasted 
from other sources, it was the wrong paper all together! After I complained to them 
about the paper, they sent me a ‘revised’ paper on the correct subject, but again it 
was a simple copy and paste from 1 or 2 different websites. A simple Google search 
revealed they didn’t even attempt to change the writing from the original websites. 
When I complained to IVY, they sent me a ‘revised’ paper that was exactly the same 
as the first, but now it had misspelled words and words used in the wrong context 
throughout the paper. I complained again, and they sent the exact same paper with-




5.4.3  Where to Draw the Line?
With regard to ghostwriting, there are two ethical issues that must be considered. 
One affects the individual researcher, who must decide where to draw the line. 
Hiring others to do your work is wrong, but on the other hand, collaboration is 
becoming more and more common practice in science (even though it’s often not 
properly acknowledged, see Farrell 2001). This raises the question of who involved 
in the research should be granted co-authorship. Would that include fellow research-
ers? The project manager? Even the lab technician?
The second question affects the academic community, who has an obligation to 
protect objectivity and transparency. Peer review plays an important role in this 
obligation. It comes down to critical scrutiny for any internal and technical flaws. 
Some fear that ghostwriting bypasses this critical process. Virginia Barbour, chair-
person of COPE (Committee on Publication Ethics), expressed her concerns that 
academic peer review is being subverted by ‘almost industrial attempts by groups 
outside of normal publishing’ (Barbour 2017) (Box 5.5).
Box 5.5: ‘Free Riding: Misunderstood or Underreported?’
Imagine you are working with two other students on an assignment. There are 
certain items each of you need to work on, and the deadline is in 3 weeks. 
During that time, you realize that Alexandra, one of your teammates, contin-
ues to find new excuses for why she can’t do her share of the work. Last week, 
she explains, she fell ill, before that she had to move, yesterday her computer 
crashed, and this morning she got into a fight with her boyfriend. When she 
finally does deliver, her work is inadequate. You and your teammates end up 
doing the lion’s share of the work, even rewriting parts of Alexandra’s section. 
When the paper authored by your team gets a ‘B-’, you feel cheated by 
Alexandra.
Most students are all too familiar with behavior like Alexandra’s, known as 
‘free riding.’ It tops the list of common student annoyances, although the ‘bet-
ter than average’ principle seems in operation here: the free rider is always the 
other student.
Free riding is known to be demotivating even for diligent students, causing 
the entire team to perform suboptimally (a phenomenon called the ‘sucker 
effect’, see Swaray, 2011). Most universities recognize free riding as a nega-
tive side effect of group work and find it neither desirable nor acceptable in an 
academic environment. Thus the board of examination at the University of 
Twente declared that ‘free-riding behavior, that is benefiting from other peo-
ple’s efforts in group assignments while not putting in the same effort as the 
other group members, can be considered as fraud’ (source: www.utwente.nl/
en/bms, emphasis added).
Indeed, free riding is no different than cheating and should therefore be 




5.5  Fraud Facilitating Factors
5.5.1  What Causes Fraud?
We return to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter: what circumstances 
or factors lead researchers to fabricate research findings (and students to cheat)? 
Researchers find this to be a particularly difficult question to answer, offering a host 
of explanations. We review four different dimensions to the problem.
5.5.2  Psychological Dimension
There are indications that scientific misconduct may be a sign of ‘moral weakness,’ 
as the virtue approach would predict it (see Chap. 3). A modern-day idiom for 
behaviors of ‘moral weakness’ could be ‘anti-social personality disorder,’ which is 
associated with irresponsible behavior, grandiose feelings of self-worth, and a 
answer is no. Firstly, free riding often flies under the radar, since students 
(understandably) don’t want to ‘snitch’ on their peers. Secondly, even when 
reported, it is difficult to prove. Alexandra, in our example, could claim that 
she did contribute to the team’s effort. Is it her fault that the other two decided 
to rewrite her work?
Although acknowledging the problem, many universities find it hard to 
counter free riding. However, recently developed programs seem to be help-
ing reduce its prevalence. Swaray (2012) reports that randomly selecting one 
group member to present the group’s work increases participation, and coop-
erative learning is stimulated as a result. Further research by Maiden and 
Perry (2011) report that identifying individual contributions to group work is 
important, especially because groups can request that underperformers 
account for their behavior.
Romy Nefs (2019) proposed the following strategies to counter free riding:
• Use of small groups to allow for easy identification of individual 
contributions
• Clear assignments with well-structured schedules and strict deadlines
• Team kickoff meetings with mandatory division of labor taking place 
right away
• Team progress evaluation at midway point
• Evaluation of the team’s work at the project’s end




general lack of guilt. An example of this can be seen in the case of fraud Cyril Burt 
(see Box 5.6), who was later described as a ‘sick and tortured’ man; the enormity of 
his trickery was anything but rational (Gould 1981, p. 236).
Box 5.6: ‘The Case of Cyril Burt’
Educational psychologist Cyril Burt (1883–1971) has been regarded as one of 
the greatest frauds of the social sciences, at least until Diederik Stapel later 
assumed this dubious distinction.
A leading figure in his field between the 1940s and 1960s, Burt’s most 
important research examined the heritability of intelligence. In particular, his 
work on monozygotic (or identical) twins was considered groundbreaking at 
the time. Having collected data on identical twins from 1909 to 1930, Burt 
used then state of the art statistics to calculate the correlation of the Intelligence 
Quotient (IQ) of identical twins who had been raised together and those who 
had not, comparing those with IQs of fraternal (non-identical) twins. Based 
on these findings, he claimed that intelligence has a very strong genetic driver.
In papers published between 1943 and 1966, Burt reported IQ correlations 
of 0.771 for identical twins raised apart, and 0.944 for identical twins raised 
together, fueling rhetoric that compensatory education is ‘wasted money.’ In 
the 1960s, Arthur Jensen, following Burt’s lead, argued that ‘for many people, 
there is nothing they can learn that will repay the cost of the teaching’ (quoted 
in Tucker, 1997, p.156).
However, just months after Burt’s death in 1971, Leon Kamin, a Princeton 
psychologist, pointed out several problems in Burt’s work. For one, the num-
ber of monozygotic twins raised apart grew with every publication. Burt had 
started with a mere 15 pairs in 1909 and ended roughly 50 years later with 53, 
even though he had long since stopped collecting data. Identical twins sepa-
rated at birth are a rare commodity. Additionally, Kamin found that the cor-
relations reported remained exactly the same. He mused that the chances of 
finding the exact same correlation every time is close to zero. Remarkably, 
Kamin identified even more of Burt’s foibles, finding that the two assistants 
he had supposedly worked with were seemingly nonexistent. Further still, it 
appeared Burt’s data was constructed from ideal statistical distributions, 
rather than measured in reality (Gould, 1981, p. 235). To add insult to injury, 
Burt burnt his scientific papers shortly before his death, making foul play dif-
ficult to prove.
Burt’s supporters attempted to explain away some of the most ostensible 
problems, interpreting them as ‘sloppiness,’ not fraud, and accusing ‘left 
winged environmentalists’ of slandering his name. However, even Burt’s offi-
cial biographer, Leslie Hearnshaw, who had access to his diaries, gradually 
came to the realization that his research was completely fraudulent. By the 
(continued)
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Were frauds to be understood in terms of their psychological condition only, it 
would help explain why their behavior can be so reckless and self-destructive. After 
all, how could high profile authors producing fraudulent studies expect their deceit 
to go undetected? But would this explanation also help understand less serious 
forms of fraud (such as cheating on an exam), that people from all walks of life 
may commit?
Social psychologist Scott Wowra of the University of Florida probed first year 
psychology students at a southeastern university in the US, using an ‘integrity scale’ 
to measure the strength of their ‘moral identity’ (i.e. the incorporation of ideals of 
justice and fairness). He related student’s moral identity to their ability to recall anti-
social behavior, including academic dishonesty, and found a negative correlation. 
Thus, the ‘relative centrality’ of a college student’s moral identity appears to affect 
his or her willingness to engage in academic dishonesty’ (Wowra 2007, p. 317).
Box 5.6 (continued)
late 1970s, the verdict was accepted that Burt, once called the ‘dean of the 
world’s psychologists,’ had likely fabricated most of his data. A meticulous 
historical analysis of the case by William Tucker (1997) showed that Burt was 
a fraud beyond reasonable doubt (Fig. 5.5).
Fig. 5.5 Sir Cyril Burt in 




5.5.3  Situational Dimension
From an economic perspective, fraud in science may be all but irrational. To those 
seeking the highest outcome for the lowest cost, misconduct may be considered 
rational behavior. Economist James Wible of the University of New Hampshire 
argues that statistically-inclined, opportunistic scientists ‘estimate the probability 
and the expected utility of successful evasion from discovery and then make a con-
scious choice to commit or not commit fraud’ (1992, p. 21).
If this is true, then their decision-making depends on (a) the relative gains of 
committing fraud, (b) the probability of getting caught, and (c) the sort of punish-
ments one can expect to encounter when caught. In this calculation, the chances that 
one will engage in fabricating data can be expected to decrease with the probability 
of being discovered and the weight of the penalty.
The same applies, of course, to students who may be seduced into engaging in 
cheating behavior when the situation appears inviting or rewarding enough. 
Consequently, it can be argued that a lack of reliable systems in place to monitor for 
cheating, unfamiliarity with university policies, and the atmosphere of secrecy that 
so often surrounds fraud at universities, all contribute to the continuation of the 
conditions that breed cheating.
5.5.4  Cultural Dimension
A third approach explaining academic fraud places emphasis on the institutional 
teaching and research cultures at universities. Various cultural factors have been 
said to influence the incidence of fraud.
One such factor is publication pressure. According to sociologist Patricia Woolf 
of Princeton University, academic ‘publication is no longer just a way to communi-
cate information. It has come to be a way of evaluating scientists; in many cases it 
is the primary factor in professional advancement’ (1986, p. 254). In the decades 
since this was written, competition among universities, individual researchers, and 
even students has risen, as has the drive toward more scientific productivity and the 
call for ‘excellence.’ Some argue that this pressure caused scientists to cut corners 
(see; Fanelli, 2010a, b, 2012). We return to this issue in Chap. 9.
Another factor is peer culture, the pressure one feels to conform to the prevailing 
attitudes of their peers. In a survey of US college students, Rettinger and Kramer 
found that decisions to cheat depended at least partly on one’s perception that others 
were cheating too. They concluded that ‘seeing cheating is the beginning of a social 
learning process. New students learn how to behave by observing their peer(s)’ 
(2009, p.  310). More particularly, performance-oriented teaching styles in class, 
coupled with poor instruction, can lead students to justify cheating (Murdock in 
Rettinger and Kramer 2009). Similarly, Shu Ching Yang (2012, p. 235), who exam-
ined academic dishonesty among Taiwanese students, found that the behaviors and 
attitudes of peer groups influenced student decision making regarding such conduct.
5.5 Fraud Facilitating Factors
102
5.5.5  Integrative Perspective
Various attempts were undertaken to integrate personal, situational, and cultural 
dimensions into a unified model for analyzing cases of fraud. One such model, 
presented by Donald Cressey, is coined as the ‘Fraud Triangle’ (1973). It com-
bines three factors: incentives to commit fraud (‘opportunity’), various contextual 
factors (‘pressure’), and the perception of an action as fitting into one’s personal 
code of ethics (‘rationalization’). Thus, when students claim to be unclear about 
what behaviors constitute academic dishonesty or say a particular course ‘isn’t 
relevant for their future career,’ they rationalize. When they cite increased compe-
tition for academic positions, they perceive pressure. And when they make use of 
a gap in an exam’s procedures, they take advantage of an opportunity (Hayes 
et al. 2006).
Becker, Connoly, Lentz, and Morison (2006) found that all three factors predict 
dishonest behavior in business students (who rank the most likely to cheat). Their 
conclusion was largely confirmed by Choo and Tan (2008), who also identified that 
the three factors all held influence on a student’s propensity to cheat (Figs.  5.6 
and 5.7).
Breaking the Fraud Triangle (opportunity, pressure, rationalization) is regarded 
as a key to its deterrence. Since the three elements strongly interact, removing one 
would significantly reduce the risk of unethical behaviors emerging. Of the three, 
opportunity is ‘most directly affected by the system of internal controls and gener-
ally provides the most actionable route to deterrence of fraud’ (Cendrowski, Martin, 
& Petro, The Handbook of Fraud Deterrence, 2007, p.41) (Box 5.7).
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Fig. 5.7 ‘Alex, why are you so stressed out?’. (Photo cartoon © Ype Driessen, 2019, reproduced 
with permission from the author)
Box 5.7: ‘Hoaxing’
A ‘hoax’ is a prank, a small con committed on an individual or group of 
people, who are made to believe something only to find out that the joke’s on 
them. Hoaxes typically involve the production of some form of falsehood, but 
they aren’t classified as ‘fraud’ because the intention is not to profit from 
the deceit.
The notorious 1996 ‘Sokal Hoax’ was a practical joke played on French 
postmodernist sociologists and their followers. Alan Sokal, professor of phys-
ics at New  York University, composed a text, entitled ‘Transgressing the 
Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,’ 
which was made up largely of (attributed as well as non-attributed) quotations 
from prominent French postmodernists, including, to name a few, Gilles 
Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and Bruno Latour. In the paper, 
Sokal argued that ‘physical “reality”, no less than social “reality” is at the bot-
tom a social and linguistic construct’ (Sokal and Bricmond 1998, p. 2).
(continued)
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Box 5.7 (continued)
Sokal submitted the article to Social Text, a leading American cultural- 
studies journal, despite believing it to be complete gibberish and full of logi-
cal errors. Shortly after Social Text accepted the article and ran it in the Spring 
1996 issue, Sokal came out, declaring it a ‘parody.’ He proclaimed that his 
intentions were to expose postmodernist discourse as pretentious drivel. Sokal 
argued that despite frequent references to subjects like quantum mechanics, 
string theory, and Einstein’s general theory of relativity, postmodernists pos-
sessed a completely flawed understanding of the natural sciences. A follow-up 
book, entitled Fashionable Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of 
Science (Sokal and Bricmond 1998) spelled out his argument in further detail.
Following in the footsteps of Sokal, Peter Boghossian and two of his col-
leagues at Portland State University carried out a similar but more elaborate 
hoax in 2018, known as the ‘grievance studies affair.’ They wrote no less than 
20 articles, promoting deliberately absurd ideas on morality and morally 
questionably acts, and submitted them to journals on post-colonial theory, 
gender studies, queer theory, and intersectional feminism – which they dubbed 
‘grievance studies’ because in these fields ‘grievances are put ahead of objec-
tive truth.’ Seven articles were accepted (four even published), nine were 
rejected, and the remaining were under review or in the process of resubmis-
sion when the hoax was revealed.
The hoax, aimed to expose the lack of scientific rigor in postmodern 
research, backfired when Boghossian and his colleagues were critiqued for 
the same reason, as they had not included a control group in their experiment, 
and even had to face a research misconduct inquiry on the grounds of con-
ducting human subject-based research without approval, and for fabricat-
ing data.
Hoaxes such as these are not just ‘practical jokes.’ They are meant to be 
critiques of scientific practices, directed at the shortcomings of quality control 
in the publishing process, and purported to raise awareness of the lack of criti-
cal faculties in some academic circles. However, they also raise questions 
themselves. Is it, for example, ethically acceptable to waste recourses in this 
way? And do these authors not act in bad faith, deliberately misrepresenting 
the fields of research they purport to expose?
5.6  Clearing Science: Measures to Counter Fabrication
5.6.1  Fake Science
Fabrication is a form of academic misconduct that belongs in the realm of ‘fake sci-




5.6.2  Academic Peers
An important role in exposing fraud is reserved to the academic community. Both 
Stapel and Burt were unmasked by fellow researchers, cheating students by their 
peers. But whistleblowing is an unappealing option as we have seen, and not always 
appreciated in the academic community.
Lim and See (2001) report that Singaporean students are quite tolerant of aca-
demic dishonesty, with the majority of them preferring to ignore the problem rather 
than report it. One student commented: ‘Nobody will report another student for 
cheating as you may be the one cheating someday’ (p. 272). Malgwi and Rakovski 
(2009) found that American students were just as reluctant to report academic dis-
honesty to the relevant authorities, and preferred other counter measures (including 
stronger penalties, parental notifications, or use of an anonymous tip line).
5.6.3  Proctoring or Disciplining?
Many notorious frauds were in the position to hide their actions. Would putting 
more checks in place, and not allowing the opportunity to fabricate data in the first 
place play a role in diminishing the ethical risks?
With forms of online and distance learning rapidly expanding at universities, 
‘proctoring’ (supervising students taking exams, verifying their identities, and other 
forms of vigilance) becomes indispensable to not ‘giving an opportunity’ to cheaters.
Research by Prince, Fulton, and Garsombke (2009) suggests that some form of 
vigilance is justifiable, but it can easily transform into ludicrous distrust, as the 
‘Classroom Management and Student Conduct’ page of WikiHow reveals. On the 
page with tips for teachers, we find such suggestions as this: Greet the student as 
they come into the classroom, look them in the eye, and watch for signs of nervous-
ness, while simultaneously inspecting their arms to see if notes are written on them. 
Also: Know that some female students might write on their legs but be aware that 
that observing this behavior might lead to an accusation of harassment.
In a climate of mistrust and suspicion, students will complain that campus integ-
rity policies are biased against them (see McCabe 2005). Or worse, argues 
Zwagerman (2008, p. 6909), in a climate that is entirely designed to eliminate every 
opportunity to cheat, suppression of academic dishonesty becomes ‘more important 
than anything that might be sacrificed in the effect – including education.’
5.6.4  Sanction or Honor Code?
Would it help to decrease incidents of cheating by increasing the penalty? In an 
examination of several classical cases of fraud, Bridgestock (1982) argues to the 
contrary. He observed that for many offenders, career pressure, or even an unusual 
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commitment to a certain set of ideas, overrides considerations of ethics. Sanctions 
are ‘at best a partial deterrent to fraud’ (pp. 378–9).
Stephen Davis (1993) corroborates this finding. Confronted with the question: ‘If 
a professor has strict penalties and informs the class about them at the beginning of 
the semester, would this prevent you from cheating?’ some 40% of male students 
responded ‘no.’ Female students were only slightly more responsive. Closer exami-
nation of the data showed that the majority of the students who responded with a 
‘no’ had reported previously cheating in college. In short: ‘if students have cheated 
in the past and plan to cheat again, there is precious little that will sway their course 
of action’ (1993, p. 28).
On the other hand, would an approach that capitalizes on fairmindedness and 
justice help? Can cheating be deterred if students are made more familiar with aca-
demic integrity, and offered an honor code to abide by? Jordan (2001) finds that 
indeed, non-cheaters have a greater understanding of institutional policies than 
cheaters do, but since cheaters and non-cheaters received the same information, the 
difference between them seems to lie in their attitude towards it.
McCabe advocates for a ‘just community approach,’ which cherishes democratic 
values and promotes moral reasoning. He further adds that it’s not just students that 
need to be enlightened: ‘the real key to building and sustaining an atmosphere of 
student integrity on any campus may be involving all members of the campus com-
munity – students, faculty, and administration’ (1993, p. 656).
5.7  Conclusions
5.7.1  Summary
This chapter dealt with a wide variety of a very serious form of fraud in science, 
namely the fabrication of data, research findings, and test results, which can be 
accomplished in a number of ways. Well-known cases of forgery from the likes of 
disgraced academics Cyril Burt and Diederik Stapel were discussed, and the ques-
tion of how to identify and expose these frauds was explored. On the flip side, the 
fate of those who do the exposing, the ‘whistleblowers,’ saw our attention.
Cheating among students, as a fraudulent ‘shortcut to knowledge’ is discussed, 
and examples of cheating are presented. From this, we examined whether cheating 
has increased over the years and if there was in fact a ‘cheating crisis,’ as some 
proclaim.
Furthermore, debates were presented on the practice of having others write 
your papers, hoaxes as a specific form of fabrication and whether they have a cleans-





Cheating, fabrication, and forging of research data, among other forms of fraud, 
have plagued science from its humble beginnings, but has it increased in the past 
few decades? Is there truly a ‘cheating crisis,’ perhaps even beyond academia?
There are certainly indications that such a crisis exists, but at the same time, the 
scientific community appears more concerned with research ethics than ever before. 
From this, we identify two important questions to ponder. Are we doing enough to 
prevent or at least combat this crisis? And have conditions in science changed such 
that fabrication has become more lucrative or attractive? Both questions will be the 
subject of further discussion in subsequent chapters.
 Case Study: The Temptations of Experimental 
Social Psychology
Ruud Abma
At the end of August 2011, social psychologist and dean of the social science fac-
ulty at Tilburg University, Diederik Stapel, was confronted with allegations of fraud. 
The evidence was gathered by three of Stapel’s junior colleagues, who had tried in 
vain to replicate the results of his earlier studies. A week later, Stapel confessed to 
the fabrication of his data. He was immediately fired, and a committee was installed 
to investigate all of his publications.
As may have been expected, the media extensively covered the scandal. 
Psychologists immediately responded by emphasizing that Stapel was an exception 
and that psychological research resoundingly conformed to the rules of scientific 
integrity. Other scientific community members, including methodologists, pointed 
out the presence of a whole ‘grey area’ between accepted types of data cleaning (i.e. 
removing outliers) and outright scientific misconduct. In this grey area, they argued, 
a vast number of researchers fell prey to the temptation of bending the rules, using 
procedures such as ‘cherry picking’ (only reporting significant outcomes) and ‘data 
cooking’ (presenting and using processed data as raw data).
Of course, scientific misconduct is not limited to social psychology or the social 
sciences. It is a challenge for science itself. Around the same time Stapel’s fraud 
was revealed, a professor in vascular surgery was found to have faked results on a 
massive scale. This too caused a stir in the media, but nothing compared to Stapel’s 
case. Apparently, there is something about (social) psychology that generates an 
extraordinary amount of media attention (Fig. 5.8).
To understand what Stapel did, it’s important to know how he worked. Together 
with either a colleague or a PhD student, Stapel would propose a research theme and 
hypothesis, and construct an experimental design. Subsequently, he would volun-
teer to test it – by himself. He then would return with the data already ordered into 
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neat tables, with readymade statistical analyses in hand. From there, he instructed 
his PhD students to integrate them into their research articles.
On October 31st 2011, the Levelt Committee published a preliminary report (see 
https://www.commissielevelt.nl/) concluding that at least 30 journal publications 
(co)authored by Stapel had been based on fabricated data, and that these fraudulent 
practices had been going on since at least 2004. Thereupon, Stapel withdrew his 
doctoral degree and said in a public statement: ‘I have used improper means to pro-
duce attractive results. In modern science, the level of ambition is high and the 
competition for scarce means is huge. During the last years, this pressure has gotten 
the better of me. I did not cope adequately with the pressure to score, to publish 
(…). I wanted too much too fast. In a system where there is a lack of control, where 
people usually work alone, I have taken a wrong turn.’
In his statement, its striking that Stapel refers to flaws in the system (pressure to 
publish, lack of control, etc.). This is in line with his inaugural lecture at Tilburg 
University in 2008, where he proclaimed: ‘It is the context that determines whether 
you cheat or not. You cheat when you’re angry, if the game lets you, if you don’t 
want to lose from your older brother, or if you play against your six year old daugh-
ter and do not want to win.’
So, what then about the ‘game’ of social psychology? What is the context here 
that determines whether you cheat or not? According to Stapel, it was publication 
culture: ‘Like the consumer that sees bargains and shopping-streets everywhere, the 
scientist that is rewarded to the publication sees potential articles everywhere. In the 
long run, this strategic behavior is not in the interest of the forum of science. It leads 
to scientific pornography, the result of a quick climax. It leads to trendy and con-
formist science at the expense of originality and creativity.’
It seems there were two sides to Diederik Stapel: one that conformed to the high 
impact publication culture, with trendy articles that guaranteed attention in both 
Fig. 5.8 Diederick 
Stapel’s autobiographical 





scientific journals and the popular media, and another that rebelled against this cul-
ture in the name of quality of content and long term satisfaction – corresponding to 
the intrinsic value of science. The inner friction between the two may have stirred 
the anger and cynicism that would eventually lead professor Diederik Stapel toward 
scientific misconduct.
When Stapel’s scheme was finally found out, the self-purifying capacities of the 
scientific community were hailed. But the damage to the reputation of social psy-
chology was enormous and led to both debates and policy measures within the field 
(Van Lange, Buunk, Ellemers, & Wigboldus, 2012) and fundamental thoughts about 
the status of theory formation in social psychology (Ellemers, 2013). The damage 
he brought on his colleagues and PhD students, who had contributed to his research 
and publications but were kept in the dark about his fraudulent practices, was 
immeasurable: apart from the emotional shock resulting from such a severe breach 
of trust, they had to re-evaluate their publication list and ward off suspicions about 
their own conduct.
How was it possible that Stapel was able to skirt detection for possibly more than 
15 years? Does this mean that the structures of (social) science, with peer review at 
its foundation, are starting to crumble? The Levelt-reports presented an astonishing 
example of peer review failing to act as a check on bad science. And that is exactly 
what the committee’s statistical experts found throughout Stapel’s publications; 
‘very doubtful results’, ‘highly implausible results’, ‘unbelievably high factor load-
ings’, and ‘results extremely unlikely’, to name a few.
The scientific fraud perpetrated by Stapel prompted authorities in academia to 
introduce stricter rules and regulations, and increased efforts to better inform stu-
dents of the misgivings of scientific misconduct. The Stapel case has also sparked 
debates on publishing habits and research subject selection, including replication of 
experimental studies. Compared to the allure of producing novel results, replication 
is not ‘sexy,’ and most journals are not interested in publishing replication research 
(see Chap. 9 for further discussion).
What is to be learned from all of this?
First of all, even if Stapel’s misconduct is an isolated case – which it probably is 
not – his long-lasting misconduct can be seen as partly the result of an unfortunate 
combination of perverse incentives (publish or perish) and lack of scrutiny (by col-
leagues and peer reviewers).
Second, this unfortunate combination endemic within – at least – the field of 
social psychology is influencing a great number of researchers. Just observing the 
absurdly long lists of publications showcases how much researchers associate sci-
entific quality with number of publications. As long as this system of reward and 
promotion via publication frequency maintains its grip on researchers, the risk of 
sliding down the slope from ‘data cleaning’ to ‘data falsification’ remains a distinct 
possibility. We end with the words of philosopher of science David Hull (1998, 
p. 30): ‘Melodramatic as allegations of fraud can be, most scientists would agree 
that the major problem in science is sloppiness. In the rush to publish, too many 
corners are cut too often.’
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 Assignment
 1. There is apparently something distinct about (social) psychology that allows it to 
generate an extraordinary amount of media attention. What could that be?
 2. How do you believe Stapel was able to commit fraud for so long?
 3. What could be done to prevent cases like this from happening again?
 Case Study: Unexplained or Untrue?
Parapsychology is the study of psychological processes that are ‘not yet under-
stood’ by the ‘regular sciences.’ Think of extra-sensual perception, or telepathy 
(thought transference). Research into these processes raise several questions, such 
as: How can one have access to another’s thoughts without the need to communi-
cate? Is it even possible?
William James and Gerard Heymans, the ‘founding fathers’ of academic psy-
chology in the United States and the Netherlands, respectively, were among the first 
to take parapsychological phenomena seriously. It was Heymans who attempted to 
conduct proper experiments in telepathy (Heymans, Brugmans, & Weinberg, 1920). 
He asked a non-professional ‘medium’ (an individual claiming psychic sensitivity) 
to take part in a series of tests lasting several months, running a total of 157 trials. 
These experiments are regarded as some of the most successful parapsychological 
studies ever undertaken (Fig. 5.9).
The medium that took part in Heymans experiment was a 23-year-old mathemat-
ics student named Abraham van Dam. Van Dam was selected because he claimed 
the capacity to ‘know’ the whereabout of hidden objects by simply ‘sensing’ their 
location. He was first blindfolded, then seated in a blackened cardboard box approx-
imately the size of a telephone booth. Inside, van Dam was able to stick his hand 
through a small hole in the front panel of the box. Opposite the box, and out of van 
Dam’s line of sight, lay a rectangular board with 48 marked fields, not unlike a chess 
board (the fields were numbered A1, A2, etc.).
When van Dam was seated in the booth, Heymans withdrew to the attic above the 
test room, where he could observe van Dam’s hand hovering over the board. 
Heymans would now concentrate on a pre-selected field on the board. He would 
then attempt to ‘steer’ van Dam’s hand to the correct field by means of telepathy. 
Van Dam, being the ‘receiving party.’ would allow his hand to be ‘conducted’ by the 
thoughts of the other. Whenever van Dam believed he had reached the field Heymans 
supposedly directing him toward, he would tap with his finger on the board, thus 
selecting a particular field. Upon van Dam’s queue, Heymans would select a new 
field and the same procedure would start anew. Heymans and his assistants were 
able to record the accuracy of van Dam’s selections over a large number of attempts 
(Fig. 5.10).
The outcome of this experiment was truly impressive. Van Dam produced no less 
than 55 hits (a success ratio of 35%). This is a significant result, as the probability 
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Fig. 5.9 Gerard Heymans, 
1857–1930. Founder of 
modern Dutch psychology, 
researchers of thought 
transference. (Photo: 
A.S. Weinberg)
Fig. 5.10 Test set up of 
the 1919 telepathy 
experiments. (Source: 
Heymans et al. 1920, p. 4)
predicted no more than 4 hits in a series of 157 trials, a 1 in 48 chance to pick the 
correct field in any given attempt. Interestingly, van Dam performed much better at 
the beginning of the experiment than at the end, leading Heymans to believe that the 
‘medium’ had gradually lost his ‘psychic abilities.’ Therefore, Heymans decided to 
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discontinue the series. Finally, it is worth noting that there were two experimental 
conditions: in one, the sender (Heymans or one of his co-workers) was nearby (stay-
ing in the same room), in the other, the sender was further away (staying in the 
attic). Remarkably, van Dam did slightly worse in the ‘nearby condition,’ suggest-
ing there were no immediate cues he could use to determine his choice.
Historians of science have struggled to interpret this study. Proponents of para-
psychology often cite the experiments as solid proof that telepathy exists. Heymans 
himself claimed that ‘the existence of thought-transference […], has been put 
beyond reasonable doubt by these experiments.’ Very rarely do studies in the field 
of parapsychology result in such convincing evidence. But what does that mean – to 
have ‘convincing evidence’?
In 1979, a team of researchers at Groningen University attempted to replicate 
Heymans’ experiment using the same design, but with a different medium and mod-
ern equipment, like video cameras (Draaisma, 1970). They were resolute in ensur-
ing that no form of ‘information leakage’ help the medium guess correctly.
What they found was in effect the opposite of Heymans’ findings. During the 
entire series of trials, their medium never produced a single hit. Now, a failed repli-
cation doesn’t necessarily prove that the original experiment was ‘corrupted,’ the 
researchers admitted, but it does lay barren the challenges of studying parapsychol-
ogy scientifically. That is to say: if the phenomenon you study does not possess an 
observable set of rules, and rather its study depends on finding someone who hap-
pens to have ‘psychic abilities,’ then this ‘inexplicable process’ cannot be studied 
scientifically. Therefore, parapsychology cannot be considered a science.
Psychologist Hans Linschoten (1959) observed, however, that parapsychology 
can be a science if it ‘distances itself entirely from any inkling towards the mystic’ 
and its practitioners dedicate themselves to ‘finding law-like psychological func-
tions.’ Inevitably, this recommendation will burden parapsychology with a terrible 
dilemma. To become reputable (and thus be fully accepted as a science), parapsy-
chology must prove that its object of study (the paranormal) does not really exist, 
and is in fact a subset of psychology proper. But then of course, it would no longer 
be parapsychology, but ‘just’ psychology.
 Assignment
Consider the value of evidence (Heymans’ findings) and counterevidence 
(Groningen research findings) in controversial research. When should you be 
 prepared to accept ‘strange findings,’ and at what point do you accept that counter-
evidence has subverted your initial ‘strange’ findings? Replication is the key con-
cept here but consider how difficult it could be to replicate an original study in 
parapsychology! Think about the relevance of the Heymans studies when contem-
plating the following questions:
• What does it take to decide whether or not something is an ‘unexplained phe-
nomenon’ or is just ‘untrue’; i.e. a chance finding?
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• Should researchers be allowed to ask ‘strange questions’? In other words: can the social 
sciences study ‘elusive phenomena’ such as telepathy, and if yes, are there any limits?
• Are there subjects in the social sciences that you believe resemble parapsycho-
logical phenomena in their inability to be studied scientifically?
 Suggested Reading
Horace Freeman Judson’s (2004) The Great Betrayal and John Grant’s (2008) 
Corrupted Science present highly approachable accounts of both well-known and 
lesser-known cases of scientific fraud. Fraud and Education: The Worm in the 
Apple, by Harold Noah and Max Eckstein (2001) focuses on cases of cheating, test 
tampering, and other forms of professional misconduct in science. Daniele Fanelli’s 
2009 studies are a must read for any academic interested in these issues.
References
Anderson, E.  M., & Murdoch, T.  B. (2007). The psychology of academic cheating. London: 
Elsevier.
Anonymous. (2014, April 15). Grootschalige fraude dor eerste jaars economie UvA [Large-scale 
fraud by economy freshmen at Amsterdam University]. Algemeen Dagblad. Retrieved from: 
https://www.ad.nl/binnenland/grootschalige-fraude-door-eerstejaars-economie-uva~a62acb79/
Anonymous. (2016, December 16). Wirbel an der Uni Salzburg: 100 Prüfungen nicht beurteilt 
[Fuss at the University of Salzburg: 100 exams not decided]. Salzburger Nachrichten. Retrie-
ved from: https://www.sn.at/salzburg/politik/wirbel-an-der-uni-salzburg-100-pruefungen- 
nicht-beurteilt-604705
Barbour, V. (2017, May). ‘From the outgoing chair’. COPE newsletter, 5(5).
Becker, D., Connoly, J., Lentz, P., & Morison, J. (2006). Using the business fraud triangle to 
predict academic dishonesty among business students. Academy of Educational Leadership 
Journal, 10(1), 37–54.
Board of examinations of Tilburg University, ruling 972. (2012, July 2). Retrieved from: https://
www.tilburguniversity.edu/sites/default/files/download/ID%20972_2.pdf
Bongers, V. (2015, March 19). Taakstraf voor fraude met cijferlijst. [Community service for fraud 
with grade list]. Leids universitair weekblad MARA, 38(23). Retrieved from: http://archief.
mareonline.nl/archive/2015/03/18/taakstraf-voor-fraude-met-cijferlijst
Bridgestock, M. (1982). A sociological approach to fraud in science. The Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Sociology, 18(3), 364–383. https://doi.org/10.1177/144078338201800305.
Cendrowski, H., Martin, J. P., & Petro, L. W. (2007). The handbook of fraud deterrence. Hoboken: 
J.P. Wiley & Sons.
Chapman, K. J., & Lupton, R. A. (2004). Academic dishonesty in a global educational market: A 
comparison of Hong Kong and American university business students. International Journal 
of Educational Management, 18(7), 425–435. https://doi.org/10.1108/09513540410563130.
Choo, F., & Tan, K. (2008). The effect of fraud triangle factors on students’ cheating behav-
iors. In B. N. Schwartz & A. H. Catanach (Eds.), Advances in accounting education (Vol. 9, 
pp. 205–220). Bingley, UK: Emerald. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1085-4622(08)09009-3.
Commission Levelt. (2012). Failing science. In The fraudulent research practices of social psy-
chologist Diederik Stapel [Falen wetenschap: De frauduleuze onderzoekspraktijken van 
sociaal-psycholoog Diederik Stapel]. Tilburg: Tilburg University.
References
114
Cressey, D. R. (1973). Other people’s money. Montclair: Patterson Smith.
Crocker, J. (2011). The road to fraud starts with a single step. Nature, 479, 151. https://doi.
org/10.1038/479151a.
Davis, S. (1993). Cheating in college is for a career: Academic dishonesty in the 1990s. Paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Psychological Association (39th, Atlanta, 
GA, March 24–27, 1993). Retrieved at: https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED358382.pdf
Dickerson, D. (2007). Facilitated plagiarism: The saga of term-paper mills and the failure of leg-
islation and litigation to control them. Villanova Law Review, 52(1), 21–46. https://digitalcom-
mons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss1/2.
Diekhoff, G. M., Labeff, E. L., Clark, E., Williams, L. E., Francis, B., & Haines, V.  J. (1996). 
College cheating: Ten years later. Research in Higher Education, 37(4), 487–502. https://doi.
org/10.1007/BF01730111.
De Vrieze, J. (2017, September 23). ‘Toen deze promovenda een fraudeur ontmaskerde, keken 
haar collega’s weg’ [When this PhD student unmasked a fraud, her colleagues looked the other 
way] De Groene Amsterdammer.
Fanelli, D. (2009, May 29). How many scientists fabricate and falsify research? A systematic review 
and meta-analysis of survey data. PLOS One. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0005738
Fanelli, D. (2010a, April 7). Positive results increase down the hierarchy of the sciences. PLoS 
One. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0010068
Fanelli, D. (2010b, April 21). Do pressures to publish increase scientists’ bias? An empirical sup-
port from US states data. PLOS One. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0010271
Fanelli, D. (2012). Negative results are disappearing from most disciplines and countries. 
Scientometrics, 90, 891–904. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-011-0494-7.
Farrell, M. P. (2001). Collaborative circles. Friendship dynamics & creative work. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison process. Human Relations, 7(2), 117–140. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/001872675400700202.
Franklin-Stokes, A., & Newstead, S.  E. (1995). Undergraduate cheating: Who does what and 
why? Studies in Higher Education, 20(2), 159–172. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
03075079512331381673.
Gould, S. J. (1981). The mismeasurement of man. London: Penguin.
Grant, J. (2008). Corrupted science. Fraud, ideology and politics in science. Wisley: Fact, 
Figures & Fun.
Hayes, D., Hurtt, K., & Bee, S. (2006). The war on fraud: Reducing cheating in classroom. Journal 
of College Teaching & Learning, 3(2), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.19030/tlc.v3i2.1742.
Healy, D. (2005). Shaping discontent. The role of sciences and marketing. In P. Pietikainen (Ed.), 
Modernity and its discontent. Sceptical essays on the psychomedical management of malaise 
(pp. 33–48). Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation.
Jordan, A. E. (2001). College cheating: The role of motivation, perceived norms, attitudes, and 
knowledge of institutional policy. Ethics & Behavior, 11(3), 233–247. https://doi.org/10.1207/
S15327019EB1103_3.
Judson, H. F. (2004). The great betrayal. Fraud in science. Orlando: Harcourt.
Lim, V. K. G., & See, S. K. B. (2001). Attitudes toward, and intentions to report, academic cheat-
ing among students in Singapore. Ethics & Behavior, 11(3), 261–274. https://doi.org/10.1207/
S15327019EB1103_5.
Maiden, B., & Perry, B. (2011). Dealing with free-riders in assessed group work: Results from 
a study at a UK university. Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education, 36(4), 451–464. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02602930903429302.
Malgwi, C. A., & Rakovski, C. C. (2009). Behavioral implications and evaluation of academic 
fraud risk factors. Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting, 1(2), 2–37.
Markowitz, D., & Hancock, J. (2014). Linguistic traces of a scientific fraud: The case of Diederik 
Stapel. PLoS One, 9(8), e105937. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0105937.
McCabe, D. L. (1993). Faculty responses to academic dishonesty: The influence of student honor 
codes. Research in Higher Education, 34(5), 649–650. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00991924.




McCabe, D. L., & Trevino, L. K. (1996). What we know about cheating in college: Longitudinal 
trends and recent developments. Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning, 28(1), 28–33. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00991924.
Moffatt, B., & Elliott, C. (2007). Ghost marketing: Pharmaceutical companies and ghostwritten 
journal articles. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 50(1), 18–31. https://doi.org/10.1353/
pbm.2007.0009.
Nefs, R. (2019). Free-riding among students: Causes, consequences and solutions. Unpublished 
report, Utrecht University.
Noah, H. J., & Eckstein, M. A. (2001). Fraud and education. The worm in the apple. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield.
Pabian, P. (2015). Why ‘cheating’ research is wrong: New departures for the study of student 
copying in higher education. High Education, 69(5), 809–821. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10734-014-9806-1.
Prince, D. J., Fulton, R. A., & Garsombke, T. W. (2009). Comparisons of proctored versus non- 
proctored testing strategies in graduate distance education curriculum. Journal of College 
Teaching & Education, 6(7), 51–62. https://doi.org/10.19030/tlc.v6i7.1125.
Rettinger, D.  A., & Kramer, Y. (2009). Situational and personal causes of student cheating. 
Research in Higher Education, 50(3), 293–313. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11162-008-9116-5.
Singal, J. (2015, May 29). The case of the amazing gay-marriage data: How a graduate student 
reluctantly uncovered a huge scientific fraud. New York Magazine.
Sismondo, S. (2009). Ghost in the machine: Publication planning in the medical sciences. Social 
Studies of Sciences, 39(2), 171–198. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312708101047.
Sokal, A., & Bricmond, J. (1998). Fashionable nonsense. Postmodern intellectuals’ abuse of sci-
ence. New York: Picador.
Swaray, R. (2012). An evaluation of a group project designed to reduce free-riding and promote 
active learning. Assessment and Evaluation in Higher Education, 37(3), 285–292. https://doi.
org/10.1080/02602938.2010.531246.
Thanatos. (2006, November 10). Re: Ivy dissertations is a total scam. Retrieved from https://essay-
scam.org/forum/es/ivy-dissertation-total-two-others-try-72/
Thomas, A. (August 19, 2015). ‘Forget plagiarism: there’s a new and bigger threat to academic 
integrity’. The Conversation.com/uk.
Tucker, W. H. (1997). Re-reconsidering Burt: Beyond a reasonable doubt. Journal of the History 
of the Behavioral Sciences, 33(2), 145–162. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6696(199721
)33:2<145::AID-JHBS6>3.0.CO;2-S.
Vandehey, M., Diekhoff, G. M., & LaBeff, E. E. (2007). College cheating: A twenty-year follow-
 up and the addition of an honor code. Journal of College Student Development, 48(4), 468–480. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/csd.2007.0043.
Versluis, V., & De Wild, A. F. (2015). Actieve borging tegen fraude [Active security against fraud]. 
Kenniscentrum Business innovatie, Hogeschool Rotterdam. Retrieved at: https://www.hoge-
schoolrotterdam.nl/onderzoek/projecten-en-publicaties/pub/actieve-borging-tegen-fraude/
f6b3626e-a5e4-42b8-9199-3f2dcd469647/
Wible, J. R. (1992). Fraud in science: An economic approach. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 
22(1), 5–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/004839319202200101.
Woolf, P. (1986). Pressure to publish and fraud in science. Annals of Internal Medicine, 104(2), 
254–256. https://doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-104-2-254.
Wowra, S.  A. (2007). Moral identities, social anxiety, and academic dishonesty among 
American College Students. Ethics and Behavior, 17(3), 303–321. https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/10508420701519312.
Yang, S. C. (2012). Attitudes and behaviors related to academic dishonesty: A survey of Taiwanese 
graduate students. Ethics & Behavior, 22(3), 218–237. https://doi.org/10.1080/1050842
2.2012.672904.
Zheng, S., & Cheng, J. (2015). Academic ghostwriting and international students. Young 




Zwagerman, S. (2008). The scarlet P: Plagiarism, and the rhetoric of academic integrity. College 
Composition and Communication, 59(4), 676–710. Retrieved March 27, 2020, from www.
jstor.org/stable/20457030
References for Case Study: The Temptations of Experimental 
Social Psychology
Abma, R. (2013). De publicatiefabriek. Over de betekenis van de affaire-Stapel [The publication 
factory. On the significance of the Stapel affair]. Nijmegen: Vantilt.
Ellemers, N. (2013). Connecting the dots. Mobilizing theory to reveal the big picture in social 
psychology (and why we should do this). European Journal of Social Psychology, 43(1), 1–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.1932.
Hull, D. L. (1998). Scientists behaving badly. New York Review of Books, December, 3, 24–30.
Levelt, P., et al. (2011). Interim-rapportage inzake door prof. dr. D.A. Stapel gemaakte inbreuk op 
wetenschappelijke integriteit. Tilburg: Universiteit van Tilburg.
Levelt, P., et al. (2012). Flawed science. The fraudulent research practices of social psychologist 
Diederik Stapel. Tilburg: Tilburg University.
Stapel, D. A. (2008). Op zoek naar de ziel van de economie. Over het werkwoord hebben en het 
werkwoord zijn [Searching for the soul of the economy. On the verb ‘to have’ and the verb ‘to 
be’]. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
Stapel, D. A. (2011, October 31). Public statement.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Buunk, A. P., Ellemers, N., & Wigboldus, D. H. J. (2012). Sharpening sci-
entific policy after Stapel. ASPO: Internal report. https://kli.sites.uu.nl/wp-content/uploads/
sites/426/2019/09/Sharpening-Scientific-Policy-After-Stapel.pdf
References for Case Study: Unexplained or Untrue?
Draaisma, D. (1970). Een Replica van Heymans’ onderzoek betreffende telepathie [A replica of 
Heymans’ study into telepathy]. Heymans Bulletins, p. 79.
Heymans, G., Brugmans, H. J. F. W., & Weinberg, A. A. (1920). Een experimenteel onderzoek 
betreffende telepathie [An experimental study regarding telepathy]. Mededeelingen der SPR, 
1, 1), 1–1), 7.
Linschoten, J. (1959). Parapsychologie en algemene psychologie’ [Parapsychology and general 
psychology]. Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie, 27, 226–237.
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
5 Fabrication and Cheating
117© The Author(s) 2020





6.1  Introduction  118
6.1.1  Sloppy Science  118
6.1.2  Falsifying  119
6.2  Bias at the Start of the Research Process: Asking Critical Questions  120
6.2.1  Confirmation  120
6.2.2  Challenging Bias  121
6.3  Bending the Empirical Cycle: Manipulations During Research  122
6.3.1  ‘Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics’  122
6.3.2  Questionable Research Practices  122
6.3.3  Image Manipulation  126
6.4  Bias in Disseminating Research: Publication Bias  128
6.4.1  File-Drawer Problem and False Positives  128
6.4.2  Reviewer and Editorial Bias  129
6.5  Self-Deception  131
6.5.1  Mistakes Happen  131
6.5.2  To Remember or Not to Remember (That Is the Question)  133
6.6  Science’s Self-Correction  134
6.6.1  Self-Correction  134
6.6.2  Beyond Retraction?  135
6.7  Conclusions  136
6.7.1  Summary  136
6.7.2  Discussion  137
 Case Study: Yanomami Violence and the Ethics of Anthropological Practices  137
 Assignment  140
 Case Study: Fraud or Fiction? Diary of a Teenage Girl  140
 Assignment  143
 Suggested Reading  143
 References  144
Electronic Supplementary Material: The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/ 
10.1007/978-3-030-48415-6_6) contains supplementary material, which is available to autho-
rized users.
118
After Reading This Chapter, You Will:
• Know exactly what falsifying is
• Be able to distinguish falsification from other forms of fraud
• Understand how falsifying impacts the social sciences
• Develop strategies to address falsification
Keywords Conformation bias · Deep data diving · Dichotomization · 
Disconfirmation dilemma · Editorial bias · False positive · Falsification · Falsifying 
· File drawer problem · Image manipulation · Impact factor · HARKing · My side 
bias · Outliers · Pathological science · Peer review · p-hacking · Post- publication · 
Protheus phenomenon · Publication ethics · Publication bias · Questionable 
research practice · Replication · Retraction · Reviewer bias · Self- correction · 
Self-deception · Sloppy science · Submission bias
6.1  Introduction
6.1.1  Sloppy Science
In 2012, Anthropologist Mart Bax of Free University Amsterdam was already in 
retirement when suspicion arose about the validity of his field work, some of which 
dated back to the 1970s and 80s. It was thought that if he hadn’t fabricated his 
research outright, then at the very least he had manipulated it. That is to say, he was 
accused of (among other things) having altered and even removed crucial details in 
his data. He had ascribed statements to untraceable participants and staged actions 
that could not be verified.
An integrity commission was set to work and concluded the following year that 
Bax was guilty of scientific misconduct. He had presented ‘improbable events as 
“historical facts,” embedded in research that systematically obscures names of per-
sons and places and muzzles sources and contains inaccuracies in a large number of 
places’ (Baud et al. 2013, p. 39).
The lack of openness and transparency Bax exhibited has become an exemplar of 
what we now call ‘sloppy science’ – carefree and negligent research practices that 
include both intended and unintended violations of scientific norms. In this case, the 
researcher seemed to have placed little value into verifiability and transparency, 
which sit as cornerstones of appropriate scientific practice.
When sloppy research veers into falsehoods, we speak of ‘falsifying’ or ‘falsifi-
cation.’ To avoid confusion with the terminology used by philosopher Karl 
Popper (see below), we stick to ‘falsifying.’ Falsification in Popper’s sense means 





The term falsifying, literally meaning ‘rendering false,’ entails forms of manipula-
tion that allow researchers to use a dataset that supports biased or even erroneous 
claims. It includes ‘trimming’ (leaving out certain findings) and ‘massaging’ 
(slightly changing) data, as well as altering images, misrepresenting results, and 
simply not reporting findings.
If fabrication (presenting fake or non-existent research data) and plagiarism (lit-
erary theft) are sciences’ deadly sins, punishable by severe penalties, then falsifying 
is its daily sin. It is a less visible, less spectacular form of misconduct, and the sci-
entific community tends to view it more tolerably than its lethal counterparts. 
Unjustly so, says Köbben (2012), who warns that the accumulation of these smaller 
sins represents a far greater danger to science than the (isolated) larger ones. 
Overtime, and left unchecked, this accumulation will result in the large-scale pollu-
tion of scientific research.
This being said, some considerations must be first addressed. Not all manipu-
lations represent a researcher’s intent to deceive, nor is every form of manipula-
tion prohibited, as we shall see below. Also, one must distinguish between 
deliberate manipulations and honest errors. Furthermore, these two should not 
be confused with scientific disagreement (researchers challenging the conclu-
sions of one another). Thus, although falsifying is considered ‘misconduct,’ it 
can be difficult to assess exactly when acceptable research practices lapse into 
dubious ones. It is on this note we enter into the heart of the problem of aca-
demic fraud – which is less about demarcating right from wrong, and more about 
ethical reflection and decision- making. The aim of this chapter is to raise aware-
ness of these issues by exploring several dimensions of falsifying in research 
practices.
By and large, in this chapter we follow the research process itself. We start with 
the forms of bias that appear at the first stage of the process, when research ques-
tions are posed. Following the selection of questions, a discussion will take place 
regarding the falsities that result from (slight) alterations, or the act of manipulation 
during data collection and analysis.
We finish with a discussion of the biases often present when research conclu-
sions are reported and disseminated in a skewed or one-sided way. Though this is 
referred to as publication ethics, it relates to our subject of research ethics because 
it discloses disturbances in the research process.
In two separate sections, we discuss the problem of self-deception (falsifying by 




6.2  Bias at the Start of the Research Process: Asking 
Critical Questions
6.2.1  Confirmation
Research starts with asking questions. But, as any student knows, asking good ques-
tions demands a self-critical attitude, and a readiness to address and counter one’s 
own preconceptions. In fact, scientists should actively look for information that 
disconfirms their opinions about the world, an action for which the term ‘falsifica-
tion’ is reserved (as explained above).
The reality is, this is much more difficult than it appears. There is a long- identified 
experimental effect known as confirmation bias (sometimes called myside bias, see; 
Perkins 1985; Toplak and Stanovich 2003). Confirmation bias consists of the ten-
dency of individuals to judge new information in a way consistent with their preex-
isting ideas or convictions. People thus prefer supporting information rather than 
conflicting information and tend to overlook or disregard information that does not 
fit into their worldview (Jonas et al. 2001).
Notorious examples are found in ‘psychic studies’ (studies into paranormal 
activities) and psychoanalysis (studies into the unconscious mind). In both tradi-
tions, there exists a strong tendency toward confirming what was theoretically 
hypothesized. But it is far from restricted to just these domains and has been 
observed in more empirically oriented research traditions a well.
As a case in point, Greenwald et al. (1986) examined empirical research into a 
phenomenon known as the sleeper effect. This is the counter-intuitive finding that a 
persuasive message accompanied by a ‘discounting cue’ (a prompt that indicates the 
message is untrustworthy) tends to develop more impact over time. For example, 
viewers watching a ‘smear campaign’ against one political candidate, paid for by 
the opposite candidate, will develop a more favorable attitude towards the message 
weeks after being exposed to the message, rather than immediately afterwards, 
despite being aware that the source is biased.
To explain this effect, it was hypothesized that over time, the discounting cue 
becomes dissociated from the original message, and therefore ceases to be effective 
in countering it (this is known as the dissociation hypothesis). Research into the 
sleeper effect has not been able to confirm this hypothesis, however that did not 
deter the researchers from investigating it. Only much later did researchers realize 
that the ‘dissociation hypothesis’ was incorrect, and that an entirely different expla-
nation was required. This fixation on a single hypothesis, and the resulting neglect 
of alternative theories has obstructed scientific understanding on the subject for 
some 25 years, Greenwald et al. observed.
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6.2.2  Challenging Bias
Effectively, confirmation bias undermines open and critical thinking and runs 
against creativity. This poses a serious challenge for science. Open-mindedness and 
creativity are two of science’s most crucial features. How can scientists avoid or 
Box 6.1: ‘Disconfirmation Dilemma’
How are we to deal with disconfirmation in the empirical process? If the 
results of an experiment don’t confirm theoretical expectations, researchers 
are confronted with what Greenwald et al. call a ‘disconfirmation dilemma.’ 
Researchers can decide to either (a) reanalyze the data, (b) revise the proce-
dures, or (c) reformulate a different prediction (based on the same theory). 
Rarely do researchers decide for option (d), to publish disconfirming results.
When researchers resolve the disconfirmation dilemma by repeatedly 
retesting predictions, instead of reporting disconfirmation, they may be 
accused of some form of ‘falsifying’ because they resort to theory- confirmation 
rather than theory testing (Fig. 6.1).
Fig. 6.1 Disconfirmation Dilemma. (Adopted from Greenwald et al. 1986, p. 220. The dotted line 
represents a route infrequently taken)
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counter this type of bias? Is it possible, for example, to train scientists to consider 
both sides of an argument? There is evidence that this may be possible, at least to 
a degree.
Wolfe and Britt (2008) found that when students were assigned to one side of a 
(somewhat controversial) topic and received instructions to search for as much 
information on the topic as they saw fit, they would display confirmation bias. 
However, when instructed to search specifically for balanced information, confir-
mation bias was significantly reduced. Similarly, Macpherson and Stanovich (2007) 
found that decontextualization instructions (instructions to put aside one’s own con-
victions and consider the issue from opposite sides) helped reduce confirmation 
bias. These findings, preliminary as they are, point to the importance of making 
explicit one’s expectations (Box 6.1).
6.3  Bending the Empirical Cycle: Manipulations 
During Research
6.3.1  ‘Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics’
The next step in the research process consists of setting up a design in order to test 
hypotheses. In the social sciences, significance testing of null hypotheses is an 
omnipresent tool, and will be the focus of the next three sections.
The simplest example of significance testing is the evaluation of null hypothesis 
μE = μC against the alternative hypothesis μE ≠ μC. Here μE denotes the mean of the 
outcome variable in an experimental group, and μC the mean of the outcome vari-
able in the control group. If the p-value for testing the two hypotheses against each 
other is smaller than .05, the null hypothesis is rejected. If it is larger than .05, then 
it means there is no significant difference between the two groups, and the null 
hypothesis is accepted on account that no evidence of an experimental effect 
was found.
Scientific journals have long tended to only publish results that have shown the 
experimental condition to be ‘effective,’ that is, if the p-value is smaller than .05. It 
is therefore crucial for researchers to obtain low p-values, otherwise their effort, 
time, and money is wasted. For some, obtaining small p-values has become a goal 
in itself. This raises some ethical questions which will be explored below.
6.3.2  Questionable Research Practices
Can research outcomes be manipulated such that lower p-values are obtained? The 
answer is yes, for example, by removing so-called ‘outliers.’ Outliers are extreme 
scores, and removing them heightens the chance of getting significant results. 
It sounds like cheating but that need not be the case, there can be good reason to 
6 Falsifying
123
remove outliers. Outliers can result from data errors (incorrectly recorded data) or 
because respondents may have failed to understand their role, or the questions 
asked. For instance, one survey gathered data on nurses’ hourly wages. While on 
average respondents reported to earn $12.00 an hour, with a standard deviation of 
$2.00, one nurse reported an hourly wage of $42,000.00, which was clearly errone-
ous (it was more likely their annual income). Not removing this number would 
influence the true outcome (see Osborne and Overbay 2004).
However, consider the case of Dirk Smeesters, professor of consumer behavior 
and society at the Rotterdam School of Management. His work attracted the atten-
tion of fellow researcher Uri Simonsohn from Wharton University in 2011. He had 
read some of Smeesters’ work and suspected foul play. Simonsohn believed 
Smeesters’ studies were ‘too clean to be the result of random sampling’ (quoted in 
Chamber 2017, p. 81). He requested and obtained Smeesters’ dataset and discov-
ered anomalies. It seemed that Smeesters had removed participants from his data 
when they led his hypotheses toward not being confirmed. Smeesters responded that 
the participants ‘had not understood the instructions’ (quoted in Kolfschooten 2012, 
p. 270).
This did not satisfy Simonsohn. An integrity commission investigated the case 
and ruled that this reversal of logic, by which outliers are removed to boost signifi-
cance, should be understood as ‘data massaging.’ Smeesters confirmed that he had 
acted ‘erroneously’ but denied that he had committed fraud: ‘What I have done was 
to give a study, which was already almost good, a push in the right direction’ 
(Kolfschooten 2012, p. 270). That didn’t help his case. Seven papers he co-authored 
were retracted and Smeesters resigned from his position in 2012.
What Smeesters engaged in are called questionable research practices, or QRPs 
for short. QRPs have become serious concerns in the academic community. 
Simmons (2011) noted that ‘flexibility in data collection and analysis allows 
researchers to present almost anything as significant.’
QRPs take many shapes and forms. To name a few; failing to report all dependent 
measures, selective reporting (only submitting studies that were successful), and 
excluding data after looking at the impact (as Smeesters had done).
Evidence of QRPs on a large-scale were found by Masicampo and Lalande 
(2012). They collected the reported p-values from three high-level psychological 
journals and compared their distribution. Given that smaller p-values are more 
appreciated, one would expect to see a steady decline in reports with larger p- values. 
What they found instead was a steady decline, followed by a peculiar peak of 
p- values just below .05 (see Fig. 6.2).
Many take this as evidence for the existence of ‘falsifying,’ because it appears 
that researchers have manipulated their data to ensure their data falls within an 
acceptable p-value of below .05.
Further qualitative evidence of QRPs on a large-scale was found by Leslie John 
and his collaborators. John et al. (2012) surveyed over two thousand psychologists 
and found a majority of psychologists admitted to engaging in a variety of such 
behaviors. In their widely circulated article, it was estimated that some questionable 
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research practices are so widespread that it must be assumed that virtually everyone 
uses them.
This raises the question as to whether these practices constitute a new scientific 
norm (John et  al. 2012). Discussing this controversial conclusion, Fiedler and 
Schwarz (2016) warn against an inflation in the usage of the term QRPs precisely 
because of the suggestion of normalization. Some of the reported practices, they 
argue, are merely ambiguous, not ‘questionable,’ while others may or may not be 
justifiable depending on the specifics of the case (p. 50).
We do not propose that QRPs are the ‘new norm.’ On the contrary, there is a seri-
ous danger that the scientific literature becomes polluted with ‘breakthroughs’ (sig-
nificant findings) which are not breakthroughs at all. Indeed, in the June 1st, 2011 
issue of Scientific American, John Ioannidis argues that exaggerated results in peer- 
reviewed scientific studies have reached ‘epidemic proportions’ in recent years 
(Box 6.2).
Fig. 6.2 ‘A peculiar prevalence of p-values just below .05’. Figure by Larry Wasserman, based on 
the data collected by Masicampo and Lalande (2012). Used with permission from the author. 
(Source: Normal Deviate, entry August 16, 2012)
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Box 6.2: ‘P-hacking and HARKing’
The following case, discussed in several entries on the critical website 
Retraction Watch in 2017, provides a rare glimpse into how the academic 
community responds to questionable research practices.
Several years ago Brian Wansink, a world-renowned food researcher at 
Cornell University, provided a visiting PhD student with the complete set of 
data of a self-funded study that failed to produce any notable results. He told 
the student that it is was well worth the effort to search for overlooked pat-
terns, further stating that ‘there’s got to be something here we can salvage 
because it’s a cool (rich & unique) data set.’ The student set to work and man-
aged to produce five articles in just six months using the dataset. In a now 
deleted blog post of November 2016 (‘The Grad Student Who Never Said 
“No”’), published on his personal website, Wansink proudly reported on this 
student’s success, presenting it as a ‘lesson in productivity’.
His readers were less impressed. ‘This is a great piece that perfectly sums 
up the perverse incentives that create bad science. I’d eat my hat if any of 
those findings could be reproduced in preregistered replication studies.’ 
Another reader commented, saying that what was described in the blog 
sounded suspiciously like p-hacking and HARKing (entry at Retraction 
Watch, 2.2.2017).
P-hacking (also called ‘phishing’) is term used to describe how researchers 
try to uncover statistically significant patterns in a data set without having a 
specific hypothesis. They just hope to find statistically significant results. 
HARKing is the flipside of this coin (HARK stands for Hypothesizing After 
Results are Known). It consists of presenting a post hoc hypothesis in a 
research report as if it were, in fact, an ‘a priori’ (earlier formulated) 
hypothesis.
Had Wansink been ‘bending the rules of the game’ by letting his student go 
through raw data in the hopes of unearthing something (anything), which then 
would be presented as a ‘finding’?
When confronted with the accusation of p-hacking, Wansink retorted that 
testing the null hypothesis had been his ‘plan A.’ It was when he didn’t find 
anything that he turned to ‘plan B.’ As Wansink explained: ‘P-hacking 
shouldn’t be confused with deep data dives – with figuring out why our results 
don’t look as perfect as we want. With field studies, hypotheses usually don’t 
“come out” on the first data run. But instead of dropping the study, a person 
contributes more to science by figuring out when the hypo worked and when 
it didn’t. This is Plan B′ (quoted in an entry on Retraction Watch, 2.2.2017).
Wansink’s rebuttal failed to convince readers of Retraction Watch. One 
wrote: ‘Deep dives are great, but they should be planned when the study is 
being constructed, not created after the fact in an attempt to “salvage” some-
thing from the experience’ (2.2.2017). Another sarcastically remarked: 
‘Wansink’s use of the phrases “our results don’t look as perfect as we want” 
[…] pretty much speaks for itself’ (3.2.2017).
(continued)
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6.3.3  Image Manipulation
Recent technological advances provide researchers with a wealth of opportunities 
for furthering their research in ways not available fifteen or twenty years ago. But as 
with any change, new ethical considerations emerge. In the case of digital images, 
there is a growing concern in the scientific community over how to properly han-
dle them.
However, not everyone saw wrongdoing. Another reader wrote in 
Wansink’s defense, exclaiming that not all exploratory studies constitute 
‘p-hacking’: ‘[There] is nothing wrong with a researcher honestly engaging in 
and presenting an exploratory analysis without a single pre-defined hypothe-
sis. As long as these studies are presented honestly, they can provide useful 
insights and generate useful hypotheses that can later be verified (or debunked) 
through attempts to replicate, often by other researchers in the field’ 
(19.2.2017).
The result of Wansink’s actions?  – By the summer of 2019, when this 
chapter was written, 17 of his papers were retracted (one even twice) and he 
resigned from his position. (See Resnick and Bellus 2018, for further discus-
sion.) (Fig. 6.3)
Box 6.2 (continued)
Fig. 6.3 Threats to reproducible science. (Adapted from Munafò et al. 2017)
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Today, there are multiple known cases of unethical manipulation of images that 
affected the interpretation of the data presented, a number of them having led to 
retractions. One such case, a 2009 paper published in the Journal of Biological 
Chemistry by Spanish researcher José G. Castaño, was retracted because (quoting 
from the notice published September 9th 2016 on Retraction Watch) ‘the same 
image was used to represent results of different experimental conditions’ on multi-
ple occasions, adding further that the ‘background of one image had inappropriately 
been adjusted.’
A lack of awareness of what is considered an acceptable form of image manipu-
lation calls for the creation of guidelines to help researchers distinguish between 
appropriate and inappropriate use of digital images. A set of such general principles 
is discussed by Cromey (2010), who compares these guidelines to what is already 
established practice in the field of photojournalism. A sampling of these guiding 
principles includes the following recommendations:
• Digital images should be acquired in a manner that does not intend to deceive the 
viewer or to obscure important information.
• Manipulation of digital images should be performed only on a copy of the image.
• Simple adjustments and cropping are acceptable but lossy (irreversible) com-
pression should be avoided, and use of software filters to improve image quality 
is not recommended.
• Cloning or copying objects into a digital image is considered highly questionable 
(Box 6.3).
Box 6.3: ‘Consequences of Retraction’
With an increased awareness of research ethics in our day and age comes 
an increased awareness of the consequences of misconduct. We quote from 
an anonymous cry for help, posted on October 16th, 2013 on ‘Editage 
Insights’ (a platform for researchers, authors, publishers and academic 
societies): ‘I recently got an email from the editor of a journal in which my 
paper is published, requesting me to retract the paper because they found 
some errors in my data and statistical analysis. I am worried about my repu-
tation if I have a retracted paper. I may not get a grant for my next study. 
Please advise me.’
In a response posted on March 30th, 2017: ‘I would encourage you to 
respond positively to the journal editor’s request and offer to have your paper 
retracted. If you do so, the journal’s retraction notice will inform readers that 
the paper has been retracted by agreement among the authors and the journal 
editor, owing to errors in data.’ (source: Editage Q&A).
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6.4  Bias in Disseminating Research: Publication Bias
6.4.1  File-Drawer Problem and False Positives
Imagine a researcher testing the effects of the new and promising treatment ‘X’ (say 
a particular form of cognitive behavioral therapy for a certain type of anxiety disor-
der). To the researcher’s disappointment, a comparison between the experimental 
group who received this form of therapy and a control group who received no ther-
apy (or a different therapy), resulted in a p-value of .14. Since this is larger than .05, 
the hypothesis is rejected, and the results are not published. Another researcher 
(unaware of the first researcher’s work because it was not published) is interested in 
the same therapy. Their comparison results in a p-value of .37, and again the results 
are not published. Shortly thereafter, a third researcher evaluates treatment ‘X’. 
They find a p-value of .02, and as a result the findings are published.
Based on this one publication by researcher No. 3, the unsuspecting reader will 
conclude there is evidence for the effectiveness of treatment ‘X’. In reality, the 
effectiveness of treatment ‘X’ is a false positive because there is actually more evi-
dence to the contrary – that it doesn’t work. The problem being, that evidence was 
never published. Our full understanding is obscured by the fact that studies that 
show no result are not published. Robert Rosenthal coined a term for this; the file- 
drawer problem.
‘False positives’ and the complementary ‘file-drawer problem’ relate not so 
much to theoretical or methodological issues in research, but to questions regarding 
dissemination (communication or non-communication of research findings), related 
to publication ethics.
If there are frequent false positives and/or numerous unpublished null results, 
any meta-analysis of a particular research subject will turn up corrupted. How seri-
ous is this problem?
One way of researching this question is by comparing the amount of research 
undertaken with the number of publications stemming from that research. In many 
fields of research, pre-registration is required (the researcher must catalogue his 
research protocol in advance, submitting hypotheses, methodology, and expected 
findings). This makes it easier to check for both p-hacking and HARKing, but it also 
allows for the questioning of submission bias (the tendency to only submit for pub-
lication studies that have ‘positive findings’). In the social sciences though, pre- 
registration is a recent phenomenon and not the norm, with a few exceptions.
One exception is the public registry TESS (Time-Sharing Experiments in the 
Social Science). Franco et al. (2014) followed studies registered in TESS over a ten- 
year period, to see how many of them were eventually published in peer-reviewed 
journals. It turned out that 80% of the registered studies were written up, but less 
than half (48%) were published. Unsurprisingly, there proved to be a strong rela-
tionship between the outcome of the study (whether or not the hypothesis was sup-
ported by the results) and it being published. Studies that had negative results were 
far less likely to be published, and even less likely to be written up at all.
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Why do researchers opt to not write up ‘null results’? Franco et al. (2014) ques-
tioned a selective group of researchers by email and got answers that confirmed 
their suspicion. As one of their respondents reported: ‘I think this is an interesting 
null finding, but given the discipline’s strong preference for p < 0.05, I haven’t 
moved forward with it.’ (p. 1504).
6.4.2  Reviewer and Editorial Bias
Another source of publication bias is located in the process of peer review and jour-
nal editorship. Both peer reviewers and journal editors effectively function as gate-
keepers, deciding whether an article is worthy of publication. We discuss both roles 
below, starting with peer reviewers.
The ‘peers’ in the peer review process are researchers themselves, often experts 
in a field from which they are recruited. They are asked to assess the quality of 
manuscripts sent to a journal. The review procedure in which they participate is as 
a rule blind. That is to say, the author is not aware of the reviewer’s identity (single 
blind), but often the reviewer doesn’t know the identity of the author either (double 
blind). Peer reviewers do not get paid for their work, should have no interests 
involved, be unconnected to the authors, and act solely on the desire to guarantee 
objectivity and impartiality in science.
But does it really work like that? Some argue that peer review is indeed the best 
system that we have, providing impartial quality control. Others contend it may 
have functioned as such at one point but it longer does in today’s society, where sci-
ence cannot permit the luxury of operating from an ivory tower any longer (we turn 
to this discussion in greater detail in Chap. 9). And then there are those who argue 
that the peer review system has never guaranteed quality control in the first place.
They point to the fact that some of the most important and groundbreaking works 
in the history of science were never peer reviewed, that some of these work were 
initially rejected by peer reviewers, and that vice versa, flawed, non-sensical or even 
absurd papers were accepted by them (see Box 5.7 on ‘hoaxing’).
If we cannot rely on peer reviewers to detect errors, identify misconduct, or spot 
what is truly innovative, then the peer review system does not safeguard quality. But 
perhaps it is even worse. There is reason to believe that the peer review system is 
biased in at least two ways.
 1. Peer reviewers may be too conservative. Reviewers are believed to be biased 
against new findings and new ideas. Also, they focus too much on finding weak-
nesses in manuscripts and not on the positive contributions therein. Suls and 
Martin (2009, p. 43) argue this may be so because ‘appearing to be too lenient 
seems worse that appearing to be too harsh.’
 2. Reviewers seem prejudiced in favor of prestigious research institutions and 
established authors. Peters and Ceci (1982) found confirmation of this suspicion 
in a small-scale study they performed. They selected 12 previously published 
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articles, originally written by researchers from prestigious American psychology 
departments, and resubmitted them to the same (highly prestigious) journals that 
had previously published them, but under fictitious names and fictitious institu-
tions. Only three articles were detected as ‘resubmissions’; eight out of the nine 
remaining articles were rejected on ground of insufficient quality (some were 
even critiqued for having ‘serious methodological flaws’).
Consider next the role of journal editors. As gatekeepers, editors not only have to 
safeguard quality, but also to present interesting, original, and novel findings to their 
readership. This may lead to a bias against replication studies because they don’t 
offer anything new, despite replication being the ‘gold standard’ in science (see 
Møller and Jennions 2001). Kerr, and later Rowney and Zenisek (quoted in Hubbard 
and Armstrong 1994) conducted a survey among editors and review board members 
of both management and psychology journals, and indeed found confirmation of 
editorial bias against replication studies.
The editor’s obligation to present novel and interesting results can furthermore 
lead to an effect known as the proteus phenomenon. In essence, whenever positive 
results are published, a window of opportunity quickly opens for researchers to 
publish findings that contradict these results. Editors often publish these findings 
because they too are a ‘novelty.’ The net effect is a tendency for journals to rapidly 
publish conflicting results (see Pfeiffer et al. 2011) (Box 6.4).
Box 6.4: ‘Adjusting the Data? A Dilemma’
On the ‘r/AskAcademia’ Reddit community, a student identified as 
‘Throwinbin’ (henceforth ‘T’) published a telling post. T referenced a super-
visor who requested that they make use of a dataset in which a specific 
approach was implied. The problem was, the data (provided by a third party) 
did not fit the format that the approach required. In T’s words: ‘Using [my 
supervisor’s] method will involve removing whole articles from our data set 
and changing the (important, central) main attribute of the set. It’s basically 
massaging the data until it fits the model of his method. I’m not comfortable 
doing this as I strongly believe that it’s going to give us false results […]. How 
to raise this with [my supervisor] without sounding really bad?’
Below are the (edited) exchanges between T and three community mem-
bers who responded to the post. From these exchanges, it becomes clear that 
‘data massaging’ is not the only issue at stake, and a number of other ethical 
dimensions are in play. Consider how T managed the situation:
Respondent A: ‘Is there a person in your department you could consult (with 
no stake in your publications)?’
T: ‘I have a “second supervisor,” but I’m not keen to take this concern else-
where in the department at the moment. I like my supervisor and I don’t 





6.5.1  Mistakes Happen
Earlier we noted that various forms of falsifying must not be confused with ‘honest 
mistakes.’ But there is one type of ‘honest mistake’ that should be considered a form 
of falsifying, even if the researcher had no intention to mislead. This is self- 
deception. Self-deception occurs when the researcher is so strongly convinced that 
a particular model or theory is correct that they are unable to accept evidence to the 
contrary. We will discuss a few forms of self-deception from here.
Perhaps the strongest form of self-deception consists of discovering information 
that doesn’t exist, a phenomenon ironically dubbed pathological science. The dis-
covery of so called ‘N-rays’ (an alternative to X-rays) by French physicist René- 
Prosper Blondlot in 1903 counts as one such example (Grant 2008, pp.  88–89). 
Blondlot built a device that enabled him to ‘see’ these rays. He gave demonstrations 
and others, if trained properly (or told what to look for), would see them too. The 
non-existence of N-ray was exposed when a sceptic secretly turned off the device 
and Blondlot still claimed to ‘see’ the rays.
Respondent B: ‘If you do want to approach your supervisor, then ask how to 
organize the data to make them fit (rather than the approach of saying it is 
wrong), and maybe he will explain something you hadn’t thought about.’
T: ‘I’ve done this – which is how I now have in emails him telling me to 
remove certain rows from the data, and later reorganize whole columns 
without making sure the changes carry over the entire dataset. I’ve made 
the changes he asked for and ran his method and it looks pants [not good].’
Respondent C: ‘Could you not go down the ‘play dumb’ route? – “I’m con-
fused, maybe I’m just stupid, I’m not sure how your [method] is entirely 
relevant. Can you explain how it’s better than x”?’
T: ‘I do understand his need for this method well; he wants to move on from 
our current institution and this will look good on a CV. I sympathize with 
him as I’m not very happy with the situation in our department either and 
would be looking to move on if I could. I’ve admitted defeat and made our 
data work his model. Results so far are rubbish, so I’m going to take it to 
him and put the ball in his court – though if he insists on it going into a 
paper I don’t want my name anywhere near it.’




The biography of Wilhelm Reich, a former Freudian who had gone astray (Sharaf 
1983) offers a similar story. Reich was convinced he had discovered a new form of 
energy, which he called ‘orgone.’ He built a device in which orgone would accumu-
late, and while testing his device, he found a constant temperature difference of 2 °C 
inside the ‘orgone accumulator.’ Believing this to prove the validity of his discovery 
beyond a reasonable doubt, he contacted Einstein, who kindly agreed to study his 
device. Two weeks later, Reich received word from Einstein, who stated that his 
assistant had come up with a simpler explanation for the temperature difference – 
lack of air circulation. Reich was unswayed and maintained faith in his ‘discovery.’
In the field of parapsychology, Alfred Russell Wallace, a British naturalist and 
the co-discoverer of natural selection, offers another interesting example. During 
his investigations, Wallace accepted certain observations as evidence for the exis-
tence of extra-perceptual phenomena. In his autobiography, he wrote about his con-
version to ‘Spiritism’ after having attended a series of séances with a ‘medium’: ‘I 
was so thorough and confirmed a materialist that I could not at that time find a place 
in my mind for the conception of spiritual existence, or for any other agencies in the 
universe than matter and force. Facts, however, are stubborn things. […] Facts 
became more and more assured, more and more varied, more and more removed 
from anything that modern science taught, or modern philosophy speculated on. 
The facts beat me’ (quoted in Shemer 2002, p. 192).
The irony of ‘facts’ having ‘beaten’ Wallace is probably not lost on the reader, 
for the séances were in reality very likely carefully orchestrated performances of 
frauds. Wallace himself, however, was not a fraud – he was taken in by the perfor-
mance (Fig. 6.4).
Fig. 6.4 Carried away by self-deception
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6.5.2  To Remember or Not to Remember (That Is 
the Question)
The above discussed cases of self-deception may be comical illustration of how 
scientists were able to fool themselves in the past. Yet the question arises whether 
we can be sure that some of our own present day discoveries are not also instances 
of self-deception.
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, a debate emerged within psy-
chology over whether or not a repressed childhood memory of sexual assault could 
be recovered through the aid of specific forms of therapy (Pezdek and Banks 1996). 
Proponents of recovered memory therapy argue that children who go through such 
assaults ‘dissociate’; meaning they repress all memories of such traumatic experi-
ences and will not remember them, unless aided in some way.
Recovered memory therapy became prominent in the 1990s. Certain recipients 
of the therapy recalled highly bizarre satanic-abuse memories. In some cases, these 
testimonies led to prison sentences for men accused of these crimes. However, it 
turned out that at least some of these accusations were false and the ‘perpetrators’ 
were released. This prompted critics to question the validity of recalled memories 
(for a full discussion see Loftus and Ketcham 1994).
Did the ‘recovered memory movement’ find in the testimonies of their clients 
what they wanted to hear, or had they unearthed a new phenomenon which main-
stream science refused to accept because it was too controversial? (Box 6.5)
Box 6.5: ‘Not Sure If It’s Research Misconduct’
A PhD student turned February 2020 to ‘r/AskAcademia’ discussion platform 
on the website Reddit, for advice, writing how that it seemed as if a professor 
in had been engaged in research misconduct, and considered taking it to 
the board.
When I opened the file [of my professor], I noticed that a lot of the figures 
have been altered. In several cases he took a bar graph (looks like a screen-
shot from a Prism file) and then covered one of the bars with a different bar. 
The new bar would have a different height and number of significance aster-
isks than the original one. I could move over the replacement bar and see the 
original figure – the replacement was clearly cropped out of a different figure 
and pasted onto this one. […] I talked to a few other students about this. They 
think it’s possible he’s just lazy or doesn’t know how to use Prism. Like maybe 
his students repeated an experiment and that changed the results, but he didn’t 
want to (or know how to) update the figure in Prism so he just pasted the new 
bar on top? This seems sketchy to me, and I don’t think it explains the differ-
ence from his published figure either. […] I’m hesitant to ask him directly. If 
he actually is falsifying data, it’s not like he’s going to admit it to me. I’d 




6.6  Science’s Self-Correction
6.6.1  Self-Correction
Discoveries of falsehoods in research are traditionally met with a defensive system 
of self-correction known as retractions. This quite simply means that a ‘contami-
nated’ publication is flagged but not withdrawn from the public domain. A note is 
attached to the paper that states it has been ‘retracted.’ Retraction can take place 
with or without the author’s consent and can be argued on the grounds of method-
ological or theoretical flaws, or because research misconduct was identified.
Retractions are not to be taken lightly. Until quite recently, misconduct and sub-
sequent retraction of a publication remained an internal matter, known to only a few 
parties. However, with the rise of digital publications, retractions have become 
much more public (and visible). For example, the website Retraction Watch is dedi-
cated exclusively to highlighting misconduct, fraud, and retractions in science 
(across all disciplines). It keeps track of virtually all that is going on in the academic 
world in a very public manner, posting the full names and affiliations of all parties 
involved. A retracted article, though ‘withdrawn,’ not only remains visible, it effec-
tively becomes a permanent stain on an author’s reputation (see Box 6.3 for an 
impression of this consequence).
However my classmates think going over his head without first asking for an 
explanation would be wrong. I’m really at a loss for what to do.
Here are some of the replies this PhD student received:
 1. I think it’s quite weird that you are worried that it may reflect badly on you 
if you ask him directly. Yet, you think that the more drastic approach of 
going to the chair is less worrying.
 2. You don’t have evidence of misconduct and there are only downsides to 
yourself from making accusations. I’d say forget about it.
 3. I think a good and non-accusatory way to go about it is (if initially via 
email): ‘Hi X, I’ve noticed that there are revisions to the graphs in the 
PowerPoint. Did you happen to obtain more evidence/data changing the 
original graphs and supporting your conclusions? If so, what steps or proj-
ects are you pursuing after the new information?’
Which of these advices do you prefer? Or would you consider a different 
approach?





Apart from the personal consequences, there remains the question of what dam-
age fraudulent articles can cause. After all, an undetected (unflagged) fraudulent 
paper will remain in the public domain, continuing to act as a source of pollution in 
future literature. This is important to consider, as a great deal of time may pass 
before a fraudulent study is retracted. Interestingly, in the last few decades, the 
retraction process has quickened, with the number of retracted papers increasing 
in lock step. From this, three questions can be raised: (1) Is this increase a good 
thing or not, and how to account for it?; (2) Are retractions the right answer to the 
problem of QRPs?; and (3) Are there better alternatives? We will very briefly touch 
on these issues in the sections to come.
6.6.2  Beyond Retraction?
In an often-cited article, Daniele Fanelli (2013) investigates retractions in scientific 
literature. Scouring through data from the Web of Science (a publisher-independent 
global citation database) for the entire twentieth century, Fanelli notes a sudden 
increase in retracted papers per year since the 1980s of some 20%. He then com-
pared this increase to the number of ‘corrections’ applied to articles in the same 
period, which did not see a similar increase.
Fanelli proposed two hypotheses, that both have a radically different outlook on 
the question of whether or not the increase in retractions signifies a positive devel-
opment. One attaches the increase to growing misconduct within the academic com-
munity, and thus sees the growing number of retractions as a bad sign. The other 
states that the system has become more resilient, and thus the increased number of 
retractions signifies something good.
Fanelli argues that the evidence in his study suggests that the ‘stronger system 
hypothesis’ is more likely to explain the rise in retractions than the hypothesis that 
scientists have become more fraudulent. Peers, editors, and the scientific commu-
nity at large seem to have become more sensitive to and aware of misconduct, and 
consequently, have become more proactive about it (see furthermore Ioannidis 
2012; Fanelli 2018).
This begs the question, even if editors have become more aware of the issue, can 
we trust that science will be able to rectify (all of) its mistakes this way? Stroebe 
et al., reviewing a number of recent examples of misconduct, are not overly optimis-
tic. Science is based on trust, they argue, and as such ‘scientists do not expect their 
colleagues to falsify their data, and do not look for signs of fraud’ (2012, p. 680). 
What would really help, Stroebe et al. argue, is to fortify the position of the whistle-
blowers, who, after all, have been responsible for detecting the majority of falsities 
in the first place.
Furthering this line of thinking, consider Post-publication Peer Review (PPPR). 
PPPR is a commenting system that allows publications to be reviewed and dis-
cussed online, on platforms such as PubPeer and Open Review after they have been 
published – on a (mostly) permanent basis.
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Appraising this approach, Jaime Teixeira da Silva (2015, p. 37) considers that the 
advantage of PPPR is that it ‘makes authors, editors, peers, journals and publishers 
accountable for what they have published or approved of publishing in the frame-
work of their publishing models.’
However, the question is whether PPPR should consist of anonymous reviews 
(comparable with traditional peer review) or not. Teixeira da Silva is a vocal oppo-
nent of anonymity in peer review and a severe critic of PubPeer, which publishes 
anonymous reviews and allows unchecked accusations with little or no accountability.
Evidently, PPPR invites questions about the quality of those peers, but it also 
points to a new direction science is taking. In the twenty-first century, research in 
the social sciences is no longer considered an isolated effort of one individual (or a 
small group of individuals), but rather that of whole networks. Using the strength of 
collectives (networks) while simultaneously answering the increasing call for 
greater transparency, we find a growing inclination among social scientists to use 
open repositories to deposit and share data, pre-registration of protocols, and the 
commissioning of experts to monitor and review research. Thus, in the social sci-
ences (modeling the medical sciences), ethical review boards have attained a pro-
gressively more important function in research.
While many of these initiatives further the social sciences in becoming more 
open and more accountable, aiding it in diminishing publication bias and forms of 
sloppy science, it does little to overcome confirmation bias, which still looms over 
the field, mainly because scientists will still only publish ‘significant’ results. In an 
attempt to address this problem, Ioannidis (2012) and van Assen et  al. (2014), 
among other advocates, propose that journals should no longer focus on novel find-
ings. Let them instead publish everything, including null results. They argue this 
change will make the scientific record complete, rather than fragmented.
6.7  Conclusions
6.7.1  Summary
In this chapter, we’ve followed the empirical cycle from beginning to end, exploring 
the various ways bias may disturb or corrupt our findings. We found that research 
does not always reveal what was intended or desired, leading to the danger of mis-
representation, one-sidedness, or even the production of downright falsehoods.
We showcased how the questions we ask may be biased towards the confirmation 
of what we already know. Confirmation bias (AKA myside bias) effectively 
obstructs creativity and progress in science and impedes more objective or at least 
impartial explorations from taking place.
With a strong incentive to publish research that show significant results, the dan-
ger of questionable research practices (QRPs) was introduced. Data massaging, 
p-hacking, HARKing, and other tricks meant to lower the p-value and thus ‘heighten’ 
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the validity of research outcomes have the potential of polluting research findings 
on a large-scale, and endangers science’s credibility.
The file-drawer problem and false positives point to the danger of bias during the 
dissemination process and reside under publication ethics. The tendency to report 
only what is significant, and to avoid reporting null findings creates a distorted view 
of reality, further enhanced by editorial and review bias, and the dangers of 
self-deception.
Increased retractions of ‘contaminated’ (fraudulent) papers show that science is 
able to self-correct, but the question is whether this is enough. Some argue that the 
system is strong enough to correct itself in the long run, whereas others believe 
more drastic measures are called for, including post-publication peer review (PPPR), 
pre-registration, and new journal policies to publish everything instead of only 
‘interesting’, ‘novel’, and ‘significant’ findings.
6.7.2  Discussion
Research falsifying clearly poses a threat to science’s claims of objectivity, verifi-
ability, and other core values of science (see Chap. 2). Part of the problem may be 
attributed to overly ambitious researchers not taking the standards seriously enough, 
but part of it cannot be attributed to willful misconduct. Confirmation bias may be 
the result of something that remains entirely unconscious, and the file-drawer prob-
lem may be more likely the result of a fault in the system than the fault of an indi-
vidual researcher. Similarly, editorial bias seems ingrained in the larger dissemination 
process, and certainly requires further attention. What suggestions do you have for 
addressing these ever-present issues of falsifying?
 Case Study: Yanomami Violence and the Ethics 
of Anthropological Practices
Toon van Meijl
The classic monograph by Napoleon Chagnon ([1968] 1983) about violence and 
warfare among the Yanomami Indians in the Amazon is one of the best-known eth-
nographic studies of a tribal society. In combination with a number of films he made 
alongside Timothy Ash, the monograph Yanomamo: The Fierce People offered a 
penetrating picture into a society that was intensely competitive and violent. In 
Yanomami society, one-third of all adult men were claimed to die as a result of 
violence (Fig. 6.5).
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Chagnon visited the Yanomami periodically over many years to examine his 
assumption that patterns of warfare and violence may best be explained in terms of 
man’s inherent drive to have as many offspring as possible, which he labelled repro-
ductive fitness. He argued that the most aggressive men win the most wives and 
have the most children, thus passing their aggressive genes on to future generations 
more abundantly than the peaceful genes of their nonaggressive rivals. For Chagnon, 
the Yanomami provided an excellent case of this sociobiological principle because 
in the 1960s, while they were exhibiting an intense competition for wives, they were 
still virtually unaffected by Western colonial expansion.
The assumption that Yanomami society had not been influenced by colonial con-
tacts, however, has been criticized by the historical anthropologist R. Brian Ferguson 
(1995). Rather than viewing the Yanomami as innately violent, he interpreted the 
intense violence in the region as a direct consequence of changing relationships 
with the outside world. Although the villages visited by Chagnon may not have had 
contact with missionaries or colonial officers, their presence in the wider region had 
disturbed the balance in inter-communal relations, especially by the introduction of 
steel tools and weapons. As a consequence, the rivalries between villages intensified 
and fighting erupted in efforts to gain access to the increasingly important new 
goods available in the region. Accordingly, Ferguson contended that the fighting 
was a direct result of colonial circumstances rather than biological drivers.
Several years later, Chagnon’s interpretation of violence in Yanomami society 
was also criticized on ethical grounds by the investigative journalist Patrick Tierney 
(2000b). He argued that the violence witnessed by Chagnon had not only been 
caused by indirect influences of colonial contact with westerners, as Ferguson had 
argued, but also by Chagnon’s own fieldwork practices. He pointed out in great 
detail that Chagnon had contributed to disturbing the balance between communities 
Fig. 6.5 Yanomami 
woman and her child at 




by providing steel goods, including weapons, to his informants, which in turn pro-
voked numerous conflicts, raids, and wars. He was also accused of exploiting hos-
tilities between factions and rival communities so he could document violent 
incidents for the films he and Timothy Ash produced. Finally, Chagnon was charged 
with transgressing Yanomami ethics by obtaining the names of dead relatives, which 
was considered taboo for surviving relatives. Thus, Chagnon’s own fieldwork prac-
tices were argued to be a direct cause of the violence that he explained only in terms 
of genetics.
The publication of Darkness in El Dorado (Tierney 2000b) was preceded by a 
pre-publication in The New Yorker (Tierney 2000a), which appeared shortly before 
the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) in 2000. 
This piece highlighted an additional accusation, namely that Chagnon had collabo-
rated with epidemiologist James Neel, who was claimed to have tested a new vac-
cine against measles among the Yanomami. As a consequence of Neel’s work, 
hundreds of Yanomamis were said to have died because they never built up an 
immunity to the measles virus. To prevent a huge scandal that could severely harm 
the reputation of the entire discipline of cultural anthropology, a public debate was 
held at the AAA meeting about the ethical aspects of Chagnon’s research practices. 
According to his critics, he had violated the ethics of ethnographic fieldwork in 
order to prove his sociobiological hypotheses about the genetic causes of violence 
and warfare (Turner 2001).
The debate about Chagnon did not only focus on the ethics of field research 
among a vulnerable group, but also on the professional responsibility of anthropolo-
gists. In this context, Chagnon was criticized for collaborating with a group of 
wealthy Venezuelans in order to obtain access to the living area of the Yanomami 
Indians, despite the Venezuelan government rejecting his application for a research 
visa. More importantly, however, Chagnon was criticized for not objecting to the 
use, or abuse, of his representation of the Yanomami as extremely violent and prone 
to warfare. Chagnon’s characterization of the Yanomami was later used to prevent 
the establishment of a reservation by gold prospectors who joined into a coalition 
with politicians, military leaders, and journalists so they could continue their search 
for gold in the Amazon. A Brazilian organization of anthropologists submitted a 
form of protest about this to the AAA. This protest, in turn, caused the AAA to 
investigate the work of Chagnon and its dissemination.
The report of the so-called El Dorado Task Force, however, is equally as contro-
versial as Chagnon’s work. Chagnon’s critics argue the report is too weak, while his 
supporters argue it is too strong. The report did rehabilitate the reputation of epide-
miologist James Neel, but Chagnon will likely be forever stuck in a widely con-
tested ethical debate. The confusion about the report, however, has only increased 
since the membership of the AAA rejected it (Borofsky 2005). At the 2009 AAA 
meeting, a new panel was organized to discuss this controversy, which accused the 
AAA of scandalous behaviour by using Tierney’s book to investigate Chagnon and 
his companion Neel, rather than defending these researchers against so-called false 
journalism by Tierney.
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 Assignment
 1. Is it possible to use modern societies as ethnographic analogies to suggest how 
early prehistoric societies operated? Or should anthropological research always 
be situated in a specific social, political, and historical context?
 2. What guidelines can we suggest to ensure that anthropological field research 
practices do not violate a code of ethics for research involving human 
participants?
 3. How can we define the professional responsibility of anthropological researchers 
to influence the reception and use of their findings?
 4. Do anthropologists have an obligation to protect the interests of their research 
participants, even when they are allegedly violent?
 Case Study: Fraud or Fiction? Diary of a Teenage Girl
When psychoanalysis was still a developing discipline (early 1900s), a publishing 
house was founded that would issue psychoanalytic literature exclusively. Among 
its publications were the journals of a teenage girl named Gretl (Tagebuch eines 
halbwüchsigen Mädchens, 1919) (Fig. 6.6). She was 11 at the start of the journal, 
and 14 by the end. Her ‘case’ seemed to illustrate Freud’s theories on psychosexual 
development perfectly.
Gretl came from an upper middle-class family and was a typical teenage 
girl: she gossiped, quarreled with her friends and made up again, cried hot tears 
over silly things, and, of course  – she came of age. More specifically, she 
became aware of her own sexuality. She discovered the difference between 
boys and girls and found out about the ‘great secret.’ Writing in an October 9th 
entry she exclaimed: ‘Now I know everything!! So that’s where little children 
come from.’
By the time she turned 14, her mother had died. At the funeral, she expressed 
feelings of hurt because her older sister Dora was allowed to walk besides her father 
in church, but she was not. Dora even said to her sister that the death of their mother 
was ‘God’s way of punishing their father’ because they (the sisters) had kept things 
hidden from their mother – a typical instance of ‘magical thinking’, as described 
by Freud.
The diary was supposedly authentic. Not a word was altered, the anonymous edi-
tor of the journals assured the reader, nor had grammatical errors been corrected (so 
presumably slight but meaningful slips of the pen could reveal the young girl’s true 
intentions).
The diary confirmed many psychoanalytic notions in detail (sexual anxiety, 
childhood jealousy, oedipal feelings, etc.). In fact, in an introductory note to the 
book, Sigmund Freud wrote: ‘The diary is a little gem. I really believe it has never 
before been possible to obtain such a clear and truthful view on the mental impulses 
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that characterize the development of a girl in our social and cultural stratum the 
years before puberty.’
A year after the journal’s arrival, Hermine Hug-Hellmuth, an early (and now 
forgotten) follower of Freud and practicing child analyst, confirmed rumors that it 
was she who had collected the young girls notes and published them (Fig. 6.7). In 
1921, an English translation of the diary appeared, and it became a commercial suc-
cess. Shortly thereafter however, accusations of fraud bubbled to the surface. 
According to a critic, Gretl’s journals were too sophisticated to be true. The critic? 
Fig. 6.6 Cover of Diary of a Young Girl (Tagebuch eines halbwüchsigen Mädchens), pub-
lished in 1919
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Cyril Burt, then a young psychologist, who ironically would later be exposed as a 
fraud himself (see Chap. 5, Box 5.6 on Cyril Burt).
The editor of the journal denied all allegations, claiming that Gretl’s published 
diary entries were ‘authentic’ and had not been ‘touched up.’ While the controversy 
raged on, Hug-Helmuth tragically died (she was murdered by her nephew, whom 
she had partly raised and treated with psychoanalysis). In the years after her death, 
more incriminating details of fraudulent information surfaced. Critics revealed 
numerous chronological errors, including Gretl’s mention of a grading system at her 
school which was introduced only after the diary had supposedly been written. 
Today, historians concur that the diaries are not authentic and, in all likelihood, were 
largely if not entirely made up by Hug-Hellmuth.
This case raises three important questions: (1) Why would someone want to pub-
lish a fictitious diary? (2) How did the psychoanalytic community respond to the 
affair when the diaries were exposed as fraudulent? And (3) How does a case like 
this reflect on the field of psychoanalysis in general?
It may not have been fame the author was looking for. Rather, as Appignasi and 
Forrester proposed in their review of the case (1992, p. 200), Hug-Hellmuth had 
merely meant to ‘provide evidence for Freud’s theories.’ While this explanation is 
to a certain extent circular, it still gives us a hint as to her possible motives. 
Psychoanalysis was still a young science in the first few decades of the twentieth 
century and it was very much in need of confirmation, with many of Freud’s follow-
ers struggling to find support for his concepts. Lacking a library of psychoanalytic 
cases in the field’s early years, many enthusiasts turned to myths, stories, and his-
torical figures for evidence. The ‘Diaries of a Young Girl’ seems to fit perfectly into 
this pattern of early ‘missionary work’ that was meant to give credibility to 
psychoanalysis.
Fig. 6.7 Hermine 
Hug-Hellmuth, an early 




How did the psychoanalytic community respond to the allegations? The editors 
of the publishing house were still making desperate efforts to check the diaries’ 
authenticity by the time Hug-Hellmuth died (in 1924) (Borch-Jackobson and 
Shamdasani 2012, p.  284). By 1927, the publishers decided to retract the book, 
directing bookstores to return any remaining copies without an accompanying ratio-
nale. The English translation, published in the UK, however, remained available and 
was reprinted several times, with no note of its fictitious nature. Additionally, a 
number of practicing psychoanalysts continued to defend the diaries. As an exam-
ple, Helene Deutsch said she considered Hug-Hellmuth to be ‘too imaginative to 
have recreated a childhood out of whole cloth’ (quoted in Roazen 1985, p. 19). In 
sum, while the history of psychoanalysis is riddled with controversies, it appears 
that the case of the forged diary had little to no impact on the early reception of 
the field.
 Assignment
Should the discovery of the fraudulent diaries have had a bigger impact on the early 
reception of psychoanalysis? Consider some of the possible reasons they didn’t.
Personal factors – Hug-Hellmuth was a woman working in a field dominated by 
men; she was not considered a central figure in psychoanalysis.
Contextual factors – Hug-Hellmuth met an untimely death and could never be held 
accountable, nor could fraud be sufficiently established at the time.
Disciplinary factors – Psychoanalysis has often been accused of being a sect-like 
cult, not open to discussion.
 1. Which of these factors do you think holds the most weight?
 2. Think of a similar case of fraud (Diederik Stapel or Cyril Burt for example) 
and consider which of these factors impacted the field most. How so?
 Suggested Reading
For a general introduction into the methodological problems in present-day science, 
we recommend John Staddon’s 2017 highly readable Scientific Method: How 
Science Works, Fails to Work or Pretends to Work. We also recommend Fanelli’s 
papers on retractions in scientific literature, and the question of whether or not they 
signify a positive trend (Fanelli 2013, 2018). A must read on the subject of false 
positives can be found in Ioannidis (2005) ‘Why Most Published Research Findings 
Are False.’ Finally, we recommend Stroebe and Spears’ 2012 article ‘Scientific 
Misconduct and the Myth of Self-Correction in Science,’ which provides a crucial 
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After Reading This Chapter, You Will:
• Know what confidentiality entails and why it is important in research
• Become familiar with techniques of securing confidentiality
• Understand the difference between anonymity and confidentiality
• Be able to identify breaches of confidentiality
Keywords Anonymity · Autonomy · Blind protocols · Confidentiality · Data 
leakage · Deductive disclosure · Dignity · Hacking · Identifiers · Informed consent 
· k-anonymity · Personal data · Privacy (attacks) · Proxy consent · Re-identification 
· Research data management plan [RDMP] · Self-disclosure · Trust
7.1  Introduction
7.1.1  The Privacy of Facebook
Since the launch of Facebook as a (commercial) social media platform, its potential 
as a treasure trove of data on the dynamics of social networks and both online and 
offline behavior was quickly recognized by sociologists. In 2006, just a few years 
after Facebook entered the public sphere, a group of researchers downloaded the 
publicly available data for an entire cohort of some 1700 freshmen students at an 
undisclosed US college. The data haul included demographic, relational, and cul-
tural information for each individual, and the interested sociologists intended to use 
it in generating multiple future research projects.
The researchers had requested and obtained permission to utilize the data for 
research purposes from Facebook, the college involved, as well as the college’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). Notably, they did not seek consent from the indi-
vidual users, although steps were taken to ensure that the identity and privacy of the 
students remained protected, including the removal of identifying information (such 
as the names of the students). Also, they demanded that other researchers who 
wished to use the data for secondary analysis would sign a ‘terms and conditions for 
use’ agreement that prohibited any attempts to re-identify the subjects. Convinced 
that this would ensure confidentiality, the data set was released in 2008 as the first 
installment of a data sharing project purported to run until 2011.
However, just four days after the data’s release, Fred Stutzman, a PhD student, 
questioned the non-identifiability of the data, writing: ‘A friend network can be 
thought of as a fingerprint; it is likely that no two networks will be exactly similar, 
meaning individuals may be able to be identified in the dataset post-hoc’ (quoted in 
Zimmer 2010, p. 316). Soon thereafter, it was established that the source of the data 
was very likely Harvard College, and although no individual subjects were identi-
fied at that point, the dataset was taken offline as a precaution.
In a discussion of this case, Zimmer (2010) observed that the researchers who 
initialized the project made two assumptions. Firstly, they believed that even if the 
data set were ‘cracked’ (allowing individual subjects to be identified), the privacy of 
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the subjects would not be violated because the data was already public in the first 
place. Secondly, they assumed the research ethics implications had been sufficiently 
observed by consulting the college’s IRB and taking steps to anonymize the data.
Addressing both arguments, Zimmer argued that extensive collection of personal 
data over a long period of time, made publicly available for the purpose of social 
networking only, by subjects whose consent was neither sought nor received does 
constitute a violation of their privacy (Box 7.1). Additionally, Zimmer found it to be 
a breach of research ethics because subjects were not provided access to view the 
data to correct for errors or request the removal of unwanted information (for further 
discussion of this case, see Zimmer 2010) (Fig. 7.1).
This case raises two important issues. The first being that confidentiality is not 
merely a matter of shielding research participants’ identities. Confidentiality is 
about knowing what sort of personal data may be available, to whom, and under 
which conditions  – in essence, it’s about considering the whole picture. It also 
implies the participant’s right to being informed about the scope of their participa-
tion, to being explicitly asked to take part in the research project, and extends to 
their right to retain (some degree of) control over their own data. Secondly, this case 
exemplifies how quickly, and recently, our understanding of confidentiality has 
changed. Not only is it very unlikely that an IRB would approve of the above pro-
cedures today, but Facebook and other online social networks have also been 
increasingly critiqued for their defective privacy policies, of which we have only 
recently become aware.
In this chapter, we outline confidentiality from a wide lens, and flesh out some of 
its most salient properties. We will discuss some difficulties with securing confiden-
tiality and examine its relationship to anonymity and informed consent procedures. 
Finally, we discuss breaches of confidentiality and their consequences.
Box 7.1: What Is Personal Data?
What is defined as ‘personal’ may differ from one person to the next, although 
there are some obvious instances that perhaps everyone would agree is per-
sonal, such as your medical history, sexual orientation, or certain beliefs or 
opinions. Research policies distinguish between these various categories of 
‘personal data.’ The following list, derived in part from the European General 
Data Protection Regulation, is not exhaustive (Fig. 7.2).
Full name Sexual orientation
Home address/email address/IP address Trade union membership
Date and place of birth Passport/ID/driver’s license number
Mother’s maiden name Credit card number
Ethnicity/race Telephone number
Age Job position
Religious or philosophical beliefs Biometric records
Political opinions Criminal record
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Fig. 7.2 What are personal data? (Source: European Commission, data protection)
Fig. 7.1 Can you tell me something personal?
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We restrict our analysis, as we have in all other chapters in this book, to research 
ethics, and do not cover confidentiality issues within professional relationships, and 
only briefly touch on the (often severe) judicial components of the issue.
7.2  Defining Confidentiality
7.2.1  What Is Confidentiality?
Any information relating to the private sphere of a person that they wish not be 
shared with others is considered ‘confidential.’ This information is differentiated 
from ‘public information,’ which everyone has a right to access. The right of 
research participants to not disclose certain information and to retain control over 
their privacy has increasingly been acknowledged inside and outside of academia 
and has become subject to extensive legislation.
In research ethics, the crucial principle of confidentiality entails an obligation on 
the part of the researcher to ensure that any use of information obtained from or 
shared by human subjects respects the dignity and autonomy of the participant, and 
does not violate the interests of individuals or communities (see Box 7.2 for clarifi-
cation of concepts). The right to confidentiality in research is recognized in interna-
tional bio-ethical guidelines, such as the ‘Helsinki Declaration’ (last updated in 
2013), and the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, effec-
tive 2018).
In practice, safeguarding confidentiality entails that the researcher observes the 
following restrictions:
• Research participants remain anonymous by default
• Researchers do not obtain private data unless there is good reason to
• Participants must be briefed on the goal or purpose of the research, its means of 
investigation, and who has access to the data
• Participants must give active consent, are not coerced to participate, and retain 
the right to withdraw their cooperation at any moment (even after the study has 
been completed)
• Participants must be provided with an opportunity to review their data and cor-
rect any mistakes they perceive
Box 7.2: ‘Privacy, Autonomy, Confidentiality, Dignity’
Autonomy: the capacity to make uncoerced decisions for oneself.
Privacy: an individual’s sphere of personhood, not open to public inspection.
Confidentiality: private information that a person may not want to disclose.
Dignity: a sense of one’s personal pride or self-respect.
7.2 Defining Confidentiality
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7.2.2  Confidentiality and Trust
Confidentiality pertains to the understanding between the researcher and participant 
that guarantees sensitive or private information will be handled with the utmost 
care. Ultimately, confidentiality is rooted in trust.
The participant must trust that the researchers will fulfill their responsibilities 
and protect the participant’s interests. To ensure this happens, an agreement is drawn 
up in which these duties are specified and communicated to the participant (see 
Sect. 7.3).
In online and computer-assisted research – a variety that often lacks a face-to- 
face dimension and perhaps poses a greater privacy threat than traditional research – 
trust and especially the perception of control over one’s own information are key. 
Addressing the concerns dictates how much and to what degree participants are 
willing to disclose about themselves (Taddei and Contena 2013).
7.3  Securing Confidentiality
7.3.1  Informed Consent
Perhaps the most important instrument for securing confidentiality is the informed 
consent procedure. It is rooted in the idea that involvement in research should have 
no detrimental effects on the participants, honor the individual’s fundamental rights, 
and respect relationships, bonds, and promises.
Certain conditions and arrangements have been designed to guarantee safe par-
ticipation in research. These procedures assume the shape of a contract with a par-
ticipant who actively and knowingly agrees with the conditions. Informed consent 
typically notifies the participant of the following items:
• Name(s) and affiliation of researcher(s)
• Goal or aim of the research (in comprehensible language)
• Research techniques or procedures to which the participant is subjected
• Risks involved (if any)
• Estimate of time investment
• Agreement on compensation (if any)
• Conditions of confidentiality (anonymization or pseudonymization)
• Storage, usage, and access to data
• Rights of the participant:
 – to withdraw at any moment
 – to review/correct erroneous data (if possible)
 – to receive/be informed about the results (if interested)
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• Complaint procedures (including contact details of an independent commission 
or officer)
Informed consent procedures have become mandatory in social scientific 
research for qualified researchers, including PhD candidates. Undergraduate stu-
dents, who do research under the supervision of qualified staff, are generally also 
required to make use of these procedures (with the responsibility for their proper 
implementation that of the supervisor). Many of these principles are paralleled by 
similar procedures in medicine, law, and other professional domains (for further 
discussion, see Bok 1983, and Israel 2014).
7.3.2  Difficulties with Informed Consent
While informed consent thus aims to protect the participant, a few difficulties arise 
with how we approach it, some of a philosophical nature, others more practical.
One contention is that informed consent is biased towards a particular (Western) 
view of individuality. Research participants are supposed to be autonomous, well 
informed, capable subjects who are solely responsible for their own behavior and 
for knowing with whom formal contracts can be negotiated, and understanding the 
conditions of their participation.
Not all participants fit into this ideal of autonomous agency. Children (minors), 
vulnerable communities (for example those who harbor suicidal ideation), or any-
one in a dependent relationship who may not be (entirely) free to refuse participa-
tion, as well as those who may be unable to fully understand the ‘contract,’ all fall 
outside of this ideal of autonomous agency.
Furthermore, participants may not always be in the position to appreciate exactly 
what the conditions of participation entail. This is exacerbated when deception is 
involved, or when the research design does not allow for the participant to be fully 
or correctly informed about their role in the study.
Finally, confidentiality procedures warranting subject autonomy favor quantita-
tive research (experimental studies, surveys) that does not require meaningful rela-
tionships to be formed with participants. In qualitative research (interviewing, 
participant observations, etc.) these relationships are pivotal, and formal agree-
ments, such as informed consent procedures, ‘can be problematic in a culture that 
values relationships over roles and position’ (LaFrance and Bull 2009, p. 145).
Although it is possible to address some of these difficulties in the informed con-
sent agreement between researcher and participant, other issues remain unresolved, 
especially those regarding qualitative research, to which we return below.
In the final chapter of this book, we review the procedural dimension of confi-
dentiality. There we discuss how to weigh the various risks and benefits, explore 
how to deal with deception, discuss how to assess the vulnerability of participants 




7.4.1  Anonymity Versus Confidentiality
These two concepts, anonymity and confidentiality, are related, but differ in some 
important respects. Anonymity can be defined as the degree to which the source of 
a message can be identified (Scott 1995). It ranges from very high (source is nearly 
impossible to identify) to none (source is easily identifiable or in fact already identi-
fied). Confidentiality, on the other hand, relates to an agreement between the 
researcher and the participant. The former concerns the initial collection of data, the 
latter makes promises to not disclose specific personal information.
Seeing as how researchers need to protect the participant from unwanted conse-
quences, anonymity seems a safer guarantee for achieving this goal than confiden-
tiality. A researcher who offers anonymity does not record any identifying 
information. If confidentiality is offered, however, identifying information is 
recorded, but this information will not be disclosed to others.
Does it matter much whether you offer anonymity or confidentiality to your par-
ticipants? Whelan (2007) demonstrated that research participants are aware of the 
difference and are equally able to appreciate the different degrees of protection 
offered under both conditions. This raises the question of whether ‘weaker’ confi-
dentiality agreements could undermine the reliability of research. In a comparative 
analysis (comparing an anonymous and a confidential condition) of self-reported 
substance abuse surveys among 15 and 16-year-old Icelandic students, Bjarnason 
and Adalbjarnardottir (2000) found no evidence that a confidential condition low-
ered the study’s reliability. Conversely, Lelkes et  al. (2012) found that complete 
anonymity may compromise self-reporting.
Anonymity thus may be a more absolute, though not ‘better,’ criterion than con-
fidentiality in ensuring the participant’s right to privacy. Confidentiality, on the 
other hand, allows for the creation of a relational dimension that is explicitly left out 
in anonymity. The importance of relationships in research is a ripe field of study 
(Box 7.3).
In brief, there can be good reason to offer confidentiality as opposed to anonymity, 
although anonymity is generally preferred.
7.4.2  Managing Anonymity
While anonymity is the norm in research, safeguarding it poses an increasingly 
prevalent challenge in our digital age. ‘Privacy attacks’ and ‘data leakages’ are ram-
pant and the mechanisms for using public data for participant re-identification have 
greatly increased (Ramachandran et al. 2012). Netflix’s 2019 true crime documen-
tary ‘Don’t F*ck with Cats’ gives an instructive illustration of how it is possible to 
identify an anonymous individual from a YouTube video by combining contextual 
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information in the video (type of electoral receptacles, doorhandles, background 
noises), publicly available records (street maps, location of shops, etc), and the use 
of common sense.
Such easy, cheap, and powerful re-identifications not only undermine our faith in 
anonymization and cause significant harm, they are also difficult to avoid (Ohn 
2010). The advantages of digitalization, including increased potential to collect, 
process, analyze, store, and share data, are countered by new privacy risks, in par-
ticular the disclosure of personal data and re-identification. And although GDPR is 
meant to avoid these risks as much as possible, Rhoens (2019, p. 75) warns how in 
the age of ‘big data’, power tends to be shifted towards data controllers, reducing 
consumers’ autonomy, undermining a key element of private law in Europe.
In health-related research there is the ever-present risk that databases get hacked, 
which are full of sensitive information regarding symptoms, diagnoses, and treatment 
plans. Longitudinal studies (which follow (groups of) individuals over a long period 
of time) must allow for an identifying key at least until the study is finished, and thus 
pose the risk that while the study runs the key is revealed. Online social network 
analyses that deal with large amounts of data run the risk that the privacy of its users 
may be infringed upon (as the Facebook example demonstrated). Lastly, as studied by 
Williams and Pigeot (2017), we should be wary of powerful organizations, 
Box 7.3: Breaking Confidentiality in Good Faith? A Dilemma
Consider the case of a student who did research into ‘workplace inclusion’ at 
a large governmental institution. The student was commissioned to research 
the attitudes and experiences of employees with workplace inclusion.
Using a qualitative design, the student interviewed some 20 participants in 
three different departments in the institution. In accordance with standing 
institutional policy, the student was not allowed to identify participants on 
basis of their ethnicity (employees were not ethnicity registered at the institu-
tion). However, during the student’s research, she found that ethnicity did 
play a role in how employees experienced feelings of inclusion and exclusion. 
Some participants felt that ‘the fact that they belonged to an actual or per-
ceived group determined how they were treated by fellow employees and the 
managers at the institution.’
This result was clearly of importance for the study, yet it conflicted with 
institutional policy that did not allow the student to identify the ethnic back-
ground of the participants. A dilemma arose on how to continue. Should she, 
or should she not mention ethnicity?
How would you advise the student to proceed? Should the student make 
use of this information and break confidentiality of the basis that she acts in 
good faith, or should all mention of ethnicity be removed, in accordance with 
institutional policiy, at the cost of losing vital information?




corporations, and governments, who are gathering vats of information about us, fur-
ther arguing that ‘We have good reasons to fear that this may damage our interests, 
since their processes of data gathering are so shadowy and unaccountable’ (p. 248).
In an attempt to prepare for privacy attacks and possible data leaks today, research 
institutions require that anonymization be part of a larger research data manage-
ment plan that invokes policies about data security, data privacy, and data licensing 
(see Patel 2016) (Box 7.4).
7.4.3  How to Secure Anonymity?
Though this question regards research techniques rather than research ethics, we 
will have to outline the constraints of this issue before we can discuss the ethical 
aspects related to it (Fig. 7.3).
The anonymization of data necessitates that identifiers (defined below) are changed, 
either by removing them outright, or by substitution, distortion, generalization, aggre-
gation, or the employment of any number of masking techniques (Ohm 2010).
Direct identifiers, such as name, address, or zip code, can be removed or substi-
tuted by a pseudonym or code without loss of information. If substitution by a code 
is used, a key that allows reidentification may be kept, but as explained above, that 
key can subsequently become a security risk.
Indirect identifiers, such as information regarding occupation, training, age, or 
workplace can be aggregated or generalized, but therein lies the risk of information 
loss (for example, when the value ‘19’ is substituted for the aggregated value 
‘between 15-20 years old’).
Box 7.4: Research Data Management Plan (RDMP)
Any RDMP must be compliant with applicable national or international stan-
dards and stipulate conditions for the following data-related considerations 
(pertaining to both new data and amendments of existing projects):
• security, privacy protection, and transparency
• working with sensitive data
• archiving of research data
• storage procedures
• creating metadata
• authorship of data and data use
• verifiability of data
• searchability of data
• data sharing and licensing
• retention period and contact details of the data manager
(Compiled after various university library sources)
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Quasi-identifiers make it possible that a participant be identified when disparate 
information that by itself do not identify a subject are combined to create a clearer 
picture. For example, in an institution, the combination of age, position, and gender 
may lead to the identification of the participant if there is only one person with that 
specific set of characteristics.
In order to anonymize sets of data while retaining as much original information 
as possible, certain techniques have been developed. One known as k-anonymity 
was specifically designed for quantitative data sets (introduced by Samarati and 
Sweeney 1998, and since improved, see Amiri et al. 2016).
This technique allows for sensitive data to be recorded but disallows that data 
may be combined to create quasi-identifiers. Essentially, k-anonymity requires that 
there always be several individuals that match any combination of values in the 
same set of data (see Doming-Ferrer and Torra 2005; Ciriani et al. 2008, for further 
discussion of k-anonymity and Zhou et al. 2008, for a comparison with other anony-
mization techniques) (Fig. 7.4).
7.4.4  Is Complete Anonymization Possible?
The answer to this question is… probably not. The main reason being that anony-
mizing techniques, including k-anonymity, do not offer fool proof protection against 
the malicious use of background information, data triangulation, or even just basic 
web searches (Martin et al. 2007). As a result, ‘deductive disclosure’ (Tolich 2004) 
occurs, where certain individual or group traits make them identifiable in research 
reports.




For example, user profiles for many common web-oriented services (such as 
Facebook or Google profiles) provide a host of background information that make 
it easy to re-identify research participants in anonymized data sets (Kumpošt and 
Matyáš 2009). Also, with the aid of publicly available census data that contains 
records of individual’s birth date, gender, and address, quasi-identifiers can be con-
structed, and anonymized records from smart meter data (Buchmann et al. 2013) or 
cell phone users (Zang and Bolot 2014) can be used together to re-identify anony-
mous research participants. Similarly, anonymized online social networks have 
been de-anonymized with the aid of certain re-identification algorithms (Narayanan 
and Shmatikow 2009).
The reality is that at this moment, anonymization is not absolute, but a matter of 
degree (Dawson 2014). A dataset may never be completely safe from intentional 
attacks, and therefore re-identification of anonymized data presents serious policy 
and privacy implications (Lubarsky 2017; El Emam et al. 2019).
7.4.5  Anonymization in Qualitative Research
Qualitative research is performed within a diversity of disciplines such as ethnogra-
phy, anthropological field work, community studies, as well as clinical interviews 
and (critical) discourse analysis (the study of larger connected sets of textual cor-
puses). A defining feature of this form of research is that it deals with texts and their 
non-quantifiable characteristics; the heterogenous and ambiguous structure of 
language.
When compared to quantitative research, qualitative researchers are confronted 
with both similar and different challenges regarding anonymization, which we will 
now explore.
What is similar is that qualitative researchers also must consider confidentiality. 
What personal information are they allowed to make public (with consent from the 
participant), and what is off limits? When qualitative researchers choose to remove 
or alter identifiers, they too must worry that background knowledge will allow 
online sleuths to re-identify (some of) the participants. But masking the identity of 
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Fig. 7.4 Anonymization: use of coding, aggregation and redaction (fictitious case). Adapted from 
Ruth Gerathy, Anonymisation and Social Research (2016)
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an interviewee or a patient may be even more difficult because of the wealth of self- 
disclosing information available online.
An additional comparable difficulty that quantitative researchers must also 
resolve when anonymizing their data, is that even when direct and indirect identifi-
ers are removed, contextual identifiers in an individuals’ narrative remain. For 
example, certain (unusual) life events, particular details or circumstances, and spe-
cific places are all difficult to anonymize without distorting the text. Despite this 
difficulty, attempts have been made to create computer programs that facilitate the 
finding and replacement of personal identifiers (see Kaiser 2009 for a discussion).
What is different in qualitative research is that not all researchers share the ‘fetish 
of individualism’ (Weinberg 2002). Some insist that research communities are 
places where people know each other, where ideas and knowledge is shared, and 
where no-one goes unnoticed. For this reason, they argue, anonymity is virtually 
unachievable, and the question is whether anonymity is even desirable at all (van 
den Hoonaard 2003; Walford 2005; Tilley and Woodthorpe 2011). Other research-
ers have argued to the contrary, and insist that in spite of these objections, anonym-
ity should still prevail as a guarantee against gratuitous and casual identification 
which does nothing to add to public understanding (Kelly 2009).
Another notable difference with quantitative research is that the ‘situatedness’ of 
qualitative data (Thomson et al. 2005) makes secondary use questionable (use of the 
same data by different researchers). Qualitative data is ‘generated through personal 
interactions with participants, involving a high degree of trust and a duty of care 
towards participants’ data on the part of the researcher’ (Irwin 2013, p. 297). Trust 
and duty cannot be transferred onto unknown researchers just like that.
Finally, Giordano et al. (2007) point out that sometimes participants specifically 
wish to be heard and do not want to remain anonymous. Depriving them of a voice 
that provides personal meaning would deny them of (at least a part of) their auton-
omy. Giordano proposes that participants be offered a choice of disclosing their 
identity or not.
In light of the discussion above, consider the following study by Wiles et  al. 
(2006). They conducted research about the use of consent procedures among social 
scientists and health researchers working with vulnerable populations. The partici-
pants – experienced researchers who themselves used qualitative methods – were 
mostly critical of informed consent procedures. Some had little or no experience 
with consent forms and were put off by the idea of using them. Others refused point 
blank to sign the forms Wilkes and her colleagues gave them, which they disquali-
fied as an ‘overly formalistic and paternalistic enforcement of a biomedical model’ 
(p. 286).
A difficulty was that some of participants were well known in their field and 
could easily be identified by others in the research community. They refused to give 
consent that their data be archived. They also insisted that for reason of indefinabil-
ity, entire sections of the transcripts be deleted. This meant the loss of important 
findings, while also making secondary analysis impossible.
The ‘researching the researchers’ study by Wiles et al. (2006) led to the conclu-
sion that in qualitative research, two items of crucial importance cannot be managed 
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by consent procedures: trust of the participant in the research project and their moti-
vation to participate in it.
7.5  Breaches of Confidentiality
7.5.1  What Constitutes a Breach of Confidentiality?
A breach of confidentiality means that the obligation of the researcher to ensure 
their research respects the dignity and autonomy of the participant is not fulfilled or 
honored, or that an essential element in the agreement between researcher and par-
ticipant is broken.
For example, when a promise of anonymity is revoked, then not only is the par-
ticipant’s trust violated, but in the case of any negative consequences the participant 
may face, the researcher may be liable.
However, not all breaches are reprehensible. Some may even be considered jus-
tifiable, for example when a higher goal is served. Other breaches may be brought 
about by a third party and are not a result of the researcher’s actions. Or there is the 
possibility that the breach could simply result from the wish of the participant not to 
remain anonymous (waiver of confidentiality) (Fig. 7.5).
In the coming section, we discuss examples of these four classifications of 
breaches in further detail, and identify a number of consequences and possible 
remedies.
7.5.2  Culpable Breach of Confidentiality
When sensitive, personal, or identifying information from participants is made pub-
lic without their consent, and it has negative consequences for the participant (or the 
community), the researcher can be held responsible if they could have prevented 
this from happening.
Suppose a researcher interviews a number of employees from several different 
companies about their job satisfaction. The participants are guaranteed complete 
anonymity. At some point in time a report on the findings is published. Now con-
sider that a supervisor at one of the participating companies reads the report and is 
able to ascertain a certain participant as one of their employees, based on a number 
of characteristics. Since this employee has been found to be critical of the 
Culpable breach of 
confidentiality




Enforced breach of 
confidentiality




organization, the supervisor decides not to promote them. Now, the question can be 
asked: is the researcher responsible or even liable for the damage?
The answer depends on whether the researcher has done enough to secure the 
anonymity they guaranteed. For example, if only the participants’ names were ano-
nymized, but certain unique characteristics remained (gender of the participant, the 
position in the organization, age group), allowing for easy re-identification, then the 
researcher might indeed be liable. But if the researcher has done everything that 
reasonably could be expected from them, and the supervisor deduced the identity of 
the employee by chance, the breach of confidentiality could be considered merely 
lamentable, not culpable.
In 2015, the journal Expert Systems and Applications published a paper that used 
several sentences taken from the logged-in section of a website called 
‘PatientsLikeMe’. One particular quote from an HIV-positive user on the site con-
tained specific dates and types of infections the patient had experienced. This led to 
a complaint to the editors of the journal that ‘a search within PatientsLikeMe for this 
string [of information], or fragments of it, would quickly identify this patient.’ The 
editors of Expert Systems and Applications accepted the validity of this complaint 
and withdrew the paper. The authors were requested to delete the incriminating 
quotations and when completed, the paper was later republished (case taken from 
‘Retraction Watch,’ September 2016).
7.5.3  Justifiable Breach of Confidentiality
There can be good reason to disclose sensitive or personal information without con-
sent if circumstances force the researcher’s hand. This can be found, for example, if 
a third party could find themselves in immediate or future risk were certain informa-
tion to remain unknown to them (Box 7.5).
The well-known 1974 ‘Tarasoff Case’ may be taken as the classic example of a 
justifiable breach of confidentiality, even though it is more of an instance of profes-
sional ethics rather than research ethics (see Bersoff, 2014 for a discussion). In the 
‘Tarasoff Case,’ a patient confided in a mental health professional his intentions to 
kill someone. The intended victim was not alerted and indeed, was later murdered 
by this patient. When the case came before a court of law, it was ruled that client-
therapist confidentiality should have been breached because of a higher duty, the 
protection of the intended victim (see Herbert 2002 for a discussion of the case).
In social science research, analogous situations may present themselves, even 
though they are rarely as extreme as the Tarasoff Case (see Duncan et al. 2015). For 
example, Jonathan Kotch (2000) discussed some of the challenges researchers 
encountered in studying the complex matter of longitudinal child maltreatment 
research, which led to serious deliberations regarding breaching confidentiality.
The researchers were interested in the behavior of mothers, but in the process 
they not only collected confidential information about children, but also from 
them. Would this make these children automatically research participants? And if 
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so, under which conditions could they be considered ‘participant’ in the research? 
Logically, parents would have to give consent on behalf of their children (this is 
called ‘proxy consent’), on the presumption that they act in the best interest of their 
children. But that may not be likely in the case here, given that the research was on 
child abuse and neglect.
Confidentiality issues were further complicated when suspicion of child abuse 
arose. Under US law, anyone who suspects maltreatment of a child is legally 
required to report it. Under these circumstances, is longitudinal research on child 
maltreatment possible at all?
If the answer is yes, then whose interests prevail: those of the mother, the child, 
or the researcher? Kotch (2000) argues that all three must be factored in when mov-
ing forward with a research project, but they carry different weights. Kotch contents 
Box 7.5: Breaching Confidentiality or Not? A Dilemma
George is a psychologist who is interested in high-risk sexual behavior among 
adolescents. He speaks with 25 participants, one of whom is Martin, an 
18-year-old male who has agreed to be interviewed on the provision of com-
plete confidentiality. During the interview, Martin reveals that he has been 
diagnosed with HIV and has not informed his partner, even though they have 
regular unprotected sexual intercourse.
George is worried that he is obliged to breach confidentiality and disclose 
this information to Martin’s partner. For guidance, he consults the Ethical 
Principles of the Psychological Association. It states that confidential infor-
mation can be disclosed (without the consent of the individual) ‘when man-
dated or permitted by law for a valid purpose such as to protect the client, 
patient, psychologist, or others from harm’ (quoted in Behnke 2014).
The laws in George’s country aren’t very clear about this issue, though. 
HIV is a contagious disease but doesn’t pose an imminent risk of death, 
though being infected could be deemed considerable harm.
Are there sufficient grounds for George to breach confidentiality? Argue 
from one of the following positions:
 1. George should inform Martin’s partner and does not have to inform Martin 
about this breach of confidentiality because the partner may be in immedi-
ate danger.
 2. George should inform Martin’s partner but also inform Martin about this 
breach of confidentiality.
 3. George should urge Martin to inform his partner but does not have to inter-
fere himself.
 4. George should not interfere in any way as he is bound by confidentiality 
and the responsibility is Martin’s alone.
(Case adapted after Hook and Cleveland 1999)
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that a child’s participation on a basis of ‘proxy consent’ is ethical as long as the 
benefits (child welfare, possible beneficial research outcomes) outweigh the risks 
(harm done to the child). If the child’s welfare is at stake, confidentiality may justifi-
ably be breached, but this must be considered very carefully, and weighed against 
the consequences. This is because the consequences can be substantial, both for the 
mother (social, personal, and even job-related repercussions) as well as the child 
(embarrassment, emotional distress).
In order to sensibly handle confidentiality, a special ‘blind protocol’ was designed 
for this case, that allowed the mother to respond in writing to sensitive questions 
that might lead to a suspicion of abuse or neglect, without the interviewer being 
aware of the answer. Only the principal researchers (PI) would be allowed to review 
this sensitive material and only they could decide (after careful deliberation) that a 
case needed to be reported (they eventually did so in five cases out of 442, one of 
which was confirmed).
7.5.4  Enforced Breach of Confidentiality
There are only a few circumstances that could force a scientist to breach confi-
dentiality. One of those is the enforcement of state regulations. Rik Scarce was a 
PhD student at Washington State University doing research on an environmental 
movement in the United States. In his research, he conducted interviews with 
environmental activists in this movement. Even before his dissertation was pub-
lished, one of his interviewees attracted the interest of the police. They requested 
that Scarce appear at the campus police station, where he was interviewed. When 
he refused to answer certain questions about his research participants and did not 
allow the police access to his data on grounds of confidentiality, he was subpoe-
naed to appear before a grand jury. In his testimony, he declared the following: 
‘Your question calls for information that I have only by virtue of a confidential 
disclosure given to me in the course of my research activities. I cannot answer 
the question without actually breaching a confidential communication. 
Consequently, I decline to answer the question under my ethical obligations as a 
member of the American Sociological Association […]’ (Scarce 1995, p.  95). 
This defense was not accepted. Confidentiality simply did not matter to the court, 
Scarce later wrote (1995, p. 102). He was found in contempt of court and held in 
custody for over five months.
Although no general conclusions regarding what to do is such cases may be 
drawn from this case, because laws with respect to liability differ in every country, 
students should be advised to ensure that their research proposals are in accordance 
with university policy. In case of doubt, they may want to consult their IRB. See 
Box 7.6 for further considerations.
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Box 7.6: The Russel Ogden Case
In 1994, Russel Ogden, a Canadian MA student in criminology at Simon 
Fraser University (SFU), completed a controversial study on assisted suicide 
and euthanasia of persons with AIDS, which was illegal at the time, and 
attracted a high amount of media attention.
Shortly after the defense of his thesis, based on interviews with 
people involved in this activity, Ogden was subpoenaed by the Vancouver 
Regional Coroner to reveal his sources. Ogden refused on grounds that he had 
promised confidentiality, and that he had acted in accordance with universi-
ties policy.
It is noteworthy that Ogden had actively sought approval from the univer-
sity’s independent IRB, noting that anonymity and confidentiality would be 
assured with each participant. He also informed his participants in a consent 
letter that the ‘proposed research project involves data about illegal behavior,’ 
and that participants would not be required to give information regarding their 
identity. Finally, Ogden sought advice from the university’s IRB about what 
to do in the unlikely event that the Coroner’s Office requested cooperation. He 
was informed that there was ‘no statuary obligation to report criminal activ-
ity,’ and thus accepted full responsibility for any decision he would make 
(quoted in Blomley and Davis 1998).
When he was subpoenaed, his former university refused to offer assistance, 
on grounds that ‘in cases where it can be foreseen that the researcher may not 
legally be in a position to ensure confidentiality to their subjects, these 
researchers must be required to prove only limited confidentiality’ (quoted in 
Lowman and Palys 2000, p. 4). They offered limited financial support only, on 
compassionate grounds.
Ogden felt abandoned and believed that SFU was unwilling to protect his 
academic freedom as a researcher. Therefore, after successfully having 
defended his case before the Court, he filed a lawsuit against the university, 
claiming they had a contractual obligation to support his ethical stand and to 
reimburse his legal fees.
Though Ogden lost that case, following Bloomley and Davis’ 1998 review 
of it, the university belatedly accepted responsibility and reimbursed his legal 
fees and lost wages and send him a letter of apology, promising to assist 
researchers in the future who may find themselves in the position of having to 
challenge a subpoena (see Lowman and Palys 2000, for a discussion of the 




7.5.5  Waiver of Confidentiality
Finally, we consider cases where participants themselves wish to be identified or 
wish to waive their right to confidentiality. Technically these would not be breaches 
of confidentiality, but rather waivers of confidentiality agreements.
The number of cases in which participants waive confidentiality and/or in which 
IRBs agree to such a design are uncommon. In certain types of research, however, 
waivers of confidentiality are the rule rather than the exception. In Participatory 
Action Research (PAR), participants agree to be ‘collaborators’ of the researchers, 
not ‘research subjects.’ They will not merely be ‘interviewees’ or ‘respondents’ of 
the researcher, but actively engaged in the research process itself, defining together 
with the researcher the research question and research set up. This means to a 
degree, the roles of researcher and participant roles blur. And as much as this is the 
case, there is good reason to give ‘special concerns regarding the need to protect 
confidentiality’ say Khanlou and Peter (2005, p. 2338), although that does not nec-
essarily imply lifting it. It means that participants themselves decide how they be 
involved and define their involvement.
There may be another reason for participants to give confidentiality a 
second thought. Vainio (2013, p. 689) examined an example in which a researcher 
conducted a study of an organization, and the individual who developed the orga-
nization insisted they be mentioned by name in the report (in the hopes of profit-




Confidentiality stands as a core tenant of scientific research ethics. Few issues mat-
ter more than allowing the participant control over which information they wish to 
share. The most important procedure in this aspect of research is to secure the 
informed consent form, which formalizes a confidentiality agreement between the 
researcher and participant. Also, various data points, or identifiers, that allow for the 
re-identification of participants, are important for researchers to understand, as are 
the techniques to anonymize data, though none offer waterproof guarantee against 
re-identification. Furthermore, we noted that anonymization in qualitative and 
quantitative research differs greatly. Finally, breaches of confidentiality were dis-




Two obstacles regarding confidentiality remain. The first regards the availability of 
information, and the growing capacity to combine information on a large-scale is 
making it increasingly difficult to guarantee anonymity. The second is that data 
protection regulations are still evolving, and the way these regulations coalesce may 
significantly influence future research agendas.
These two issues – protection of participants’ privacy and their autonomy, and 
evolving data protection regulation – comprise an underlying dilemma: how do you 
ensure academic freedom while at the same time making sure that everything is 
done (morally and legally) to protect confidentiality?
 Case Study: Too Much Information? A Case Study 
on Maintaining Confidentiality
The case outlined below highlights some of the difficulties of maintaining scientific 
standards while simultaneously offering confidentiality, specifically when research-
ing a highly sensitive subject. The following details derive from a group of master’s 
students and their supervisor who were engaged in a field study examining the risks 
related to sexual and reproductive health (SRH) in a country considered conserva-
tive in several respects. Notably in this country, it is a cultural taboo to speak pub-
licly about SRH issues, and accessibility to SRH services remain quite limited 
as well.
State officials in this country admit that a lack of knowledge on SRH can result 
in risky sexual behavior and unintended pregnancies, and that these in turn contrib-
ute to high rates of sexually transmitted diseases and increased maternal mortality 
due to (illegal) abortions. While it seems clear that this would justify setting up SRH 
facilities, a clear government policy on the matter was still lacking, and the empha-
sis was on countering maternal morality rather than communicating knowledge.
However, the government did allow a network of private SRH care professionals 
to collaborate with international agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) to initiate a project aimed at filling this gap. Such a project could increase 
the prevalence of SRH facilities, offering affordable, accessible, quality services 
which, if successful, could increase awareness and knowledge of SRH, all with the 
desired outcome of behavioral change.
This project became the focus of the researchers. The project leader granted the 
students permission to interview key project members and stakeholders. The aim of 
the study was not to evaluate the offerings of the project as such, but to ‘assess the 
potential indicators that determine success of the project as a case study.’
Prior to beginning their research, the master’s students sought and received ethi-
cal approval from the local IRB, as well as from their own institutional ethical 
review board. Due to the sensitivity of the project, it was agreed that the 
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interviewees, the stakeholders, and the organization itself would remain anony-
mous, and all identifying information would be removed. All participants received 
an ‘informed consent’ agreement fully detailing the aims of the study. The agree-
ment also contained a privacy statement that promised full confidentiality. All inter-
views were recorded, transcribed, and subsequently anonymized.
During the first few weeks of research, interviews were conducted on the partici-
pant’s expectations, thoughts, and doubts surrounding the project. Many respon-
dents demonstrated an acute awareness of the sensitivities regarding sexual and 
reproductive health. One stakeholder noted how ‘increasing conservatism makes 
talking about SRH difficult,’ and believed that professionals would be ‘nervous rais-
ing these issues.’
In concluding their research, the master’s students stressed the importance of the 
project for the community. They argued that although it touched upon sensitive 
issues, the project was neither illegal nor in violation of any state regulations. In 
order to make the project sustainable, it was recommended that ‘partnerships 
between public and private sector need to be further developed,’ and that perhaps 
‘business experts could be involved to establish a sustainable SRH service model.’
When a draft was presented to the SRH project leader, the students received word 
that there were still concerns about the ‘potential harm’ of their research. The stu-
dents were told that they should consider removing all identifying information 
about the project from their report. While the project leader admitted that an ethical 
clearance had been issued by the local IRB earlier, and that promises of confidenti-
ality had been met by the students, drawing attention to the sensitive issue of SRH 
services in a conservative culture with a taboo on sexual matters could have unfore-
seen and even adverse consequences for those involved, if not immediately, then 
perhaps in the future. Therefore, all names of the participants were either to be 
removed or anonymized, and any references to the actual project be omitted. 
Additionally, the report was to only be made public if it did not include a description 
of the SRH project.
This posed a dilemma for the students and their advisor. Firstly, it would be dif-
ficult to ensure the quality of their theses without describing the project being stud-
ied. Secondly, because their institution required that any master thesis project be 
submitted and subsequently archived at an institutional repository, it would there-
fore be made public and open for anyone to inspect in accordance with the scientific 
demand of transparency. Under the circumstances, it did not seem possible to fulfil 
participant requests for confidentiality and submit a Master’s thesis in accordance 
with university requirements.
In practice, the requirement ‘not to publish the report with the description of the 
project’ would imply that the students could not formally finish their research proj-
ect and thus not conclude their studies. The student’s supervisor thereupon arranged 
for an exception to be made in this case, allowing the report to be archived without 
the possibility to inspect it, in turn effectively annulling the scientific merits of 
the study.
When we (the authors of this book) asked to report on this case, the students’ 
supervisor allowed us access to relevant documents, including correspondence with 
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various stakeholders, on the provision that any and all identifying information be 
removed, including the names of the Master’s students, the supervisor, and the SRH 
project leader, as well the name of the country where the research took place. After 
having completed our description, we destroyed all documents in our possession 
pertaining to this case were. Then we asked the supervisor and students involved to 
review this reconstruction, to see if they approved of it.
 Assignment
Consider the nuances of this case. What efforts have the different parties (authors of 
this case study, project leader, supervisor, and students) pursued to ensure confiden-
tiality? Do you believe these measures were enough? Can you think of another 
outcome that could have been possible had other steps been taken, and if so, what 
would you recommend? Discuss the case (and its possible alternative scenarios) in 
class, and answer the following questions:
 1. Is it even possible to research ‘sensitive issues’ such as sexual and reproductive 
health, in a conservative culture without endangering the parties involved?
 2. If so, what measures should be taken to ensure complete anonymity?
 3. How, in the present situation, could a scientist still report on this project safely 
without giving up on academic freedom?
 Suggested Reading
We recommend Sissela Bok’s 1983 classic The Limits of Confidentiality and the 
chapter on confidentiality by Slowther and Kleinman (2008) for further orientation 
on the subject. We also recommend the chapter by Macnish (2020) in the Handbook 
of Research Ethics and Scientific Integrity (Iphofen, ed., 2020) for a discussion on 
the challenges inherent to privacy. Furthermore, we point to Manson and O’Neill 
(2007) for an extensive discussion on informed consent (though it is mainly focused 
on the medical sciences).
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8.1  Introduction
8.1.1  Science in a Global Society
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, scientists began noticing that the social 
and political landscape was changing rather rapidly. This change was beginning to 
impact the organization of science too, including the way it is financed. Also, the 
process of production and dissemination of scientific knowledge transformed, call-
ing into question the very values of science.
Two related trends brought about these changes. One was the onset of ‘globaliza-
tion,’ a series of processes that caused the world’s economies, cultures, and popula-
tions to become more interdependent, simultaneously intensifying interactions 
among people, companies, and governments on a global scale (Bartelson 2000; 
Hoekman 2012; Mosbah-Natanson and Gingras 2013). The other is the introduction 
of neoliberalism in politics (resurgent of nineteenth century economic laissez-faire 
ideas and free market capitalism). This soon found its way into university adminis-
tration (see Fine and Saad-Filho 2017, for a discussion of neo-liberalism, with its 
internal contradictions, tensions, and sources of dynamics).
During this time period, more emphasis was placed on ‘output,’ ‘quality control,’ 
and ‘cost-efficiency,’ on science’s ‘added value’ to society. Many scientists saw new 
opportunities in these developments and began to establish new collaborative rela-
tionships, especially with commercial parties. More space for entrepreneurial 
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activity was created and universities began to enhance their social impact on society. 
Incubators (start-up organizations and businesses involved with advanced technol-
ogy) found their way onto college campuses, and universities flourished as creative 
business environments.
At the same time, new challenges and tensions emerged, having to do with the 
growing competition over dwindling public funding and a ‘pressure to produce.’ A 
trend towards valorization of research was also observed, which meant that the 
economic value of scientific activities began to predominate, not its intrinsic value 
(see Box 8.1). Some even began to speak of ‘academic capitalism’ (Slaughter and 
Roades 2004 (Fig. 8.1).
Box 8.1: Valorization and Academic Careers
‘Universities, Academic Careers, and the Valorization of “Shiny Things”’ is 
the title of a 2016 paper by Joseph Hermanowicz, professor of sociology at 
the University of Georgia. Hermanowicz researched the careers of some 60 
physicists employed at universities across the U.S. between the mid-1990s 
and mid-2000s, when neoliberalism ‘enabled academic capitalism to flourish 
with its attendant effects in privatization and marketization’ (2016, pp. 303–4). 
How did this affect their careers and aspirations? Here are a two notable 
changes Hermanowicz found:
Publish and Perish Institutions began to favor research which brought 
about a ‘press for productivity.’ By the time the older generation (who entered 
university before 1970) became tenured professors, they had published on 
average of about 20 papers. The younger generation, in comparison, pub-
lished over 40 by the time they became professors. Doubling the number of 
publications in roughly the same time span meant an increased pressure to 
publish.
Disappointment Greater output did not result in more job satisfaction or 
commitment. On the contrary, actually. Many scientists were disappointed, 
even bitter, about the insistence on greater output. Although it differs whether 
one works at an ‘elite’ institute, which is largely committed to research, or 
one that emphasizes (mass) teaching and services, job satisfaction and work 
attitude seems to be affected negatively by valorization throughout different 
cohorts. ‘Professors increasingly understand themselves and their work in 
terms of free agency, geared to a market, and interested especially if not 
exclusively in themselves’ (Hermanowicz 2016, p. 324).
Students’ Change of Focus Adding to this picture, Saunders (2007) found a 
change in the focus of students during the same period. In his findings, the 
majority of students switched from being intrinsically motivated, having an 
interest in developing a ‘meaningful philosophy of life’, to being extrinsically 
motivated, having an interest in being ‘well off.’ Many students now agree 
with the statement that ‘the chief benefit of a college education is to increase 
one’s earning power.’ Students today are more competitive, less interested in 
liberal arts and sciences, and seem to subscribe to a neoliberal agenda.
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It has been argued that a growing emphasis on protection of intellectual property, 
and a strong preference for profit, has corroding effects on some of the core values 
in science, such as openness, transparency, and autonomy. In turn, these invited a 
host of unwanted behaviors in research, ranging from fraud to questionable deci-
sions, which we will discuss in greater detail below (see Washburn 2005; Healy 
2002; Greenberg 2009).
In this chapter, we explore the links between the three parties involved in these 
developments, namely science, private industry, and government. Traditionally, 
these three parties had clear, distinct roles. Sciences’ task was restricted to research 
and investigation; industry focused on development and production; and govern-
ment in creating and enforcing regulation. In the age of academic capitalism how-
ever, the boundaries between these roles gradually dissolved, resulting in a number 
of emergent conflicts. It is these various conflicts that we will discuss in this chapter.
8.1.2  Interests at Stake
New forms of collaboration between researchers and third parties bring special 
interests into play which hitherto did not have such importance. How do the inter-
ests of collaborative parties influence a researcher’s judgement?
Consider the case of a researcher who was commissioned by a political party to 
investigate a certain social question. Would it matter if the researcher has strong 
political convictions themselves? Would it make a difference if these convictions 
Fig. 8.1 Age of academic capitalism
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align, or differ, with those of the employing political party? Or consider a researcher 
investigating the effectiveness of certain policies implemented by an organization. 
Would it matter if these researchers are also being paid to provide training to mem-
bers of that same organization? Would that affect their assessment of the policies 
being examined?
Most would agree that these situations contain an element of suspicion. How do 
we know the researcher in question is not influenced by certain external interests, 
either financial or otherwise?
When there is reason to believe that a researcher’s judgement may be compro-
mised by certain interests related to their ties with other parties, we commonly 
speak of a conflict of interest (see Davis 2001). Some authors, such a Aubert (1963), 
and more recently Bero and Grundy (2016) and Wiersma et al. (2017), have sug-
gested that we distinguish ‘conflicts of interest proper’ (having to do with financial 
motives only) from ‘conflicts of values’ (having to do with morality and belief sys-
tems), which are both structured in fundamentally different ways and require diver-
gent strategies to resolve.
We accept the suggestion to separate financially induced conflicts of interest 
(COI), which mostly appear in privately funded research, from conflicts of values 
(COV), which arise out of various types of partnerships with thirds parties (non- 
profit organizations, interest groups, civil society organizations, and others). We 
furthermore propose to highlight two additional categories, namely competing 
interests, which are more often found in publicly funded research and do not directly 
impact judgement calls, and conflicts of ownership, which have to do with questions 
of copyrights and patents.
In the coming sections, we discuss how these various conflicts impact scientific 
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8.2  Conflicts of Interest
8.2.1  What Is a Conflict of Interest?
The classical situation in which a researcher’s decision-making may be compro-
mised because of certain financial interests is called a conflict of interest  
(COI). Conflicts of interest are more common in the bio-medical and pharmaceuti-
cal sciences, where large financial gains are at stake, and the development of new 
medication is a costly affair. In the social sciences, financial conflicts of interest do 
exist but the temptations differ from those of the bio-medical and pharmaceutical 
science.
Let’s start with an example from the pharmaceutical sciences. Resnik (1998) 
cites a classic case of a scientist who researched the effects of a certain medication 
on the alleviation of common cold symptoms. The scientist also owned stock in a 
company that produced the same medication he was researching (a tablet of zinc 
lozenges). When their findings showed a positive result, the company’s stock soared, 
from which the researcher benefited. This raised a serious question: Was the 
researcher’s scientific judgement being influenced by the expectation of a finan-
cial profit?
In the social sciences, direct financial gains are rarer. Rather, the problem lies 
in indirect gains, having to do with the formation of dependency on the research 
itself. Soudijn (2012) quotes the case of a Dutch psychologist, who set up a  project 
offering help to clients suffering from phobias. The clients received free treatment 
(in the form of experimental therapy, given by his students) on the condition that 
they agreed to participate in the research project. Thus, the clients became reliant 
on the research as a means of free therapy. These dependency relationships obfus-
cate the research project to the point that by today’s standards, the data would no 
longer be considered valid, and although the research participants did not profit 
from the research financially, financial gains (free therapy for the client) posed a 
COI in this case.
Whether these influences actually impair a researcher’s judgement is not of 
importance in our understanding of a COI.  It is the potential to cloud or impair 
judgement that defines the problem.
In any conflict of interest, objectivity as one of sciences’ key values is at stake:
• How do I know your conclusions are not biased?
• How can I trust your judgement?
In the coming sections, we discuss cases from within the social sciences where 
differing financial interests were at stake to differing degrees (Box 8.2). Note that 
not every situation with financial interests at stake automatically leads to a conflict 
of interest. Furthermore, it can be difficult to establish whether a researcher acts in 
bad faith or not.
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8.2.2  Promotion Bonus
In a commercialized academic climate at Tilburg University, a sudden increase in 
the number of successfully completed PhD dissertations in the field of the humani-
ties and the social sciences was observed a few years ago. They were carried out 
under the supervision of a small number of professors. Suspicion arose that this 
increase had to do with financial interests, as each dissertation produced financial 
yields, and some of the revenue was being paid to the supervisors directly (they 
received a promotion bonus).
A complaint was issued. The commission that investigated the cases found that 
while many of the dissertations were rather weak and held very little scientific 
value, there was no evidence that fraud was being committed. Did this cancel out 
the possibility of a conflict of interest? Not entirely. The commission strongly rec-
ommended that the promotion incentives be abolished to preemptively avoid any 
possible suggestions of COIs. Tilburg University complied with this advice and no 
longer pays these incentives out to supervisors (case reported in Universe, September 
20th, 2018).
Box 8.2: Funding Bias
Often regarded as a specific form of COI, the term funding bias indicates the 
tendency found in scientific studies to support the interests of the study’s 
financial sponsor. Funding bias is a well-documented effect (see Krimsky 
2012). A study by Turner and Spilich (1997) well illustrates this conclusion. 
The authors compared 91 papers written about the effects that tobacco and 
nicotine have on cognitive performance. The authors differentiated between 
industry sponsored and independent studies. Both types of studies reported on 
the positive effects of tobacco and nicotine use (indications that tobacco 
enhances cognitive performance). However, all non-sponsored studies also 
reported negative effects (indications that tobacco does not enhance cognitive 
functioning), while only one sponsored study did so.
While non-sponsored studies thus present more balanced results, there can 
be disadvantages to not having external sponsorship too. It can mean that the 
researchers have not succeeded in developing links to the field of expertise, 
and that their work is ‘sterile.’ Martens et al. (2016), reporting on the field of 
counseling research, noted that ‘sponsored research has the potential to 
advance the professional goals of a field by allowing researchers to conduct 




8.2.3  Financial Ties
In a report on the financial links between panel members who were asked to contrib-
ute to the development of diagnostic criteria for the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the pharmaceutical industry, Cosgrave 
et al. (2006) found notable examples of said links. More than half of the panel mem-
bers queried had financial ties with a pharmaceutical company; 40% of them had 
consulting income; 29% served on a speakers bureau; and 25% received other pro-
fessional fees (2006, p. 156).
Does the presence of financial ties imply that these panel members can’t be 
trusted? Not necessarily. Cosgrave et al. (2006) argue that receiving financial sup-
port does not automatically disqualify members, but it does pose a conflict of inter-
est. ‘The public and mental health professionals have a right to know about these 
financial ties, because pharmaceutical companies have a vested interest in what 
mental disorders are included in the DSM’ (p. 159) (Box 8.3).
Box 8.3: Mutual Favors: A Dilemma
Consider and discuss in groups of three or four students the following case 
and select the best course of action:
Jacky is a student enrolled in the same course as you. When you are 
assigned to write a paper on a certain subject together, Jacky makes you 
the following offer. If you do the work this time and put her name on the 
paper, she will do the same for you next time. You are both pressured for 
time, but Jacky has been particularly overloaded and could use some 
help. The syllabus allows students to team up on papers  – but not in 
this manner.
How do you respond? Choose the option you prefer and present your ratio-
nale to your group.
 1. You allow Jacky co-authorship on the paper but you decline her offer to 
return the favor.
 2. You accept the offer, on the condition that you both commit to a critical 
peer review of each paper.
 3. You ask for advice from a professor outside the course, who also happens 
to know Jacky.
 4. You decline the offer and report the unethical behavior to the 
professor.
(Case adapted after the Erasmus University Dilemma Game)
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8.2.4  Paid Consultancies
Do financial interests resulting from paid lectures and expert consulting pose a con-
flict of interest? This question was raised in the case of Jean Twengy, a psychologist 
at San Diego State University. Twengy studied people born after the mid-1990s, 
which she dubbed ‘iGen’ (after the iPhones this generation grew up with). In 2010, 
she started a business called ‘iGen Consulting’. As a consultant, she gave paid lec-
tures and advised large commercial corporations, acquiring a considerable side 
income. In her academic papers, she did not mention this revenue.
Some argue this poses a conflict of interest. Psychology journals require that per-
sonal fees be declared, and since Twengy had not done so, her side activities qualify 
as a COI by default, they said. Others however, including psychologist Steven Pinker 
from Harvard University, argue they do not, because ‘these activities do not provide 
incentives to make certain judgement calls.’ Pinker argues that Twengy’s case does 
not compare to ‘evaluating a drug produced by a company in which one holds stock’ 
(case discussed in Chivers 2019). It is true that these financial interests did not relate 
directly to the researcher’s field of inquiry. However, they do so indirectly, since 
‘iGen’ is the basis of both her research and her advisory work. 
8.2.5  Gifts
In pursuit of any research project, accepting gifts or ‘gratuities’ should be avoided 
or kept to the bare minimum (such that the gifts represent no substantial value). At 
the very least, it can leave the impression that favorable opinions can be bought. 
Accepting something of value without the other party expecting something in return 
constitutes a conflict of interest because of the suggestion of favoritism. And if 
something of value is accepted and the other party does expect something in return, 
this is even worse. It’s called bribery.
A bibliography study by Volochinsky et  al. (2018) concluded that conflicts of 
interest produced by gift giving result in an ‘undeniable dependence on relationships 
that implicitly lead to reciprocity and deprive the professionals from the necessary 
autonomy and impartiality’ (p. 101). But there is another side to this story as well.
Anthropologists, who have long emphasized the importance of gift giving in 
human societies, argue that a strict view may be too narrow (Mauss 1970; Sherry 
1983). Some noted that specifically in Asia, gift giving is part of an ‘exchange sys-
tem,’ and non-participation will be considered rude and disruptive of social relation-
ships. Respondents in the research of Zhuang and Tsang (2008) were found to have 
‘different ethical evaluations of different marketing practices.’
Gift giving in a natural setting poses an ethical dilemma for researchers: either 
go along with the practice of gift giving and run the risk of a possible conflict of 
interest, or stay within the strict boundaries of research ethics and accept that certain 
research goals may not be achieved as a result. (Box 8.4)
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8.3  Conflicts of Values
8.3.1  What are Conflicts of Values?
Similar to conflicts of interest (COI), conflicts of values (COV) compromise the 
researcher’s judgement, or decision-making. The main difference being that the 
source of commitment in a conflict of values is not financial in nature.
Thus, if a researcher has close working relationships with research affiliates, is 
on personal terms, or has a dependent relationship with them, conflicts of values 
may arise. For example, if a researcher is asked to assess the work of one of their 
personal associates, it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that their judgement is influ-
enced by this relationship.
In a straightforward example of a conflict of values, a researcher from Shanghai 
University, acting as the handling editor of a research journal, was asked to process 
a recently received manuscript. After receiving a positive review from an anony-
mous revierwer, the paper was published. Not long thereafter, it was discovered that 
the handling editor had co-authored several papers with the author of the recently 
published paper. It was also revealed the author was a former PhD student of the 
handling editor. The paper was subsequently retracted.
Box 8.4: Big Pharma
The expression ‘big pharma’ refers to the ‘pharmaceutical industry,’ the 
 private sector that invests billions into medical research and services. 
Pharmaceutical companies employ various (often aggressive) means to pro-
tect their investments, and for this reason the term ‘big pharma’ is loaded with 
a fair amount of distaste or even mistrust (see for example: Angell 2004, The 
Truth About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What to do 
About It).
One such critic is David Resnik, whose 2007 book The Price of Truth pro-
vides ample evidence of how academic values such as objectivity, truthful-
ness, and openness have been corrupted by financial interests. Another critic, 
Ben Goldacre (2013), wrote critically on the naive view that the public has of 
medical research and doctors, and how they often fail to acknowledge just 
how much financial interests shape the medical field.
Johan Hari (2018) writes in a similar vein, in his case focusing on the field 
of clinical psychology, which he argues has become equally dominated by the 
pharmaceutical industry. Drug companies, he claims, are aggressively adver-
tising an image of depression as a ‘chemical imbalance’ in the brain, with the 
sole intent of selling drugs to the clinically depressed. They fund scores of 
studies, ‘cherry pick’ those that corroborate the positive effects of the drugs 
they produce, and ‘kill’ the ones that challenge their narrative.
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Although it is entirely possible that the relationship between the author and han-
dling editor played no factor in the matter, for the sake of scientific disinterested-
ness, journals must avoid any suggestion of ‘favoritism.’ And indeed, the journal 
changed its review policy after the fact, such that no future editor would be allowed 
to deal with manuscripts submitted by colleagues or ‘research alliances’ (partners 
involved in the same research). (case derived from Retraction Watch, ‘We would 
now catch’ this conflict of interest, entry September 8th, 2017).
In our understanding of conflicts of values, the values of reliability are at stake:
• How do I know your assessment is fair?
• How can I trust your valuation is not prejudiced?
Below we discuss a few cases in which conflicting values factored into a 
researcher’s ability to weigh the situation fairly or justly.
8.3.2  Allegiance Effect
Maj (2008) discusses a phenomenon known in clinical research as the allegiance 
effect, the propensity of researchers to favor the school of thought they belong to. 
This effect plays out in ways similar to how financial conflicts of interest impact 
drug trials. Maj (2008, p. 91) found that the allegiance effect occurs through the 
‘selection of a less effective intervention to compare with the researcher’s favorite 
treatment; unskillful use of the comparison treatment; focusing on data favoring the 
preferred treatment in study reports; and failure to publish negative data.’ In short, 
researchers purposefully restrain themselves to a specific, desirable body of 
knowledge.
8.3.3  Disciplinary Bias?
Scientists often feel that grant application review processes are skewed. Some 
believe that certain disciplines are favored over others, or that certain approaches 
are more likely to get selected over others. They liken it to rivalries and disciplinary 
prejudices in peer reviewing. Should this be the case, then conflicts of values, rather 
than conflicts of interest, are at play, because there are no direct monetary gains to 
be expected by the reviewers.
A team of French researchers interviewed 98 scientists involved in grant review 
processes (either as a reviewer or as an applicant) and found that many did in fact 
believe that disciplinary bias played a role in the process, although they admitted 
that this was impossible to prove. Nonetheless, many still felt that certain disci-
plines strongly support their research topics, and that favoritism was almost self-
evident. One reviewer even admitted to being ‘much more lenient […] with the 
people we know’ (Abdoul et al. 2012, e35247).
8.3 Conflicts of Values
186
8.4  Competing Interests
8.4.1  What are Competing Interests?
Any situation where collaborating researchers have unaligned intentions or desired 
outcomes is a situation of competing interests. Throughout the research process, 
different perspectives and sometimes incompatible expectations are brought into 
the play.
This can be seen, for example, in commissioned research, when a researcher is 
asked to provide advice in a matter that interests multiple stakeholders, such as 
governmental bodies, individual clients, and industry professionals. These stake-
holders may envision contrary approaches to and focus of the research; they may 
bring in different values, risk assessment strategies, and expectations.
To help differentiate conflicts of interest and conflicts of values from competing 
interests, note that the former is in play when a researcher’s judgement is compro-
mised, but that in the latter it is not the researcher’s decision-making that is called 
into question. Rather, what is at stake is a researcher’s ability to reach consensus or 
agreement with multiple stakeholders. Will the research fulfill the needs of all par-
ties? Will they be able to assess the situation justly?
In our understanding of competing interests, the key value at stake is carefulness:
• How do I know that the parties involved are represented fairly?
• How do I know that the stakeholders’ interests are weighed properly?
From here, we will discuss cases in which competing interests affected a 
researcher’s ability to weigh a situation fairly or justly.
8.4.2  Wicked Problems
Head and Alford (2015) discuss the difficulties inherent to researching so called 
wicked problems in public policy and management research. Wicked problems are 
unpredictable and open-ended questions that involves a great number of people and 
present a major challenge to researchers (for example climate change, or pandemic 
influenza). Problems become ‘wicked’ when they elicit the unforeseen conse-
quences of policy interventions.
Most policy researchers acknowledge that wicked problems cannot be solved 
through the traditional ‘engineering approaches.’ Instead, researchers must pay 
attention to the deep-rooted disagreements between stakeholders about the nature, 
significance, goals, and solutions to these problems. This requires that researchers 
address ‘value perspectives’ that allow for certain forms of ‘bargaining’ in the polit-
ical marketplace, aimed at reaching a shared understanding, agreed purpose, and 
mutual trust. The researcher’s ethical challenge here is to negotiate a balanced per-




8.4.3  Ideological Interests
An ideologically informed bias, as explored by MacCoun (2015), serves as a basis 
of competing interests. MacCoun argues that in public policy, the ultimate goal (for 
example, income equality, reproductive rights, welfare entitlements) are not self- 
evident and in fact are often contested. This can lead to suspicion that a researcher 
may be biased in their assessment of the outcomes. However, as MacCoun found, 
these politically bent biases can also be harmful. This can be seen when adversaries 
who don’t like a researcher’s findings are granted a greater chance of questioning 
their opponent’s motives when an apparent bias is present (Box 8.5).
8.5  Conflicts of Ownership
8.5.1  What Is a Conflict of Ownership?
There are situations in which the use of findings, data, or other aspects of research 
is restricted by parties who claim ownership over them. They may be external 
financers, sponsors, commissioners, commercial parties, or any other entity who has 
secured rights to intellectual property (the right to own an idea or discovery). These 
parties may demand that certain restrictions apply were the research to be shared or 
utilized. If these restrictions contradict scientific norms (for example, refusing open 
access), we propose to speak of them as conflicts of ownership (COO).
Box 8.5: Sources of Conflicts
Conflicts of Interest 
(COI)




Conflicts of Ownership 
(COO)
Employment in a 
commercial firm
Family connections Culture Copyrights
Paid consulting Research affiliation Ideology Patents
Financial incentives Theoretical 
allegiances
Religion Data-ownership





In-kind support of 
materials




In our understanding of conflicts of ownership, there are two key values at stake, 
namely autonomy and accountability:
• What level of freedom do researchers have to make their own decisions?
• What restrictions imposed by others apply to their work?
The difference between a conflict of interest and a conflict of ownership lies in 
the fact that in a COO, it is not the judgement of the researcher that is called into 
question. Rather, it is the people with whom the researcher is working. Conflicts of 
ownership differ from competing interests in that the researcher is not at liberty to 
decide how or what to research, or how to use any subsequent findings.
8.5.2  Patents
Intellectual property is the right to own an idea. It allows the holder control over 
intellectual property. Patents challenge the communal ideal that science belongs to 
everybody, and that property right should be kept to a minimum (see Chap. 2 for a 
discussion of these ideals). Though patents are mostly associated with the natural 
sciences, the life sciences, and pharmacology, they are issued in the social sciences 
as well. Social science patents can be seen, for example, psychological testing pro-
tocols; biofeedback methods (devices that determine the psychological state of a 
subject); or educational games, methods, and instruments (see Box 8.6).
8.5.3  Copyrights
Owners of intellectual property have the right to reproduce or disseminate the 
research data they possess. The rights afforded to them may include the right to 
withhold publication or to frame research in certain ways. Copyrights very much 
challenge the communal ideal of science when they are abused.
When sponsors of a study are interested in certain findings only, and they own 
the copyrights, they can decide to insist on incomplete or partial reporting. The 
result is referred to as reporting bias (under-reporting of unexpected or undesirable 
results).
Song et al. (2010) found ample evidence of reporting bias in their comparative 
research of 300 empirical studies, identifying that pressure from research sponsors, 
instruction from journal editors, and intricacies of the research award system (who 
is eligible to receive which grants?) play substantial roles in their work and how 
they report it. ‘Clearly, commercial and other competing interests of research spon-
sors and investigators may influence the profile of dissemination of research find-
ings (Song et al. 2010, p. 81).
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8.6  Resolving Conflicts
8.6.1  Resolving Conflicting Situations
Identifying the various types of conflicts in research is just a first step in dealing 
with them. The act of resolving those conflicts come next, and will require different 
strategies, somewhat dependent on the type of conflict involved (see Resnik 2014, 
for further discussion).
Box 8.6: Patenting Psychological Tests: Costs and Benefits
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, social scientists have been 
searching for instruments that allowed them to measure ‘psychological con-
structs,’ such as intelligence, dimensions of personality, emotions, and other 
‘qualities of the mind.’ From the beginning, economic considerations were 
the primary impetus for psychological assessment. The driving thought was 
that cheap and cost-effective testing should replace inefficient and costly 
interviews that would provide the same information (see Yates and Taub 2003).
As a result of this mission, a large number of psychological tests have been 
developed and are now being used in clinical and developmental psychology, 
industrial and organizational psychology, forensic psychology, education, and 
in other applied fields of the social sciences. In these areas, psychological 
tests serve a variety of purposes, such as in the selection of candidates, assess-
ment of professional abilities, prediction of developmental trajectories, or 
planning of treatment.
As psychological testing has become standing practice in various occupa-
tional areas of Western society, the amount of money invested in these prac-
tices has increased accordingly. Psychological assessment has become an 
extremely profitable business and consequently, the copyright holders of psy-
chological tests (often the publishers) have guarded access to and use of these 
instrument, which they consider ‘trade secrets,’ similar to how pharmaceuti-
cal industries patent their products.
For a prime example, the publisher Pearson, who owns a number of psy-
chological tests, asserts that ‘test questions and answers, manuals and other 
materials divulging test questions or answers constitute highly confidential, 
proprietary testing information which Pearson takes every precaution to pro-
tect from disclosure beyond what is absolutely necessary for the purpose of 
administering the test.’
Their products are sold ‘only to qualified individuals who are bound by the 
ethical standards of their profession to protect the integrity of the materials by 




On the one hand, competing interests (CI) and conflicts of ownership (COO) 
often demand strategies that rely more heavily on judicial solutions. The resolution 
of conflicts of interests (COI) and conflicts of values (COV), on the other hand, are 
sought in ways that rely on regulation, instruction and even mediation.
8.6.2  Disclosure of Financial or Other Conflicts of Interest
To the parties involved in research, including institutions, government agencies, 
journals, and research subjects, disclosure is paramount. Disclosure makes explicit 
and transparent the important details related to the interpretation, credibility, and 
value of the information presented. It can be used as a simple tool to counteract bias 
and restore trust.
Most journals require that authors report potential conflicts of interest, both dur-
ing the online submission process as well as explicitly within the article. They fur-
ther run a ‘declaration of interest’ at the end of their articles.
Some researchers argue that such disclosure policies are inadequate, however. 
For example, with regard to the development of the DSM 5 (Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition), Cosgrove and Wheeler 
(2013) maintain that current approaches, particularly with regard to the transpar-
ency of conflicts of interests, are insufficient to solve the problem of industry’s grip 
on organized psychiatry, which is simply too powerful to be countered by ‘disclo-
sure measure(s).’ They argue a more committal policy be put in place.
8.6.3  Regulation and Management of Competing Interests
In order to regulate and manage these issues, special committees or independent 
bodies have been founded that regulate and oversee projects involving conflicts of 
interest, flexing authority to approve or deny applications. Institutional Review 
Boards (IRBs) can fulfil this function, as they oftentimes do, and they too will 
demand the disclosure of any potential COIs that researchers may have. Agencies 
that dole out research grants may require that applications meet certain non-COI 
criteria, specifying, for example, source or amount of payment or service that is 
admissible. Finally, the installment of complaint offices, or trust committees may 
have a further preventative effect.
8.6.4  Prohibition and Penalizing Researchers Who Violate 
Disclosure Policies
Some argue that the role of institutions as the primary means for managing conflicts 
of interest should be reduced. This is because institutions have become players in 
the field and run the risk of harboring conflicts of interest themselves. Instead, as 
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Resnik (2007) argues, strict rules should be imposed that limits potential COIs, like 
research funding or stock ownership. Further, these rules must carry penalties for 
those who break them.
On the other hand, a complete prohibition of any possible conflict of interest 
could deprive science and society of important benefits. Indeed, [forbidding] uni-
versities from taking funds from industry would stifle collaboration between aca-
demia and industry’ (Resnik 2007, p. 124).
8.6.5  Resolution in Court
Sometimes conflicts can only be settled in court. Regrettable as that may seem, it 
can also shed light on certain questions, because ownership rights come in the form 
of copyrights and patents, and they hold legal weight. In cases when the owners 
(sponsors) of research determine what may or may not be disseminated, challenging 
their decisions in court may be a last resort to settle differences of opinion, though 
they will be expensive for individual researchers or research institutes. However, it 
can be expected that these types of conflicts will increase as academics collaborate 
more with thirds parties and challenges over the rights to the knowledge at hand 
ramps up concurrently.
8.6.6  What to Make of All This?
Conflicting interests cast doubt on researchers motives and they have an undermin-
ing effect on overall trust in science. However, not all conflicting interests result in 
COIs. The question is how special interests impact a scientists’ research, and more 
specifically, how open scientists are about that impact. By disclosing a researcher’s 
affiliations, external positions, and (financial) ties, conflicts of interest and value can 
be avoided. That being said, additional regulation and legislation will also be neces-
sary in the future.
8.7  Conclusions
8.7.1  Summary
In this chapter, we’ve looked at science from the perspective of competing markets. 
We highlighted how different parties (in particular, industry, and government) and 
their differing (commercial) interests hold influence over research agendas. We 
examined the valorization of scientific knowledge (focus on economic value of sci-
ence) and the emergence of academic capitalism in the past 30 years.
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We differentiated between conflicts of interest (COI) and conflicts of values 
(COV), and discussed their potential to cloud a researcher’s judgement, but we also 
noted that not all interests lead to conflict situations. Disclosure of a researcher’s 
affiliations, external positions, and (financial) ties, as well as further regulation may 
help resolve future COIs.
In addition, we proposed to use the term competing interests (CI) when looking 
into situations where researchers have to strike a balance between the interests of 
collaborators. Finally, we explored considerations within conflicts of ownership 
(COO), where researchers are not at liberty to report on their research as they believe 
fit, because they don’t own it themselves. Copyright and patenting restrictions are at 
the base of these conflicts.
8.7.2  Discussion
While we investigated the reality of conflicts of interest in research, we neglected to 
examine the forces that drive the functioning of science itself. Under what condi-
tions do researchers actually do their work? How are they affected by political con-
siderations, or by administrative decisions, in practice? These questions will be 
highlighted in the next chapter.
 Case Study: Complicit to Torture?
Near the end of World War Two, the US government felt the need to set up a pro-
gram to help teach soldiers how to cope with torture, were they to find themselves 
captured. This program, known as SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and 
Escape), was extended through the Vietnam War era, and became relevant again 
after the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Decades after implementation, it was realized that reverse-engineering SERE 
techniques could be used to interrogate detainees. Psychiatrist Paul Burney and psy-
chologist John Leso (with assistance from an unnamed technician) were instructed 
to form a Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) and ramp up intelligence 
collection. In June of 2002, they were sent (under highly contested conditions) to 
Guantánamo Bay, the US detainment camp on the shores of Cuba that held over 700 
prisoners suspected of terrorism.
As explored by Sheri Fink in her 2009 exposé ‘Tortured Profession’ (from which 
we draw the following details, including the quotations from several of the people 
involved), Burney and Leso seemed to have transgressed ethical boundaries when 
they devised this reverse-engineered interrogation method for the US Army. Burney 
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and Leso had no formal training in interrogation and there were no standard operat-
ing procedures in place to guide their work. They confessed that they did not know 
what they were supposed to do, and therefore contacted psychologist Larry James 
for guidance. James had served as an Army psychiatrist at Abu Ghraib (the infa-
mous prison in Iraq where gruesome violations of human rights by US military 
personnel later took place against detainees). Apparently, James too felt unsure of 
how to proceed, and turned to Louis Banks for guidance. Banks was experienced 
with preparing soldiers to deal with mild ‘forms of torture,’ including slapping, 
pushing (into walls for example), forced placement into uncomfortable positions, 
and waterboarding (simulating the feeling of drowning).
Within just 5 months of their arrival at the Guantánamo facility, Burney and Leso 
prepared a memo. In it, they proposed several interrogation techniques using both 
physical and psychological pressure, including waterboarding, sleep deprivation, 
noise exposure, and limited access to comfort objects such as the Quran (Fig. 8.3).
They furthermore offered three approaches for different categories of prisoners, 
with the third reserved for ‘high-priority detainees’ who showed ‘advanced resis-
tance.’ These prisoners could be subjected to food restriction for 24 h, once a week. 
They could also be led to believe they would be subjected to experiences with ‘pain-
ful or fatal outcomes.’ Furthermore, they could be exposed to cold weather or water 
‘until such time as the detainee began to shiver.’
Fig. 8.3 Francisco de Goya: Why? Etching, from the series ‘The disasters of war’ (1810–1820)
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However, the authors warned in their memo that ‘physical and/or emotional 
harm from the above techniques may emerge months or even years after their use,’ 
and that ‘the most effective interrogation strategy is based on building rapport.’ In 
fact, they continued, ‘interrogation techniques that rely on physical or adverse con-
sequences are likely to garner inaccurate information and create an increased level 
of resistance.’ They had fewer reservations regarding the use of psychological pres-
sure, such as sleep deprivation, withholding food, and isolation, which they deemed 
‘extremely effective.’ They further noted that it was ‘vital’ to disrupt normal camp 
operations through the creation of ‘controlled chaos’ (quoted in Fink 2009).
Banks (the experienced Army psychiatrist) who received a copy of the memo, 
expressed his own misgivings about the use of physical pressures, which he believed 
could bring about ‘a large number of potential negative side effects.’ For one, when 
‘individuals are gradually exposed to increasing levels of discomfort, it is more 
common for them to resist harder.’ Further, ‘it usually decreases the reliability of the 
information.’
Despite these concerns, the proposed techniques were put to use interrogating 
prisoners at the Guantánamo facility. Among those subjected to interrogation was 
Mohammed el-Khatani, a high-value detainee suspected of involvement in the 9/11 
attacks. Psychologist Michael Gelles, working with the Guantánamo Criminal 
Investigation Task Force, criticized the interrogation methods, arguing that they 
weren’t up to his professional standards. Even the FBI objected, believing them to 
be ‘illegal.’ These protests were all ignored (Fig. 8.4).
Fig. 8.4 Detainee at the 
Abu Ghraib prison, with 
bag over their head, 
standing on a box with 





In June 2005, a log of el-Khatani’s interrogation was published by Time 
Magazine, causing a good deal of public indignation (Zagrin 2005). Bioethicists 
condemned the procedures as a clear violation of the ‘golden rule’ in bioethics (do 
not harm, contribute to beneficence). A week later, the American Psychological 
Association (APA) set up a ten-member committee (with six members having 
worked or consulted for the military or the CIA) to investigate the ethical aspects of 
the case.
The APA ruled that it was ‘consistent with the APA Ethics Code for psycholo-
gists to consult with interrogators in the interests of national security.’ However, 
psychologists should themselves not participate in torture, and ‘have a responsibil-
ity to report it.’ Practicing psychologists are ‘committed to the APA ethics code 
whenever they encounter conflicts between ethics and law,’ and if a conflict cannot 
be resolved, ‘psychologists may adhere to the requirements of the law.’
Banks and James (both members of the APA) also defended the Burney-Leso 
team (who drafted the memo), arguing that these psychologists had helped fix the 
problems rather than cause them. In 2005, James wrote: ‘the fact of the matter is that 
since Jan 2003, wherever we have had psychologists no abuses have been reported’ 
(quoted in Fink 2009).
The APA’s lenient attitude ultimately backfired. Two years later, a petition by 
APA members was accepted that banned psychologists from working in detention 
settings where international law or the U.S. Constitution was violated.
Of course, since this case broke and caught public attention, many more details 
about the conditions at Guantánamo have come to light. Legal battles have been 
fought in court over the legality of detaining prisoners under such poor conditions, 
with little access to counsel and most of them having never been tried. Attempts by 
President Obama to close Guantánamo were unsuccessful. As of early 2020, some 
40 detainees remain.
 Assignment
Consider this case from the perspective of conflicts of interest, conflicts of values, 
and competing interests.
 1. Identify any COI, COV and/or CI. Which values, norms, or interests are at stake 
in this case?
 2. Consider whether you find Burney and Leso liable of professional misconduct. 
Are they responsible for facilitating unethical (irresponsible) behavior towards 
detainees, or should their expression of doubt about the use of such harsh inter-
rogation procedures be regarded as a protection against liability?
 3. What recommendations would you give to a psychologist who is asked to engage 
in a task they feel to be unethical?
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 Suggested Reading
For a critical appraisal of the corrupting effects of financial conflicts of interest on 
scientific norms, we recommend Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace 
(2003), Jennifer Washburn, University, Inc. (2005), David Resnik, The Price of 
Truth (2007), and Daniel Greenberg, Science for Sale (2009), though these sources 
mostly target the pharmaceutical and biomedical sciences. A similar study for the 
social sciences is a need we hope a future scholar will address. On the subject of 
‘valorizing science’ we direct readers to the very informative, and short piece by De 
Jonge and Louwaars (2009). For an illuminating perspective on conflicts of interest, 
we refer to Resnik (1998).
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After Reading This Chapter, You Will:
• Understand how political factors impact modern science
• Appreciate in what ways the replication crisis endangers the values of science
• Know how publication pressure and perverse incentives challenge scientific 
practices
• See why teaching ethics requires reactive, proactive, and reflexive education
Keywords Adjunctification of higher education · Competition for prestige · 
Degree of freedom · False positives · h-index · Impact factor · Matthew-effect · 
Motivation (intrinsic v/s extrinsic) · New public management · Nomothetic · 
Paradigm · Performance indicators · Performance-based research funding system 
(prfs) · Perverse incentives · Publication bias · Publication pressure · Research 
rigor · Replication (exact v/s conceptual) · Replication crisis · Salami slicing 
technique · System theory
9.1  Introduction
9.1.1  Is There a Crisis in the Social Sciences?
The Guardian, a leading British newspaper, had a long running series on abuses and 
exploitation in academia titled ‘Academic anonymous’. From this series, we draw a 
few examples. In one piece (30 June 2017), the work of an unnamed researcher is 
described. It shows how the researcher tailored their papers not to fit the data, but to 
make the papers tailor fit for publication in prestigious journals. Another researcher 
left out any data interpretations that could raise questions with the journal editors. 
Their supervisor told them it could lead reviewers to turn it down. In yet another 
example, a research supervisor informed their students that research begins not with 
asking questions but with selecting suitable, high-ranking journals and defining 
subjects that might fit into those journals. All these examples illustrate the less than 
perfect publication behavior currently practiced in some corners of academia.
It was precisely experience with such practices that incited cognitive neuroscien-
tist Chris Chambers to write The Seven Deadly Sins of Psychology (2017), an indict-
ment of the numerous research misbehaviors found in the field of psychology, many 
of which already have been discussed in previous chapters of this book (see espe-
cially Chaps. 6 and 7), ranging from forms of bias and unreliability to fraud or even 
corruption.
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After working for nearly 10 years in the field, Chambers in an op-ed for The 
Guardian (May 9th 2017), said that he understood that a psychologist’s mission 
wasn’t about truth seeking, it was about ‘crunching through as many experiments as 
possible as quickly as possible, finding ways to make ambiguous data look beauti-
ful, publishing frequently in prestigious journals […] winning large public grants, 
and basically getting as famous and powerful as possible’.
Whether we will call the state of affair psychology finds itself in a ‘crisis,’ as 
some do, or more of a ‘challenge,’ may be a matter of opinion. Chambers found that 
not enough had been done to address the forces that fueled the problem (see our 
discussion of ‘academic capitalism’ in Chap. 8). An appeal to research ethics could 
be instrumental in transforming the field psychology in helping it to overcome this 
(perceived) crisis.
Whether this is the case will be the subject of debate in this chapter. We realize, 
however, that many of the discussions in this chapter are not part of a student’s lived 
experience. Many of the themes addressed here may seem ‘abstract,’ far removed 
from the reality of everyday life. To a degree this is true, but to a degree it isn’t, 
because the pressures and incentives, and political considerations that make up the 
fabric of modern academic life will reveal themselves in the educational practices in 
which students are immersed. This is why we have chosen to dedicate one chapter 
of our book to some of these broader topics.
9.1.2  System Approach
In this chapter, we will broaden our perspective on research ethics, and move away 
from considering how or why individual researchers decide to break from estab-
lished norms and values, or from examining what happens when rigid guidelines 
meant to steer our ethical behaviors are not followed. Instead, we will look at the 
interrelated and interdependent parts that make up the whole of the scientific enter-
prise, of which ethics is just one element. This holistic approach is often referred to 
as a systems perspective (see Parson 1951; Wiener 1965; Maturena and Varela 
1980). By zooming out to a lens that can capture the system as a whole, we can 
consider how scientific practices and ethics mutually influence one another. This 
allows us to explore some of the most important internal factors that regulate scien-
tific operations and shape our understanding of how ethics play a role.
We begin with an exploration of what is currently considered one of the more 
challenging problems in the social sciences, namely the replication crisis. Next, we 
will research two factors that are often closely connected to said crisis, both believed 
to have a corroding influence on ethics: publication pressure and perverse incen-
tives. In the final section, we will focus on the role of teaching research ethics in the 
future as a means of countering the corroding effects of misconduct.
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202
9.2  Replication Crisis
9.2.1  What Is a ‘Replication Crisis’?
The term replication crisis came into circulation around 2010, when it was observed 
that often, when studies were reproduced, the same findings could not be replicated. 
The replicated studies would find a smaller or larger effect than originally claimed, 
or none at all, or the direction of the effect had changed, or perhaps an entirely dif-
ferent effect was found altogether.
Derived from the natural sciences, the requirement that credible knowledge must 
consist of reproducible findings implies that studies carried out under the same con-
ditions should generate the same results. Findings that cannot be reproduced are 
considered chance findings, or false positives, and do not belong in the scientific 
body of knowledge  (Makel 2017).
The requirement of replicability is based on a nomethetic approach, meaning that 
it should be possible to discover laws that explain objective phenomena. Although 
not every social scientist accepts the requirement of replicability and its underlying 
nomothetic notion, those who do are committed to experimentation, clinical trials, 
and hypothesis testing under controlled conditions. The observation of a replication 
crisis calls into question the credibility of such research findings.
In fact, many of Daniel Kahneman’s well known social priming studies (as 
detailed in Thinking, Fast and Slow, 2011) failed in replication, likely because the 
sample sizes had been too small. ‘I placed too much faith in underpowered studies,’ 
Nobel prize laurate Kahneman famously admitted (Retraction Watch, February 20th 
2017). Kahnemann is but one of many whose studies failed to be replicated (see 
Hughes 2018, for more examples).
What constitutes the ‘replication crisis’ is a digression from the ideal of repro-
ducibility, resulting in the view that many research findings in certain disciplines 
(notably psychology, but also medicine) are unreliable, or perhaps even false. To 
better grasp the issues at hand, we discuss three aspects of the replication crisis: (1) 
lack of replication studies, (2) weak research rigor, and (3) failing replication.
9.2.2  Lack of Replication Studies
While replicability is accepted as a ‘fundamental principle’ by a large portion of the 
social science community, very few replication studies are actually carried out. This 
was noticed by Smith as early as 1970, while more recently, Makel et al. (2012) 
found an overall replication rate of psychological research at just over 1%. 
Additionally, many of these replication studies were performed by the original 
author. Why is there so little interest in replication studies? Let’s look into two pos-
sible reasons.
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One rationale is theoretical sectarianism (favoritism of one’s own theories, and 
prejudice or discrimination against rival ones), to which many social scientific dis-
ciplines are prone. Theoretical sectarianism occurs because researchers operate 
under specific theoretical assumptions, or paradigms, as they were defined by 
Thomas Kuhn (1970). Kuhn conceptualized a change in theoretical assumptions as 
a paradigm shift. The problem being, paradigm shifts aren’t often universal, with 
different disciplines regularly operating under different paradigms. Furthermore, 
there is often little common ground to be found between differing paradigms.
Without common ground (shared theories, mutually referenced authors, agreed 
upon methodologies), researchers are more inclined to confirm findings in their own 
domain than to disconfirm those of their peers in other domains. This implies that 
the use of unfamiliar methods make an interdisciplinary researcher performing a 
replication study to be more vulnerable to the possibility (or accusation) of misun-
derstanding (see Box 9.1 for an example thereof).
Box 9.1: Irreproducible Tears?
The issue of 14 January 2011 of the journal Science ran a paper by a team of 
Israeli scholars from the Weizmann Institute of Science at Rehovot, that 
claimed that human tears my serve a chemosignaling function. After a team of 
Dutch scholars subsequently failed in their attempt to replicate the experiment 
described in the original article, a dispute broke out between the two groups 
of scientists, each accusing the other of misrepresentation. The case, which 
we describe below in some detail, illustrates the difficulties of replication in 
the social sciences.
The Israeli team, headed by Naom Sobel, hypothesized that human tears 
serve a chemosignaling function, such that men smelling or breathing in 
female tears become sexually less aroused. The idea is that tears contain cer-
tain chemicals that may influence brain activity in (heterosexual) men. In 
order to test this hypothesis, the researchers collected ‘donor tears’ from 
women who had watched sad films. They then exposed a group of males in a 
within-subjects design to these tears as well as to a substitute substance. After 
exposure, the participants were asked to rate their sexual attraction to pictures 
of female faces. In a second experiment, the researchers added another depen-
dent variable, namely levels of psychophysiological arousal. The various 
studies revealed that exposure to female tears indeed has an effect, both on 
self-reported levels of sexual arousal (modest) and on objective psychophysi-
ological expression (more pronounced) (Gelstein et al. 2011).
A group of mainly Dutch psychologists attempted to replicate these find-




alterations. Thus, in one condition, male participants were not only asked to 
rate sexual attraction, but also whether or not they would be willing to date the 
females in the pictures. In a second series of experiments, the researchers 
changed the design from a within-subjects study (which had low power), to a 
larger, combined within and between subject design. However, they now 
asked the subjects to not only rate the pictures of a female face, but also of the 
whole body as a measure of ‘arousal.’
Their attempts to ‘replicate and extend’ the original studies failed. They 
found no support for the chemosignaling function hypothesis, which they 
considered a possible false finding (Gračanin et  al. 2017a, b, p.  149). The 
authors proposed instead that tears are functional in a social context, and that 
crying is a ‘self-soothing strategy’ (Gračanin et al. 2014).
Principal investigator Naom Sobel (2017) of the original Israeli study 
responded to the failed attempt at replication, arguing that the replication 
studies were not really replications of the original at all. The researchers had 
not operated from a proper chemosignaling laboratory, he argued. Further, he 
stated they had used different test materials (other films), which communi-
cated a different feeling (not sadness), and had used combined datasets in an 
‘inappropriate manner.’ Had they used the ‘appropriate techniques,’ Sobel 
believed they would have found that the data the Dutch team collected actu-
ally supported the original hypothesis. This prompted a further response from 
the Dutch replication team (Gračanin et al. 2017a, b), who argued that a the-
ory that only holds under very specific circumstances is likely not a very 
good theory.
This dispute is of interest because it leaves open any of the following alter-
natives, namely that this ‘failure to replicate’ represents:
 1. An instance of theoretical sectarianism
 2. The social sciences’ context dependency
 3. Weak research rigor
Which of these alternatives do you believe is most likely?
Box 9.1 (continued)
A second rationale may be that journals prefer to publish ‘newsworthy findings’ 
over what is ‘already known’ (see the section on dissemination bias in Chap. 6 for 
further discussion). For this same reason, it is more difficult to get funding for rep-
lication studies, especially exact replication studies (same methodology, same con-
ditions), as opposed to conceptual replication studies (same conceptualization, 
different methodology or different conditions).
The net result is that in the absence of adequate replication studies, we are much 
less sure that positive findings are in fact positive, and not accidental (see Fanelli 
2010a for a discussion).
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9.2.3  Weak Research Rigor
The replication crisis may be further worsened by weak research rigor. In 2011, 
Simmons et al. published a now famous study that shows how easy it is to produce 
false positives if the researcher’s degree of freedom is manipulated. Degrees of free-
dom pertain to a series of methodological choices researchers must make over the 
course of collecting and analyzing data, including the selection of dependent vari-
ables, determining sample size, using covariates (independent variables), and 
reporting subsets of experimental conditions (Simmons et al. 2011).
While staying within the accepted boundary of a .05 p-value, the authors suc-
ceeded in ‘proving,’ in a real experimental study with real subjects, the unlikely 
conclusion that listening to certain types of music makes you feel younger, and the 
obviously false conclusion that listening to certain other types of music actually 
makes you younger. They arrived at these conclusions by tacitly manipulating the 
researcher’s degrees of freedom (such as changing the number of participants with-
out reporting this, or reporting on certain measures only). A reviewer unaware of 
these manipulations would have to accept the ‘age effect’ (that you actually become 
younger by listening to certain music) as genuine.
The point the authors sought to make was that as long as reviewers and readers 
are not informed about the researchers’ choices within their degrees of freedom 
(which can in and by themselves be legitimate), they cannot reasonably separate 
false from true findings. They therefore recommend more transparency about the 
choices made by researchers to avoid the creation of false positives.
9.2.4  Failing Replication?
Another seemingly significant blow was delivered in 2015, when a number of 
researchers undertook a large scale attempt to replicate a swath of psychological 
studies. The result were sobering. At the insistence of Brian Nosek, a group of 270 
authors (worldwide) replicated one hundred psychological studies, published in the 
course of 1  year (2008), in three top ranking journals (Open Science 
Collaboration 2015).
Using a uniform replication protocol, all studies were carried out as exact repli-
cations as much as possible. The results were collected, assessed, and indepen-
dently reviewed. Comparing the original studies with the replication studies, the 
researchers looked at significance and p-values, effect size, subjective assessments, 
and meta-analyses of effect size. What they found was that collectively, these indi-
cators revealed that the replications produced significantly weaker evidence than the 
original findings. For example, the mean size effect of the replication studies were 
roughly half the magnitude of original the mean size effect (see Fig. 9.1).
The Open Science Collaboration project caused shockwaves that resonated 
beyond the scientific community. Newspapers all over the world reported that psy-
chological studies fail to replicate. The authors themselves were much more careful, 
9.2 Replication Crisis
206
however. They argued that their study neither proved nor disproved anything. ‘The 
original studies examined here offered tentative evidence; the replications we con-
ducted offered additional, confirmatory evidence. In some cases, the replications 
increase confidence in the reliability of the original results; in other cases, the repli-
cations suggest that more investigation is needed to establish the validity of the 
original findings. Scientific progress is a cumulative process of uncertainty reduc-
tion that can only succeed if science itself remains the greatest skeptic of its explan-
atory claims’ (Open Science Collaboration 2015, p. 4716–7).
Maxwell et al. (2015) similarly argued that when replication studies fail to show 
significant results, this should not lead to the premature conclusion that the original 
study was somehow faulty or flawed. In a reanalysis of the data collected by the 
Open Science team, Van Bavel et al. (2016) were able to demonstrate that some of 
the failure to reproduce the same findings could be attributed to contextual factors, 
having to do with social and cultural differences between the countries where the 


































Fig. 9.1 Original study effect size versus replication effect size. (© Science, 28 Aug. 2015, 
issue 6251)
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9.3  Publication Pressure
9.3.1  Value for Money
In Chap. 8, we discussed how in the last quarter of the twentieth century, globaliza-
tion and neoliberalism set in motion a trend towards ‘valorization’ of science, that 
emphasizes the monetary value of scientific knowledge. Ties with external parties 
(both commercial organizations and governmental bodies) strengthened, from 
which a variety of conflicts emerged. But ‘valorization’ also impacted the way 
 science was organized internally, including publication behavior, to which we now 
turn our attention.
The wish to demonstrate to the tax paying public that scientists produce ‘value 
for money’ found its way into an administrative logic that demands adherence to 
uniform, quantifiable norms. University administrators and policy makers began 
thinking about ways to measure a researcher’s output in terms of ‘objective num-
bers’. One objective criterion they soon came up with was a count of articles pub-
lished by individual researchers in prestigious journals. Later this was extended to a 
count of citations received. Both could be used as an approximation of a research-
er’s objective impact on the scientific community.
These measures resulted in the establishment of new standards, such as a jour-
nal’s impact factor, a researcher’s citation impact, and their so-called h-index (see 
Box 9.2). Any of these standards, with a special focus on publishing success, became 
a measuring stick for success in academia (Barnard-Brak et al. 2011). Greater out-
put and more citations equaled greater academic value. Unwittingly, these norms 
transformed the tenured job market in academia into a ‘market for prestige’ (Garvin 
Box 9.2: H-index (Adapted from Wikipedia)
The h-index (named after its inventor, Jorge Hirsch) is an author-level metric 
that attempts to measure both the productivity and citation impact of a scien-
tist’s publications. The index is based on the scientist’s most cited papers and 
the number of times those papers were cited in other publications. The index 
can also be applied to the productivity and impact of a scholarly journal, as 
well as a group of scientists residing within the same department, university, 
or even country. The values on the h-index vary greatly from discipline to 
discipline, where the number of scientists, published papers, and citations 
strongly differ. In physics, for example, the average h-value for a fulltime 
professor is between 15 and 20, in economics its 7.6, in sociology its 3.7. In 
many academic communities, it was long believed that better scholarship 
equaled higher h-factors, but recent discussion flared up about whether 
h- values actually represent quality.
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1980), thereby creating of whole series of new questions, which we will outline 
below (Fig. 9.2).
9.3.2  Publish or Perish
Has the pressure to publish in ‘high impact journals’ altered research norms? 
Moustafa (2014, p. 139) observed that the impact factor became ‘a major detrimen-
tal factor of quality, creating huge pressures on authors, editors, stakeholders and 
funders.’ More tragically, Moustafa notes, is that impact factor has also become the 
condition for allocating government funding to entire institutions in some countries.
Siegel and Baveye (2010) reason that scholars who wish to meet publication 
expectations will resort to a variety of techniques to increase their output and crank 
up their citation ranking. These include the use of co-authorships and so called gift 
authorships (author does not contribute to the research, or not significantly, but is 
included out of courtesy and in the expectation of reciprocity). Additionally, salami 
slicing techniques (slicing research such that several different papers can be written, 
all slightly varying around the same theme) and extensive referencing (‘I cite-you, 
you-cite-me’) are employed to meet publication expectations (Box 9.3).
Fanelli and Larivière (2016) researched why publication rates have increased in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century. Looking into the work of over 40,000 
researches in Western countries, whose profiles were drawn from the Web of 
Science, they compared the publishing frequency between 1900 and 1998. They 
found that the average number of papers published throughout the twentieth century 
remained stable for most disciplines, and then visibly increased after 1980. However, 
Fig. 9.2 Publication pressure
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so did the number of co-authors. Fractional productivity (the productivity of one 
researcher’s work spread out over multiple co-authored papers) remained stable. 
From this, the authors concluded that the widespread belief that pressure to publish 
causes the scientific literature to be flooded with salami-sliced, trivial, and false 
results is in fact incorrect, or at least exaggerated.
In a similar examination, van Wesel (2016) looked at output of journals rather 
than individual researchers. He examined 50 high impact scientific publication out-
lets selected from a variety of disciplines (including medicine, physiology, and psy-
chology), to see whether publication behavior changed between 1997 and 2012. Van 
Wesel compared the number of authors listed, the amount of references included, 
but also the text and abstract lengths, and even the presence of a colon in the title (as 
indicators of a paper’s ‘citability’). He found similar patterns as Fanelli and Larivière 
(2016), including a growing number of co-authors and increased referencing. Aware 
that these patterns could also be attributed to a change in editorial policies, van 
Wesel (2016, p. 212-3) believes it is nevertheless ‘not unrealistic to link the observed 
changes in publication behavior to a change in evaluation criteria.’
While the studies discussed above do not provide evidence that ‘pressure to pub-
lish’ leads to fraudulent behavior (Fanelli 2010b), there is reason to believe that 
publication norms have changed. Authors seem much more strategic in their publi-
cation behavior. Due to an awareness of the necessity to publish in order to further 
their academic careers, it seems likely that researchers plan their publications to 
meet these goals.
Box 9.3: Slicing and Dicing: A Dilemma
A well-respected colleague proudly explains to you that he has managed to 
produce 12 publications out of the one dataset he collected for his disserta-
tion. This is a particularly interesting achievement, as it involves a dataset 
with only 232 respondents to a four-page survey.
How do you respond?
 1. I think this is a great example to follow and I ask him how he achieved it.
 2. I cannot imagine each of these 12 papers having a unique contribution and 
vow never to go down this route.
 3. I tell the colleague that this is bad science and that I strongly disapprove of 
their actions.
 4. I think this is bad practice and is tainting the reputation of science. I inform 
the editors of at least the most recent of the 12 publications.
(Adapted from the Erasmus Dilemma Game)
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9.3.3  Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation
Does increasingly ‘strategic’ and ‘planned’ publishing behavior means that authors 
are less intrinsically motivated? Hangel and Schmidt-Pfister (2017) interviewed 
over 90 researchers in Germany who were in different stages of their careers (PhD 
students, post-doc, tenured professors). The authors asked their participants frankly: 
‘Why do you publish?’ They found that the most common reason to publish con-
tained both internal and external motivations, namely: (1) to communicate interest-
ing research results; (2) to gain recognition among peers; (3) because they enjoy 
writing, and (4) to obtain funding in order to secure future research.
All researchers draw from a mix of these motivations, albeit differently in differ-
ent stages of their careers. Those still in the early stages of their careers, when they 
are more dependent on their supervisors, are often highly aware of the incentive that 
one has to publish for mere survival. They cite motives 2 and 4 as most important. In 
the next stage of their career, many still feel the pressure to publish, but now more as 
a means to an end. These researchers seem more capable of enjoying the research 
process itself and more often cite reasons 1 and 3. Tenured professors almost always 
cite reason 4, claiming to publish for educational purposes and for academic survival.
9.4  Perverse Incentives
9.4.1  Reward Systems
Publication pressure represents one of the factors that contribute to what some 
believe to be a precarious situation in the social sciences. Ambition, external pres-
sure, and weak research rigor seem to highlight an element of ‘crisis’ mentioned 
earlier in this chapter. Outside of publication pressure, the other factor consists of 
reward systems that aim to stimulate academic quality and simultaneously deal with 
decreased public funding.
Acting on a desire to transform universities along neoliberal lines into efficient, 
productive, and outstanding institutions, new public management administrators (see 
Box 9.4) set up national reward systems to select the best researches. Performance- 
based Research Funding Systems (PRFS) have since been used to evaluate the qual-
ity of research proposals. They are based on the rationale that ‘funding should flow 
to the institutions where performance is manifest’ (Herbst 2007, p. 90).
These systems take into account any number of ‘performance indicators,’ such as 
the output of a research group, their citations received, their international ranking, 
and the judgements of their peers. For individual researchers, the number of suc-
cessful grant applications is counted, along with their level of participation in inter-
national research associations, the number of keynote addresses they’ve made, 
board memberships, awards bestowed, and even their perceived societal impact (as 
expressed, for example, in their role as advisors for social organizations).
9 Science and University Politics
211
Perhaps unsurprisingly, researchers faced with the prospect of losing funding 
started to seek out ways to increase their performance accordingly. In an attempt to 
keep pace, or even outdo their colleagues, researchers began spending more time 
writing research proposals, but since each of these have a limited chance of being 
honored, the ‘battle for efficiency’ effectively resulted in an even greater waste of 
public resources.
PRFSs and other performance-based evaluation systems have unintended, so 
called perverse effects, when they encourage behavior that runs contrary to the orig-
inal intentions (stimulation of excellence resulting in inefficient use of public fund-
ing) or invigorate undesirable behavior (competition for prestige, see Hicks 2012). 
Bouter (2015, p.  157) paints a grim picture of how certain incentives lead to a 
‘monoculture focused on citation scores, short term economic gains, and 
government- defined growth sectors,’ with young talented researchers not being 
scouted. In the following sections, we discuss areas where such incentives can have 
perverse effects (see also Stone 2002).
9.4.2  Matthew Effect
Sociologist Robert Merton (1968) reasoned how symbolic, as well as material 
rewards in science will have an accumulative effect. If a researcher ‘scores’ on any 
one of the criteria mentioned above, their chances of getting funded improve, and 
this effect will accumulate over time (also in a negative sense: if you don’t score, 
your chances diminish accordingly). The result is that ‘eminent scientists get dis-
proportionately great credit for their contributions to science while relatively 
unknown ones tend to get disproportionately little for their occasionally comparable 
contributions’ (Merton 1988, p. 607). This is called the Matthew Effect, named after 
the Gospel of Matthew 25:29: ‘For to every one who has will more be given, and he 
will have abundance; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away.’
There is some evidence that indicators of past performance correlate positively 
with chances of getting a grant application funded. This has been found in the fields 
of economics and the social sciences in the Netherlands (van den Besselaar and 
Box 9.4: New Public Management
New Public Management (NPM) is the late twentieth century approach to 
public service organizations that suggested they be run like businesses. It is 
based on principles of expanding managerial freedom, flexibility of organiza-
tional structures, shifting staff and job conditions, emphasis on output and 
decrease of input (‘cost-effective management’), and increase of efficiency 
(see Christopher Hood, ‘A Public Management for All Seasons?’, 1991).
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Leydesdorff 2009; Bornmann et al. 2010), although the correlation is low and is not 
consistent across all disciplines.
More worryingly, since the Matthew Effect contains an element of self-fulfilling 
prophesy in it, there is a danger of misrecognition attached to it, especially with 
young academics. When academics are overly assessed in the early stages of their 
careers, precocious students will have a far better chance of surviving the competi-
tive struggle over their late blooming peers, who may be just as brilliant.
9.4.3  Gap Between Tenured and Contingent Faculty Members
A further concern is that certain policies will negatively affect the academic labor 
market (Schwartz 2014). There are strong indications that neoliberal university pol-
itics, though meant to reward academic excellence, contribute to a divide between 
tenured staff with permanent positions and contingent faculty members who work 
on temporary contracts. This process is referred to as the adjunctification of higher 
education, or academia’s overreliance on temporary, non-tenured faculty members 
(Curnalia and Mermer 2018).
There are a number of reasons for this adjunctification. Increased focus on reten-
tion, career outcomes, and resource acquisition brought about a reduction in tenured 
positions. Once regarded as essential to protect academic freedom in the pursuit of 
knowledge, today tenured positions making up sometimes as little as 20 to 25% of 
all faculty staff in Western universities. The majority of instructors and teachers are 
hired on a contingent basis. These have little prospect of getting tenured but are 
assessed by and large along the same criteria as tenured staff, while their possibili-
ties for doing research (and getting promoted) are diminishing. Teaching and 
research are thus increasingly being undertaken by different kinds of faculty 
(Finkelstein 2014). If nothing changes in the near future, it is to be expected that this 
divide will only grow deeper (see Dobbie and Robinson 2008) (Fig. 9.3).
In a survey among some 1500 higher education professors, deans, governing 
board members, campus administrators, policymakers, and other stakeholders in the 
United States, Kezar et al. (2015) found general agreement that the present system 
is untenable. It threatens academic freedom and undervalues teaching through its 
disproportionate emphasis on research. Most respondents agreed on the necessity to 
restructure teaching positions. More full-time faculty, differentiation of responsi-
bilities, and an overarching need to restore professionalism to the role of faculty 
were among the most pressing urges uttered by administrators and professors alike.
Below, we give the floor to two adjunct faculty who experienced this gap between 
tenured and contingent up close. One, a Dutch scholar in the social sciences, left 
academia after years of working on a temporary basis. In an email to her colleagues 
(quoted here with permission), she wrote: ‘I experience a large disconnect between 
what you are paid to do as a temporary staffer (teaching) and what determines your 
career options (research). This disconnect means that many contingent faculty 
members are almost forced to put in a lot of additional hours (i.e., evenings, 
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weekends, using holidays to write papers, taking up parental/care leave to decrease 
the teaching load and use that time to work). If you do not want to go along with 
this, your research output will stay ‘behind’ compared to the competition, which 
makes you less attractive and decreases your chances on permanent positions, pro-
motions, grants, etc.’
Similarly, an adjunct faculty member in England was quoted as saying: ‘I’ve 
watched brilliant friends be employed for two or three consecutive years with 
demanding teaching loads, travelling to cities hundreds of miles away with sharing 
childcare, only to be dropped for someone else with a more illustrious publication 
record’ (The Guardian, July 14th 2017).
9.4.4  Gender Gap?
Historically, women have been underrepresented in all disciplines in academia and 
at all stages in their careers. Many industrialized countries have adopted strong 
gender equality programs in research and innovation, and the gender gap has since 
grown smaller (Ceci et al. 2014). Despite this, there is still a ‘pipeline leakage,’ 
meaning that on the way to the top, women drop out more often than men (Huyer 
2015). From the 2015 report She Figures, issued by the European Commission, we 
learn that in 2011 some 50% of all students in the social sciences and law in the EU, 
about 30–40% of researchers in these fields, and 29% ‘top level’ researchers therein 
are women (with considerable differences per country).
Is the demise of the gender gap in higher education (in industrialized countries) 
an effect of government policies or does it happen independently? Ginther and 
Kahn (2009) compared the careers of male and female researchers in the US 
Fig. 9.3 If nothing changes, the gap will grow
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between 1973 and 2001. They examined the probability of obtaining a tenure track 
after getting a PhD and found that women were still less likely to take tenure posi-
tions in science. This was explained by ‘fertility decisions’ rather than reward sys-
tems  – meaning that ‘women must face a choice between having children or 
succeeding in their scientific careers, while men do not face the same choices’ 
(Ginther and Kahn 2009, p. 183).
In non-industrialized countries (for example in parts of Africa), the gender gap 
persists, and it may also not be ascribed to government policies but rather cultural 
expectations. Ogbogu (2011), reviewing the gender gap in higher education in 
Nigeria, notes that recruitment and selection practices in their universities do not 
discriminate against women. Instead, factors such as lack of mentoring, poor com-
pensation, family responsibilities, ‘and the ideology that women should have low 
career aspirations’ accounted for the observed disparity in academia.
9.4.5  Summing Up
In an attempt to keep up with and respond to worldwide changes in the political and 
economic landscapes within which universities operate, university administrators 
and government policy makers have set up procedures that aim to enhance produc-
tivity and excellence. These policies have had (and continue to have) intended as 
well as unintended consequences, resulting in a number of fundamental changes in 
the ways universities conduct research and provide education. These changes them-
selves pose new questions and challenges that must be addressed (Fig. 9.4).
9.5  Teaching Research Ethics and Integrity
9.5.1  Ethics and Integrity Education
There is little doubt that ethics and integrity education is becoming increasingly 
important in universities, not least because of increasing demands and competition 
in the academic field (Brall et al. 2017). Universities have a commitment to prepare, 
guide, and mentor students through a litany of ethical issues; combatting scientific 
misconduct, addressing questionable research practices, applying specific proce-
dures and regulations, learning to deal with newfound responsibilities belonging to 
certain roles, knowing how to accommodate a diversity of perspectives, and learn-
ing how to deal with external pressure (Naimi 2007). We concur with Resnik (1998, 
p. 174) that the question is not whether ‘ethics be taught?’, but ‘how can ethics be 
taught?’ In the sections below, we briefly discuss three broad approaches for how 
ethics can be taught.
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9.5.2  Reactive Education
This approach is focused on the prevention of misconduct and misuse of proce-
dures. To accomplish reactive education, many research institutions offer case- 
based approaches in their curricula (with either real or hypothetical dilemmas), 
where students learn to make judgement calls through structured discussions 
(Sponholz 2000). These discussions allow students to ‘evaluate conventions, define 
responsibilities, articulate positions on different issues, and acquire some facility at 
using a framework for ethical decision making’ (Stern and Elliott 1997). Canary 
(2007) shows that these approaches are successful in enhancing moral sensitivity, 
moral judgements, moral motivation, and moral character in students.
One such development consists of the development of eLearning tools. In a dis-
cussion of the issues related to the emergence of computer-based learning, Esposito 
(2012) finds that open networked learning environments ‘encourage a participatory 
research approach and therefore foster creative suggestions and shared solutions 
from participants in an evolving landscape of ethical opportunities and challenges’ 
(p.323).
Fig. 9.4 © Cartoon by 
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9.5.3  Proactive Education
This approach is focused on preparing students to actively participate in complex 
research environments and providing skills for adapting to changes in research poli-
cies. Proactive education makes use of role playing and simulation settings, which 
are used to train students to contribute to research themselves.
Sweet (1999) and Karkowski (2010) discuss the function of simulated review 
procedures with mock research proposals, used to prepare students to produce 
higher-quality research proposals themselves, with both authors finding these pro-
cedures helpful. Löfström (2016) discusses the use of role-playing strategies in aca-
demic integrity education, specifically staging panel discussions of realistic cases, 
which act as added value in facilitating perspective-taking and the broadening of a 
student’s worldview.
9.5.4  Reflexive Education
This approach aims at developing ethical awareness not restricted to institutional 
procedures. Rather working within a broader definition of research ethics that 
includes social, political, and moral dimensions, Von Unger (2016) emphasizes the 
need for more critical dialogue in ethics education. As an example, a course format 
is discussed where sociology students were trained to reflect on a case that had 
political relevance. The students collected their own data, engaged in critical inquiry, 
learned to formulate and revise their own assumptions, and thus learned to become 
more self-critical, a cornerstone of ethical decision-making.
9.5.5  Should Misconduct Be Criminalized?
A final note on the question of what to do when teaching ethics and integrity fails to 
achieve its goals. Should misconduct be criminalized? Until very recently, miscon-
duct rarely led to litigation. Even Diederick Stapel, whose case was discussed in 
Chap. 5, was never brought before a court, though he did lose his job and a large 
number of his articles were retracted.
A critical issue in deciding whether research misconduct should be subject to 
criminal law is how it is defined, argue Dal-Ré et al. (2020). Should it only cover 
well-known forms of fraud, such as plagiarism, fabrication, and falsifying, or should 
it extend to questionable research practices, such as selective reporting? This ques-
tion is important, because while criminalization could deter everything that is 
regarded as research misconduct, it could simultaneously lead to normalization of 
what is not considered misconduct.
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Dal-Ré et al. (2020, p. 9) admit that a research integrity organization with global 
authority will not emerge any time soon, but they are hopeful that ‘a strong state-
ment that is widely supported can unify and inspire the field.’
9.5.6  In Sum
All of the approaches discussed above contribute to promoting a stronger under-
standing of research ethics and integrity in students. We do not want to suggest that 
one of these is better than another. We merely want to argue that they all fulfill their 
own role in ethics and integrity education, and that universities and educators alike 
have a never-ending obligation to prepare students the best they can, so that they can 
prepare the next generation the best they can.
9.6  Conclusions
9.6.1  Summary
In this chapter, we examined research ethics in the social sciences from the perspec-
tive of a systems approach. We situated universities in the dynamic interplay of 
political and economic forces, and, more specifically, we discussed the influence of 
new public management politics on university policies. This led us to probe whether 
there truly is a research misconduct ‘crisis’ going on in the social sciences.
First, we investigated whether the social sciences suffered from a replication 
crisis – the problem that the few studies that have even been reproduced often fail 
to be replicated. Along those lines, we also observed that many studies suffer from 
weak research rigor where true findings cannot be distinguished from false positives.
Second, we discussed the impact of perverse incentives on scientific practices. 
We found that contrary to what is often suggested, these incentives may not incite 
fraudulent behavior directly. But there is evidence that they link to several other 
undesirable trends, including a trend towards adjunctification of higher education, 
or increased prevalence of educators on temporary assignments, which has an indi-
rect impact on research ethics.
Finally, we discussed three different approaches for teaching research ethics and 
integrity in universities. These approaches can be used to help students come to 




This chapter addresses some of the more fundamental problems in the social sci-
ences, specifically those relating to the political and economic forces at play. These 
forces have resulted in a ‘crisis’ of sorts, and a drastic restructuring of universities. 
However, we do not offer political or economic solutions to these issues, which 
would fall outside the scope of this book.
The second question we did not address is whether teaching ethics and 
integrity can help solve some of these problems, or could possibly even con-
tribute to them. Some argue that research ethics in the social sciences needs to 
be modelled after similar, standing practices in the medical sciences, and that 
governing bodies, such as IRBs, will have to play a more prominent role in 
upholding professional standards. Others resist this idea based on the objection 
that a highly professionalized scientific enterprise undermines scientific free-
dom and creativity (see Resnik 1998, p. 177). There are others still that argue 
that the formalization of ethical procedures achieves the opposite of what they 
aim to achieve. Increasingly formalized research ethics structures cause a rup-
ture in the relationship between ‘following rules’ and ‘acting ethically,’ and the 
result of which is called ethics creep (Haggerty 2004).
Let us conclude by asking what are your thoughts on this question. Is your insti-
tution doing enough, or perhaps even too much, with regard to research ethics? Do 
you feel prepared to tackle the questions discussed in this book?
 Case Study: How to Start a Fire
‘Education is not the filling of a pail, but the lighting of a fire’.
In a March 24th, 2017 article in Psychology Today, Jesse Marczyk explained 
how he tried to motivate his students to always identify how they can improve. To 
achieve this end, he reported to using ‘a unique kind of assessment policy,’ allowing 
revisions after grades were received (Marczyk 2017).
From an educational perspective, this seemed ‘the reasonable thing to do,’ but 
from a professional perspective, it’s plain ‘stupid.’ When declaring why, Marczyk 
noted he spent far too much time reading, commenting, and grading papers. For 
every 100 students, he needed 8 to 16 hours per test, time he argued should be better 
spent writing grant applications. That is, if he wanted to apply for a tenured track, 
because hiring committees ‘aren’t all that concerned with my students’ learning 
outcomes.’
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Marczyk’s article drives home the point that the commodification and underap-
preciation of education is directly linked to sciences’ replication crisis, and that 
perverse incentives incite academics to behave in irresponsible ways. When teach-
ers are evaluated on the number of students that pass their tests, they will start 
‘teaching to the test.’ ‘Rather than being taught, say, chemistry, students begin to get 
taught how to take a chemistry test, and the two are decidedly not the same thing.’
In this case, we shall look at the consequences of employing a ‘technical’ per-
spective on teaching in academic education that emphasizes its instrumental use 
only (teaching should serve well defined and measurable goals as efficiently as pos-
sible). We briefly discuss three authors who criticized, each in their own ways, the 
assumptions underlying such a perspective.
We begin with Gert Biesta (2007), who offers a series of philosophical argu-
ments against the idea that educational practices should be modeled after the 
evidence- based approaches found in the field of medicine. Some educationalists, 
Biesta write, believe that much like the practices in medicine, teachers should rely 
on evidence from research about what ‘works’ in education, and establish similar 
‘evidence-based educationalist practices.’ Biesta disagrees with these 
educationalists.
Underlying their ‘evidence-based philosophy’ are several untenable assump-
tions, Biesta argues. First, that there exists ‘neutral frameworks’ that allow for the 
assessment of outcomes (namely what is ‘effective’ in education). In reality, what 
‘works’ in education is not something someone can establish beforehand objec-
tively, it is something that is constructed in the process by teachers and students 
together.
In a similar vein, James Kennedy (2016), who adheres to Biesta’s critique, argues 
against the idea that effective learning at universities can be both measured and 
guaranteed. On the contrary, says Kennedy. Learning is not ‘a given,’ nor is teaching 
a science – it is an art (2016, p. 35).
But there is room for improvement at universities, Kennedy acknowledges. One 
suggested area relates to the focus in recent years toward articulating the social 
impact of research. Universities should strive to better articulate the social impact of 
teaching and embed it into academic curricula. This would entail providing more 
room for student engagement, linking their inner concerns and passions to the needs 
of the world. Kennedy advocates for a new emphasis on student motivation, and a 
shift towards learner-led programs, that allow students more control over their 
learning processes.
Finally, we discuss a study by Andrew Boocock (2013), who interviewed admin-
istrators, departments heads, and lecturers at a UK college about their experiences 
with ‘performance indicators’ (statistics which compare universities and colleges 
against benchmarks for a number of preestablished, politically motivated out-
comes). In this case, the desired outcomes were as follows: (a) better retention rates 
of students in underrepresented groups, and (b) a higher percentage of students 
continuing higher education. Certain measures were taken to achieve these goals. 
How did these indicators impact the motivation of the actors involved?
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Administrators often saw great advantages in striving toward performance indi-
cator benchmarks. Student retention rates improved, their achievements went up, 
guidance and support systems for students were used more efficiently, as were their 
learning plans.
Teachers perceived a different reality, however. They noticed several side effects 
of focusing on performance indicators. Student attendance rates and punctuality 
worsened, which they attributed to the introduction of inertial, bureaucratic disci-
plinary procedures (Boocock 2013, p. 313). Teachers also experienced a perception 
of powerlessness and loss of authority, with one teacher describing it as the ‘de- 
professionalized status of lecturers.’ Their experience was troubling indeed. ‘You’re 
also under pressure in that if you are underperforming they can close your course or 
put it on special measures internally … We are very much ruled by numbers so that 
very much changes the tenure of how people behave and how they react’ (p. 320).
Teachers furthermore observed perverse incentives, such as to the desire to with-
draw ‘risky’ students and retain ‘marginal’ students until the end of the academic 
year (to maximize funding units). All this effected their intrinsic motivation to edu-
cate. Even administrators felt the pressure: ‘We’re now in a position where we’re so 
regulated – we get inspection, external verification, audit, all the bodies coming in 
and the pressure is felt throughout the organization both on the curriculum and non- 
curriculum sides’ (p. 321).
 Assignment
 1. Consider your own position in your university. Do you feel that you have enough 
freedom to develop autonomously as a student? Have you perceived of any ‘per-
verse incentives’ in your educational program?
 2. Do you agree with Kennedy – that universities should strive to emphasize the 
social impact of education? What would engage you?
 3. Start a fire.
 Suggested Reading
For an orientation on the relationship between universities, politics, and economics, 
we recommend Through a Darkly Glass: The Social Sciences Look at the Neoliberal 
University (Magaret Thornton 2015). Psychology in Crisis by psychologist Brian 
Hughes (2018) grapples with some of the most fundamental problems in his field: 
theoretical sectarianism, psychology’s susceptibility to produce irreproducible 
results, and convenient sampling, among others. The Open Science Collaboration 
project (2015) is a must read for anyone interested in the replication crisis.
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10.1  Introduction
10.1.1  Research Design and Ethical Approval
In this chapter, we aim to guide you through some of the most important ethical 
issues you may encounter throughout the process of finalizing your research design 
and preparing it for the process of ethical approval. The issues discussed here range 
from broad topics about the relevancy of the research itself, to detailed questions 
regarding confidentiality, establishing informed consent, briefing and debriefing 
research participants, dealing with invasive techniques, deception, and safe storage 
of your data.
The majority of these ethical dilemmas coincide largely with the concerns voiced 
by independent Institutional Review Boards (IRBs, also referred to as Research 
Ethics Committees, or RECs). IRBs register, review, and oversee local research 
applications that involve human participants. They are established to protect the 
rights of research participants and to foster a sustainable research environment. The 
task of such boards is to evaluate whether or not a research design meets the institu-
tional ethics standards and facilitates a necessary risk assessment.
The necessity of ethical reviewing is reflected in national laws as well as interna-
tional declarations and has become a mandatory procedure in universities and 
research institutes worldwide (see Israel 2015, for an overview of ethical reviewing 
practices). Failing to seek the approval of an IRB can have serious consequence for 
the researchers involved. For example, the retraction note attached to an article on 
bullying, published in 2017 in the International Journal of Pediatrics revealed ‘The 
study was conducted in agreement with the school principal and the authors received 
verbal approval, but they did not receive formal ethical approval from the desig-
nated committee of the Ministry of Education’ (entry at ‘Retraction Watch’, March 
13th 2019).
A number of scholars focusing on ethical review processes have critiqued the 
institutionalization of ethical reviewing, because, as one author observed, it seems 
to assume that unscrupulous researchers are restrained only by the leash and muzzle 
of the IRB system (Schneider 2015, p. 6).
Indeed, by setting aside ethics as a separate issue and submitting it to an ‘admin-
istrative logic’ (procedural, formalistic approach), scholarly research has fallen prey 
to a form of ethics creep, a process whereby the regulatory system expands and 
intensifies at the expense of genuine ethical reflection (Haggerty 2004). Scott (2017) 
remembers how a simple study once was killed by such formalistic procedures. 
Understandably, researchers sometimes see the completion of an IRB application 
form to be a mere ‘formality, a hurdle to surmount to get on and do the research’ 
(Guillemin and Gillam 2004, p. 263).
We agree that ethical considerations should inform our discussions about 
research, and that these discussions should not be obstructed by regulatory proce-
dures. The aim of this chapter is therefore to assist you in your ethical deliberations. 
This chapter seeks to guide you through the process of making important ethical 
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decisions at all stages of formulating a research design, and to help you identify the 
common pitfalls, objections, and critiques. To facilitate this process, we have 
designed a series of queries at the end of each paragraph, that could be taken into 
consideration whenever you plan to carry out a research project. Not all questions 
may be relevant to all research projects, but as a whole, they should facilitate a fairly 
thorough preparation.
In the sections to follow, we map out the various ethical dimensions of designing 
a research project step by step: addressing the fundamental question of why and for 
whom we do research (Sect. 10.2); an exploration of the ethical considerations of 
the research design itself, including the recruitment of study participants (Sects. 
10.3 and 10.4); violation of integrity (Sect. 10.5); avoiding deception (Sect. 10.6); 
informed consent (Sect. 10.7); collecting data during field work (Sect. 10.8); what 
to do with incidental findings (Sect. 10.9); analyzing collected data (Sect. 10.10); 
reporting and dissemination of research findings (Sect. 10.11); and finally data man-
agement and storage (Sect. 10.12). This chapter closes with a summary (Sect. 10.13) 
and we include a brief ethics checklist and offer a model informed consent form that 
can be used in the future to help you cross all your ‘t’s and dot all your ‘i’s (Box 10.1).
We highlight our discussions with multiple case studies selected from a wide 
range of disciplines within the social sciences, including specializations within psy-
chology, anthropology, educational sciences, interdisciplinary studies, and others. 
For the sake of brevity, we refrain from seeking examples from all disciplines for 
each individual dilemma, but instead focus on those that seem most poignant. We 
hope this overview will prepare you to face the rigors of research with confidence.
10.2  Relevancy: Choice of Research Area
10.2.1  What for?
There are few subjects or questions that researchers cannot study, but are they all 
worth researching? That is a different question. Contrary to what you may think, 
completely new research questions do not exist. Research builds upon the pre- 
existing research lexicon. In fact, researchers have an obligation to enhance or cri-
tique theories, improve established bodies of knowledge, and adapt or alter relevant 
methodologies.
Failing to acknowledge research traditions may come with the risk of wasting 
valuable resources, but also of self-disqualification. The relevancy of a research 
project is thus not so much measured in terms of how much knowledge it generates, 
but rather in how much knowledge it generates in relation to what is already known 
(see the imperative of originality, discussed in Chap. 2).
10 Research Ethics Step by Step
231
10.2.2  For Whom?
Some research is fundamental – for the sake of knowledge – but most is not. Often, 
results have certain practical uses for other parties, sciences’ stakeholders. They can 
be commissionaires who act as patrons of research projects, professionals working 
in a ‘field of practice’ who make use of scientific knowledge, or their clients. 
Research can have implications for policy makers, teachers, therapists, profession-
als working with minority groups, or indeed, minority groups themselves, to name 
but a few.
The question how research projects impact various (potential) stakeholders is not 
always explicitly addressed, but we feel that this is something that deserves careful 
Box 10.1: Rules of Thumb for Ethical Assessment of Research Designs
 1. Avoiding Harm Researchers have a responsibility to ensure that their 
study does no harm to any participants or communities involved. They also 
need to assess the risks that participants (and communities) may face.
How likely is your research project to cause harm to the individuals or 
communities you choose to research? How serious is the possible harm? 
What measures need be taken to offset the risks? Is there any way in which 
harm could be justified or excused? How do you ensure that your study 
does not endanger the values, cultural traditions, and practices of the com-
munity you study?
 2. Doing Good Researchers have the complementary obligation to do 
research that contributes to the furthering of others’ well-being.
Who are the beneficiaries of your study? What specific benevolence 
might flow from it and for whom? What can participants reasonably expect 
in return from you and what should you offer them, if anything? What does 
your study offer to promote the well-being of others? How does the com-
munity or society at large benefit?
 3. Seeking Justice Finally, researchers should ensure that participants are 
treated justly and that no one has been favored or discriminated against.
Do you treat your participants fairly and have you taken their needs into 
consideration? How do you ensure a fair distribution of the burdens and 
benefits in both the participant’s experience and research outcomes? How 
are the (perhaps contradictory) needs of the communities taken into account?
Whereas all three criteria seem ‘self-evident’ if not trivial, there remains 
the critical and difficult question of how to interpret them, and whether they 
apply in any given case (i.e. everybody will agree that one should not harm 
people and do good or seek justice but what does this mean in practice?). For 
further discussion, see Beauchamp and Childress (2001), Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics.
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attention. Who is addressed, who will be influenced, and who can make use of 
research in which ways? Consider the following two examples where the stakehold-
ers are specifically targeted and even addressed.
 1. Ran et al. (2003) describe a comparative research study into the effectiveness of 
psychoeducational intervention programs in the treating of schizophrenics in 
rural China. The program specifically targets patients’ relatives, who, the 
researchers conclude, need to improve their knowledge of the illness and change 
their attitude towards the patient.
 2. A qualitative study on experiences with prejudice and discrimination among 
Afghan and Iranian immigrant youth in Canada singles out the media as a ‘major 
contributor to shaping prejudicial attitudes and behaviors,’ and schools as one of 
the first places youth may encounter discrimination (Khanlou et al. 2008)
10.2.3  At What Cost?
Thirdly, there is the question of balancing costs and benefits of research. Costs com-
prise of salaries, investments, use of equipment, but also of sacrifices or (health) 
risks run by all those involved. Benefits can be expected revenue and earnings, but 
also gained knowledge and expertise, certain privileges allotted to participants, or 
even access to particular facilities.
The fact that the costs and benefits can be of a material and immaterial nature 
makes them both difficult to measure and predict (see Diener and Crandall 1978). 
How do you value and weigh costs and benefits? Who should profit and who should 
run which risks?
While there is no way to answer these questions in general, there are different 
models that you can use to assess risks and benefits, based on what you think counts 
as important.
In the first model, science is committed to the principle of impartiality. 
Researchers and research participants partake in research primarily because they 
value science, want to promote its cause, and feel that their contribution helps fur-
ther scientific knowledge. In this model, costs consist just of the salaries of the 
researchers and the marginal compensation of the participants for their time. 
Knowledge acquisition is the most important gain, and risks are understood in the 
immediate context of research (health hazards).
In the second model, knowledge production is regarded as a commercial activity. 
Universities and their researchers are seen as entrepreneurs who collaborate with 
other parties (mainly industry and government) and are committed to the principle 
of profit. In this model, costs are seen as investments, gains as (potential) revenues. 
Compensation of participants is an expense item and any risks they run can be 
‘bought off.’
The third model proposes knowledge production from the principle of equitabil-
ity (fairness for all). It accepts that knowledge may be profitable, but rejects a 
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one- sided distribution of gains, where all the profits (patents, publication, prestige, 
grants) go to the researchers only, and none to the participants. Participants should 
not merely be monetarily compensated, but profit in a much more direct way, for 
example by giving them access to health facilities, providing better knowledge of 
the topic in question (Anderson 2019) or even empowering whole communities 
(Benatar 2002).
These different models not only perceive parties or stakeholders differently, they 
also perceive of risks, costs and benefits differently. Consequently, researchers may 
come to weigh the costs, benefits, and risks differently depending on what they 
value most (Box 10.2).
10.2.4  Trauma Research: A Case in Point
Consider the question of whether research on traumatic experiences itself should be 
regarded as harmful. It is argued, on the one hand, that asking about traumatic expe-
rience is risky, as survivors may be more vulnerable and easier to stigmatize. On the 
other hand, there is also evidence that suggests that talking or writing about trau-
matic experiences can in fact be beneficial, psychologically as well as physiologi-
cally (Marshall et al. 2001). How does one weigh the (potential) risks against the 
(possible) benefits (DePrince and Freyd 2006)?
Box 10.2: Fair Compensation?
In a research application for a study on coping with undesirable social behav-
ior at the workplace in China, the researchers planned to ask participants to 
complete a questionnaire which was estimated to takes up to 15  min. 
Participants would receive ¥8 (roughly 1 Euro) in compensation for their 
effort, but only once they completed the questionnaire. When queried by their 
local IRB why every participant wouldn’t be compensated regardless, rather 
than only those who complete the questionnaire, the researchers presented 
four arguments:
 1. Rewarding participation before finishing the research leads to high drop-
out rates
 2. It is difficult to organize payment with non-completers
 3. The questions are non-invasive
 4. In comparable cases, applications are always approved by IRBs
Evaluate these responses by ranking the arguments. Which argument do 
you find most and which least convincing, and why?
(Case communicated to one of the authors of this chapter)
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In a study among 517 undergraduate students, Marno Cromer et al. (2006) asked 
subjects to rate how distressing it was for them to discuss a range of traumatic expe-
riences and found that a vast majority did not find it difficult at all. However, argued 
the authors sensibly, it’s not the average that counts here, but the exception. And 
indeed, 24 participants reported the trauma research to be ‘much more distressing’ 
than everyday life. Of these 24, all but one still believed the research to be important 
enough to be carried out. The one exception reported that the research seemed ‘a 
somewhat bad idea.’
These findings concur with Newman et al. (1999), who did research on child-
hood abuse and found that a minority of the respondents reported feeling upset after 
the research. Of these, a few indicated that they would have preferred to have not 
participated had they known what the experience would be like.
In weighing the (immaterial) benefits against the costs of talking about traumatic 
experiences (distress), the former were deemed to outweigh the latter, provided that 
interviewers are carefully selected and trained.
Of note, however, one consideration is left out of this comparison, namely the 
question of whether not doing the research should be considered a risk (Box 10.3). 
Indeed, Becker-Blease and Freyd (2006, p. 225) reason that ‘silence is part of the 
problem’, and there is a real ‘possibility that the social forces that keep so many 
people silent about abuse play out in the institution, research labs, and IRBs.’
Will the cost-benefit balance shift if the risk of not doing research be taken into 
consideration?
Box 10.3: Risks and Benefits
Risk: The probability of harm (physical, psychological, social, legal, or eco-
nomic) occurring as a result of participation in a research study. The probabil-
ity and the magnitude of possible harm may vary from minimal (or none) to 
significant.
Minimal Risk: A risk is considered to be minimal when the probability 
and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the proposed research are 
not greater, in and of themselves, than those ordinarily encountered in daily 
life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examina-
tion or tests.
Benefit: A valued or desired outcome, of material or physical nature (i.e. 
money, goods), or immaterial nature (i.e. knowledge, skills, privileges). Individuals 
may not only benefit from the research, but also communities as a whole.
(Adapted from the Policy Manual of the University of Louisville.)
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Q1: What is the added value of my research project and for whom does it benefit?
• Which research traditions and methodologies do I relate to and why?
• Who is addressed by my research project (who are my possible stakeholders)?
• Which costs and benefits can be expected, for whom, and how do I balance them?
10.3  Choice of Participants
10.3.1  Ethical Limitations in Choice of Participants
Researchers must make many decisions regarding the choice of participants. Is the 
sample randomly selected and does it give a fair representation of the population? 
Will the N be large enough to test my hypothesis? Has non-response been taken into 
account? Et cetera. Some of these methodological questions have ethical conse-
quences, as we will explore below.
10.3.2  Number of Participants
This is of ethical concern because research is considered (at least to a degree) a 
burden on participants and often times on society at large as well. The number of 
participants should therefore be no more than absolutely necessary.
In quantitative studies, a reasonable estimate can be given with a power analysis. 
‘Statistical power’ in hypothesis testing signifies the probability that the test will 
detect an effect that actually exists. By calculating the power of a study, it becomes 
possible to determine the required sample size, given a particular statistical method, 
and a predetermined degree of confidence. For example, to detect a small interac-
tion effect between two variables, using a linear mixed-effect method, a sample of 
N = 120 would suffice at a default alpha of .05. Remaining space in this book does 
not permit a detailed discussion of how to calculate the power of a study, but see 
Cohen 1988, for an explanation of power in the behavioral sciences in general.
In qualitative studies, no such power analysis would be suitable. Instead, the 
principle of saturation is often used. Saturation implies approaching new infor-
mants until enough knowledge is gained to answer the research question, or until the 
categories used are fully accounted for. What exactly constitutes ‘saturation’ may 
differ from one field of expertise to the next and may need further problematization 
moving forward (see O’Reilly and Parker 2012).
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10.3.3  Selection of Participants
Laboratory studies often use undergraduate students as research subjects (usually in 
exchange for ‘credits’). These are called subject pools. In some fields of research in 
the social sciences, subject pools make up the majority of research participants, as 
Diener and Crandall (1978) pointed out long ago.
Convenience sampling (using groups of people who are easy to contact or to 
reach) not only has methodological drawbacks, but also ethical implications. 
Heinrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) called attention to the social science’s 
‘usual subjects’ and named them WEIRDOs, an acronym for Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich and coming from Democratic cultures.
They maintain that WEIRDOs aren’t representative of humans as a whole, and 
that psychologists shouldn’t routinely use them to make broad claims about the 
drivers of human behavior because WEIRDOs differ in fundamental aspects with 
non-WEIRDOs. Different cultural experiences result in differing styles of reason-
ing, conceptions of the self, notions of fairness, and even visual perception.
10.3.4  Online Communities
As a specific target group for research, online communities pose their own dilem-
mas. Legally, researchers must be aware that they may be bound by the ‘general 
terms and conditions’ of these online platforms, which can restrict the use of their 
data for research purposes. Morally, it is important to ask whether it is right to 
record the activities of an online public place without the participant’s consent, 
regardless of whether it is allowed (see Chap. 7 for a discussion of this question). 
There are two viewpoints we will explore on this matter.
Oliver (2010, p. 133) argues that although communication in an online environ-
ment may be mediated in different ways, it is still communication between people. 
In essence, the same ethical principles should apply, including the receipt of active 
consent.
Burbules (2009, p. 538) on the other hand, argues that in online or web-based 
research, notions regarding privacy, anonymity, and the right to ‘own’ information 
needs to be radically reconsidered.
What matters online, Burbules argues, is not so much anonymity, but rather 
access. In the digital universe, people want to share information. But they also want 
to control who can make use of it. A challenging dichotomy to navigate indeed.
This problem (the question of who can access which data) has become even more 
urgent today. This urgency can be traced to new information and communication 
technologies that enable researchers to build extremely complex models based on 
massive and diverse databases, allowing increasingly accurate predictions about an 
individual’s actions and choices.
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10.3.5  Control Groups
Research on the effects of certain interventions that involve control groups (partici-
pants who receive either less effective or no treatment) leads to the question of 
whether it is fair for a participant to be placed in a disadvantageous position.
This is referred to as asymmetrical treatment. The question is grounded in con-
siderations of egalitarian justice, which is in other words, the idea that individuals 
should have an equal share of the benefits, rather than just the baseline avoidance 
of harm.
It is suggested that participants in the control group be offered the more effective 
treatment once the study is completed (Mark and Lenz-Watson 2011). A problem 
with this being that it applies to certain research designs only (typically RCT, or 
‘Randomized Controlled Trial’) and not to others (policy interventions, for exam-
ple, or education; for further discussion, see Diener and Crandall 1978). With 
research on policy interventions, (as opposed to treatment research), the question is 
whether or not it is fair to offer certain policies to certain groups and not to others.
Q2: Who are the participants in my research project?
• Which ethical consequences may be involved in selecting participants for my 
research project?
• How do I ensure that my selection of participants does not result in unfair 
treatment?
10.4  Vulnerable Participants
10.4.1  Vulnerable Participants
Vulnerable participants are properly conceived of as those who have ‘an identifi-
ably increased likelihood of incurring additional or greater wrong’ (Hurst quoted in 
Bracken-Roche et al. 2017). Seeking the cooperation of vulnerable people may be 
problematic for various reasons, but that does not imply that they cannot or should 
not be involved in research. It does mean that these groups need special attention, 
however.
10.4.2  Minors and Children
Working with minors and children requires consideration from both a moral and a 
legal perspective. Often in place are somewhat arbitrary age limits that will differ 
from country to country, which require that researchers seek active consent from the 
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parents or legal representatives of a child. This says little, however, about the minor’s 
moral capacity to participate in research.
IRBs generally acknowledge that children can be involved, but that different age- 
groups should be treated on par with their stages of psychological development, that 
will inform what a six-year-old or a twelve-year-old child can or cannot do, or what 
an eight-year-old is capable of comparatively. In general, the younger the child, the 
shorter and less intense the inquiry should be.
We concur with Schenk and Rama Rao (2016, p. 451) who argue that young 
children should be excluded from providing detailed information on potentially 
traumatic topics that may cause strong emotional distress. As is usually the case, 
exceptions can be made under particular circumstances, but they remain outliers. 
We also agree with Vargas and Montaya (2009) that it is sensible to consider any 
contextual and cultural factors, as this may make a difference in a child’s under-
standing of the research environment.
Finally, we emphasize that researchers who work with minors (children) should 
have special training on how to interview or collect data from them.
10.4.3  Disadvantaged Participants
When cognitively impaired individuals are included in a research design, special 
attention must be paid to the potential level of invasiveness, the degree of risk, the 
potential for benefit, and the participant’s severity of cognitive impairment (Szala- 
Meneok 2009). Likewise, people who are in dependent circumstances (such as 
detainees, elderly people in nursing homes, or the unemployed), may not always 
have the capacity to refuse consent, or may fail to understand that they have the 
power to refuse cooperation. A reasonable assessment regarding the perceived abil-
ity to participate and to refuse participation must thus be made for every case in 
which these populations are involved (see Box 10.4 for an overview of vulnerable 
participants).
10.4.4  Mixed Vulnerability
At times, several forms of vulnerability coincide within one research proposal. 
Consider as a case in point a proposed study into health problems (suicidal ide-
ation), sexual risk-taking behavior, and substance use of LGBT adolescents of 
between 16–17 years old, as reported by Brian Mustanski (2011). An Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) was hesitant to approve Mustanski’s application for a number 
of reasons. We will discuss those reasons below, together with Mustanski’s 
responses.
The first problem the IRB encountered was that the researcher was seeking a 
waiver for parental permission. Adolescents at this age are legally minors and any 
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Cognitive or communicative Vulnerability participants who are 
unable to process, understand, or appreciate consent either by mental 
or language limitation. Researchers targeting a population where this 
is likely to be present must provide a consent procedure that will 
accommodate the needs of participants, either by translating 
documents, writing it in basic language, or discussing the consent.
People with little 





Institutional Vulnerability this includes individuals who are subject 
to a formal authority and whose consent may be coerced, either 
directly or indirectly. A solution to this issue can be using a third party 








Deferential Vulnerability individuals who informally act as 
subordinates to an authority figure, where one party may feel 
obligated to follow the advice of another. These situations require a 
sensitive recruitment and consent plan where participants have the 






Medical Vulnerability this includes individuals with a medical 
condition that may cloud their ability to make decisions regarding 
their participation. The patient may see the research study as a miracle 
cure to their disease instead of a procedure that has no guarantee for 
results. Researchers should ensure that participants are able to 







Economic Vulnerability this includes individuals whose economic 
situation may make them vulnerable to the prospect of free care and/or 
the payments issued for participating in the study. It is important that 
the payment offered will not encourage an individual to put 








Social Vulnerability participants who are at risk for discrimination 
based on race, gender, ethnicity, or age fit into this category. The 
participant may also be prone to feel discriminated against and may 




Legal Vulnerability this includes participants who do not have the 
legal right to consent or who may be concerned that their consent 
could put them at risk for legal repercussions. For those who are 
unable to legally consent, it is important that you obtain consent from 






Study Vulnerability participants who are made vulnerable by the 
study’s design, specifically through deception. This can be alleviated 
by ensuring full consent and disclosure after the study is completed 
(debriefing) or whenever a participant withdraws from the study.
Any participant 
who is subjected 
to deception
Adapted with permission from the guidelines of the Institutional Review Board for Social 
and Behavioral Sciences at the University of Virginia.
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waiver requires the provision of an appropriate mechanism for protecting the minor. 
Mustanski argued, however, that the goal of waiving parental permission was not to 
circumvent the authority of parents. ‘Instead, it is to allow for scientists to conduct 
research that could improve the health of adolescents in cases where parental per-
mission is not a reasonable requirement to protect the participating youth’ (2011, 
p. 677).
The second concern of the IRB was the vulnerability of the LGBT community 
collectively, who have historically been more prone to stigmatization and discrimi-
nation. Mustanski replied that he knew of no evidence that demonstrated any 
decision- making impairment of members of the LGBT community, and that he 
believed many of them would be insulted to have it implied otherwise.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the IRB was worried that participants in 
this research might be exposed to sensitive information that could lead to psycho-
logical harm. Mustanski agreed that IRBs should have a role in protecting partici-
pants’ interests, but argued that IRBs tended to overestimate risks. This can lead to 
time-consuming procedures and the implementation of supposed protections that 
may mitigate the scientific validity of the research, or discourage future behavioral 
research involving certain populations. After a number of required adjustments 
(such as a more detailed risk assessment), the proposal was ultimately accepted.
Q3: How do you ensure appropriate and equitable selection of participants?
• Who are your research subjects?
• Are your research subjects part of a vulnerable population, and if so, what risks 
do you anticipate?
• Where do you expect to find them and how do you intend to recruit them?
10.5  Use of Invasive Techniques
10.5.1  Invasive Techniques
By invasive techniques, we mean any procedure or intervention that affects the body 
or mind of a research participant such that it results in psychological or physical 
harm. Some argue that our definition of invasiveness should not be limited to indi-
vidual participants but should include entire communities as well (Box 10.5).
Invasive techniques, by definition, violate the principle of nonmaleficence (‘do 
no harm’), and are among the most urgent concerns of IRBs the world over. 
However, harm is broadly (and vaguely) defined, ranging from trauma to strong 
disagreeable feelings, and from short-term to long-lasting. The European Textbook 
on Ethics (2010, p. 200) defines harm as such: ‘To be harmed is to have one’s inter-
ests set back or to be made worse off than one would otherwise have been. Harms 
can relate to any aspect of an individual’s welfare, for example physical or social. 
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Institutions can also be harmed insofar as they can be thought of as having interests 
distinct from those of their members.’
Invasive techniques may include exposure to insensitive stimuli, intrusive inter-
rogation, excessive measurements, or any procedures that can cause damage. We 
exclude from our discussion any medical practices or intervention, such as admin-
istering drugs or the use of clinical health trials and refer anyone who intends to use 
these techniques to specialized Medical Research Ethics Committees (MRECs).
10.5.2  Examples of Invasive Research
Some of psychology’s most famous experiments were hampered by the ethical 
quandaries of invasive research. For example, John Watson’s 1919 behavioral 
experiments with ‘Little Albert,’ an eleven-month-old child, who was exposed to 
Box 10.5: Invasive or Intrusive?
The term invasive originates from the medical sciences, where it means: 
entering the body, by cutting or inserting instruments. In the social sciences, 
it describes techniques that enter one’s privacy. Questions about one’s sexual 
orientation, political preferences, and other privately sensitive subjects are 
considered ‘invasive’, as is exposure to strong aversive stimuli or traumatizing 
experiences.
Intrusive was originally a legal term, described as entering without invita-
tion or welcome. In the social sciences, it describes techniques that invoke 
‘unwelcome feelings.’ Research may be regarded as ‘intrusive’ when it con-
cerns topics that respondents dislike talking about or find difficult to discuss 
(Elam and Fenton 2003, p.  16). Intrusive techniques can also involve pro-
longed procedures and processes that involve substantial physical contact. 
Intrusive questions can make a participant feel uneasy, uncomfortable, even 
shameful: ‘Are you anorexic?’ ‘Do you masturbate?’
Some examples of invasive and intrusive technique include:
• EEG, PAT scans, CAT scans, (f)MRI, or measuring heart rate, are all non- 
invasive in the medical and psychological sense, but can be intrusive.
• Questions about race, ethnicity, and sexual health can be both invasive and 
intrusive.
• Queries about personal information, including name, date and place of 
birth, biometric records, education, financial, and employment history, are 
often thought to be neither invasive nor intrusive. However, to some people 
some of these questions can be intrusive. Regardless, use of this informa-
tion is strictly limited under data protection regulation in most countries.
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loud, frightening sounds when presented with specific fearsome images. Although 
it is unclear what the net effects were on the child, by today’s standards, the design 
would be considered unethical for its gross lack on concern for the wellbeing of the 
child (see Harris 1979; Beck et al. 2009) (Fig. 10.1).
Harry Harlow’s ‘Pit of Despair Studies’ from the 1950s involved infant primates 
who were raised in social isolation, without their protective mothers or with surro-
gate mothers (dolls). They consequently developed signs of what humans call ‘panic 
disorder.’ This complete lack of concern for animal welfare would certainly be con-
sidered unethical by today’s standards.
Psychologist Stanley Milgram’s well-known 1961 experiments, that involved 
participants who were led to believe that they were administering electric shocks to 
fellow participants are deemed invasive, despite the researcher attempting to mini-
mize harm by debriefing his participants (see Tolich 2014).
Diana Baumrind (1964) was quick to recognize the ethical perils of the Milgram 
studies: ‘From the subject’s point of view procedures which involve loss of dignity, 
self-esteem, and trust in rational authority are probably most harmful in the long run 
and require the most thoughtfully planned reparations, if engaged in at all’ (p. 423).
10.5.3  Avoiding Invasive Routines?
Can (or should) invasiveness be avoided at all times? The answer seems obvious: no 
techniques that cause harm should be put to use. In practice, however, the answer is 
more ambiguous.
Some research topics are inherently ‘sensitive’ (i.e. psychological trauma, loss, 
bereavement, discrimination, sexism, or suicide). Merely discussing these subjects 
can be perceived as painful. Similarly, some techniques necessitate a physical 
response from participants and can result in some harm. Does that imply these sub-
jects cannot be researched, and that these stimuli cannot be used? Not necessarily.
Fig. 10.1 Little Albert. 
Still from the film made by 
Watson. (Source: 
Wikipedia)
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In an experiment that provides a telling example, researchers tried to establish 
the causal relationship between workload and stress response. To do so, they had to 
induce a potentially harmful stimulus, namely some form of stress. The results 
showed that such stimuli do indeed have an influence on a participant’s perceived 
well-being and impacted their physical health, as indicated by an increased cardio-
vascular response (see Hjortskov et al. 2004).
Is it justifiable to expose respondents to harmful stimuli, even when the effect is 
likely short-term? Hjortskov et al. answered the question in the affirmative and took 
refuge in what is considered by many as a safe baseline in research ethics. If harm 
does not exceed the equivalence of what can be expected to occur in everyday life, 
they argued, then the procedure should be safe.
It has been maintained that invasive techniques using stressors, unpleasant 
noises, rude or unkind remarks, among other forms of aggravators, are acceptable 
when (a) there are no other non-invasive techniques at hand, (b) the effects are 
equivalent to what people can expect to encounter in everyday situations, (c) have 
no long-lasting impact, and (d) everything is done to minimize harm.
Some retort that this will not (always) be sufficient. People who face systematic 
stigmatization in everyday life, or social exclusion, would be harmed in a way that 
is not acceptable should they be exposed to such stimuli, even though that is exactly 
what they expect to occur in everyday life.
Q4: Will the research design procedures result in any (unacceptable form of) harm 
or risk?
• Which possible risks of harm are feasible in this research?
• How do you plan to minimize harm (if any)?
10.6  Deception
10.6.1  Deceptive Techniques
Any research procedure in which a participant is deliberately provided with misin-
formation is labeled as a deceptive technique. Deception involves (a) giving false 
information, or (b) generating false assumptions, or (c) withholding any informa-
tion that participants may request, or (d) withholding information that is relevant to 
appropriate informed consent (Lawson 2001, p. 120). Just because early research on 
the harmfulness of deception does not indicate that deceived participants feel 
harmed (Christensen 1988) or that they become resentful (Kimmel 1998), does not 
mean it is without moral consequence.
By default, deception excludes consent (see below). Participants are therefore 
not at liberty to decide to participate (or to continue participating) on the conditions 
known to them, regardless of whether consent was given afterwards, or even whether 




Deception thus suggests a possible breach of two important ethical principles: 
the protection of people’s autonomy and dignity, and the fair and equitable treat-
ment of participants. Some have called for the abandonment of deception in research 
altogether, while others maintain that certain research areas, particularly in psychol-
ogy, cannot do without it (see Christensen 1988). At any rate, IRBs have become 
more cautious in the last decade and generally insist on a full debriefing at minimum 
(see Mertens and Ginsberg 2009, p. 331). But even a full debriefing may not always 
be possible.
To summarize: forms of deception include providing false or misleading infor-
mation about:
• Research goals or aims
• Research setup
• The researcher’s identity
• The nature of a participants’ tasks or role
• Any possible risks or consequences of participation.
The distinction between false information and defective information is notewor-
thy. False information means presenting an (oftentimes completely) wrong picture 
of the true research goals, while defective or misleading information might only 
mean withholding some (key) aspects thereof. Some argue that not telling partici-
pants certain things is not a form of deception (Hey 1998, p. 397), but we concur 
with Lawson (2001) that it certainly can be, especially on a relational level (pertain-
ing to the relationship between researcher and participant) (Fig. 10.2).
10.6.2  Four Cases
Consider the following four cases in which (some form) of deception was deployed. 
How does the form and level of deception differ in these cases?
In the first, that came to the attention of one of the authors of this chapter, a group 
of researchers proposed to approach a number of intermediaries with mock job 
application letters and matching CV’s that differed only with respect to the ethnicity 
of the ‘applicant’. The researchers intended to measure the response rate of the 













Debriefing Deception/debriefing Deception 
(questionable)






Fig. 10.2 Degrees of deception as a function of consent/debriefing and provision of information
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intermediaries as an indication of hidden discrimination. The ‘participants’ (the 
intermediaries) were neither informed of nor debriefed about the research project, 
and thus would not be able to not participate or retort to its findings. Deception was 
deemed necessary to elicit true behavioral response.
The second pertained to an unpublished ethnographic study into social exclusion 
of the poor in Poland, carried out by one of the authors of this chapter. The researcher 
asked participants if they could be interviewed about their ‘lifestyles,’ deliberately 
not mentioning the goal of the study (social exclusion) because the researcher rea-
soned it might instill them (against their own conviction) with an idea that they are 
marginalized and excluded. The researcher feared that this idea would impose on 
them an identity that they could perceive as harmful. The research participants who 
were asked for consent were not informed about the true nature of the research proj-
ect, nor were they debriefed afterwards. In this case, deception was considered both 
necessary as well as in the interest of the participants.
The third case concerns a covert participant observation project in an online 
anorexia support community performed by Brotsky and Giles (2007). The research-
ers created a mock identity of an anorexic young woman who said she wanted to 
continue losing weight. The researchers wanted to study the psychological support 
offered to her by the community, who was not informed about the research project. 
Throughout the course of the project, the invented character of the researchers 
developed close (online) relationships with some of its members. They justified the 
use of a manufactured identity on the grounds that if the purpose of the study was 
disclosed, access to the site would probably not be granted. Deception was deemed 
acceptable because of the ‘potential benefit of our findings to the eating disorders 
clinical field’ (2007, p. 96). The research participants were never asked for their 
consent, nor informed about the nature of the research.
The fourth case concerns social psychology research into the bystander effect 
(the inclination not to intervene in a situation when other people are present). 
Experiments on the bystander effect rely heavily on giving false information about 
the roles of other participants involved in the study, because they are in reality in 
cahoots with the researcher.
In a recent study into the bystander effect, Van Bommel et al. (2014) wanted to 
know whether the presence of security cameras would have any influence on said 
effect. The researchers designed a realistic face-to-face situation featuring a security 
camera (not featured in the control group). They exposed participants to a mock 
‘criminal act’ to see whether they would respond or not. Immediately afterwards, 
participants were informed of the true nature of the setup.
In all cases, some form of deception was considered necessary, though for different 
reasons. Deception contributes to inequity between the research and the participant. 
By debriefing the participant (i.e. informing them of the true nature or purpose of the 
research), some of this can be countered under certain circumstances. In the first case 
discussed above, debriefing was not considered, in the second it was ruled out. In the 
fourth case it was part of the design by default and not questioned as such. In the third 
case, it could (and some would argue should) have been used.
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10.6.3  Deception and Misinformation
Arguably what matters most in considering the use of deception are found within 
two parameters: the degree of misinformation and the degree to which participants 
may give consent or can be debriefed (Ortmann and Hertwig 2002) (see Fig. 10.3). 
The questions any researcher must answer regardless are (1) whether or not it is 
really necessary to use deception, and (2) how to repair inequity if it were to be used.
Q5: Will the research design provide a full disclosure of all information relevant to 
the participant? If not, why not?
• How do you ensure your participants are adequately informed?
• What do you do to prevent deception?
10.7  Informed Consent
10.7.1  Informed Consent Protocols
Following established informed consent protocols are indispensable in any scien-
tific research and serve to ensure that research is carried out in a manner that con-
forms to international regulations (such as the 1966 United Nations International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that explicitly prohibits that anyone be sub-
jected to scientific experimentation without their permission).





















Which research techniques do you use in your design, and to what extent is your design 
vulnerable to the ethical concerns above? Provide a detailed description.
10 Research Ethics Step by Step
247
Consent is based on four prerequisites: (1) it is given voluntarily (free from coer-
cion), (2) the participant is a legally competent actor, (3) is well informed, and (4) 
comprehends what is asked of them.
To inform a participant means they must be notified about the objectives of the 
study, be informed about what is expected from them, and be told how their data 
will be used. Consent requires that a participant not only has a substantial under-
standing of the situation in which they will partake, but is also at liberty to refuse. 
Consent gives the researcher the right to involve the participant in the research 
 project and at the same time assures that the respondent’s rights are protected.
Fig. 10.3 Alice Goffman, On the run
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Informed consent protocols assume different shapes and forms. Traditionally 
they were hard copy forms, physically signed by the participant. Lately, they are 
often digital (i.e. in an online questionnaire, the respondent is informed about the 
objective of the questionnaire and needs to agree by ticking a box before proceed-
ing). In ethnographic studies, speech recordings are sometimes utilized.
Consent protocols require furthermore that participants are provided with infor-
mation of whom to turn to in case of disagreement complaints, or in case of unex-
pected or accidental findings that may affect the participant. This can be an 
independent board or a professional not involved in the study.
10.7.2  Who Can and Cannot Consent?
From our definition, it follows that any adult capable of understanding what is com-
municated to them and is at liberty to say no, can give consent. This leaves out a list 
of people who cannot be expected to give consent for reasons of incompetence, 
incomprehension, or lack of freedom. These include:
• Minors or children, who cannot legally give consent
• Adults with cognitive impairment or diminished decision-making abilities, who 
may not comprehend properly
• Adults in a dependent situation, such as refugees or undocumented immigrants, 
who may not be at liberty to refuse cooperation.
In some cases, others may consent for them (with children, this may be their 
parents or legal caregivers; with patients it can be their legal representatives). See 
Box 10.4 for an overview of vulnerability categories.
10.7.3  Active and Passive Consent
Consent is by default active, which means that the participant is knowledgeable 
about the purpose of the research and actively agrees to participate in it, under the 
conditions spelled out to them. Passive consent follows a different path. The partici-
pant is informed about the research, but it is assumed that they do not object, thus 
passively agreeing to participate. The researcher proceeds unless the participant 
actively refuses to participate.
Passive consent results in higher response rates and was more commonly sought 
after until the first decade of the twenty-first century. Today, a stricter view on sub-
ject autonomy is held, and consequently many IRBs no longer condone its practice, 
allowing it only in exceptional situations (Rangle et al. 2001).
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10.7.4  Whose Responsibility?
It is the responsibility of the researcher that the participant fully understands what 
the research amounts to. The information provided must be comprehensive, to the 
point, and non-technical. Participants should be aware that they may refuse to (fur-
ther) participate, withdraw their consent, and have their data removed from the 
study at any time (Box 10.7).
In some cases, it can be challenging to obtain informed consent, especially when 
participants are not accustomed with formal, written discourse, or come from a 
cultural background where such a formal permission would raise suspicion (see 
Israel 2015, for further discussion on the pitfalls that informed consent may carry, 
especially in qualitative research) (Box 10.10).
In other cases, consent may need to be re-negotiated. This can occur in longitu-
dinal studies where parents earlier agreed that their children could participate in the 
study, but the child meanwhile grows up and becomes an adult capable of making 
their own decisions.
10.7.5  Disclosure of Sensitive Information in Consent
Researchers are obliged to conceal information that might be damaging to the 
respondent’s reputation or affect their position within their community, organi-
zation, professional field, or could have an impact on their employability. For 
this reason, some institutions request that their researchers report only on data 
larger than a certain n-value, to prevent others from finding out who the partici-
pants may be (i.e. the Karolinksa Medical Institute at Stockholm set the norm 
at n > 6).
Such considerations are of relevance even when the study participants had, prior 
to their involvement in research, expressed their consent or even a wish to stay non- 
anonymous. The latter might happen with participants who are politicians or activ-
ists, who might treat their participation in research as a means to get publicity.
Q6: Have you obtained informed consent?
• What information have you communicated to your participants?
• In what ways have you ensured they are aware of what is expected from 
them?
• Check with your local IRB for samples of an informed consent and/or guidelines 
(see end of this chapter for a sample).
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Box 10.7: Informed Consent as a Universal Principle?
Although informed consent is accepted world-wide as a necessary require-
ment for research, the question can nevertheless be posed whether or not it is 
biased in favor of a Western notion of liberal individualism. Would the moral 
conception and ideal of informed consent be applicable in China, whose cul-
tural and ethical traditions are often conspicuously different from those of the 
West, and are more specifically communally oriented (Nie 2001)?
Liang and Lu (2006) did research on legal reforms in China, for which they 
conducted interviews. When seeking informed consent, they ran into what 
they called a conflict between the rigidity and inflexibility of informed consent 
and the relativity and informality of Chinese culture. For Chinese participants, 
consent would be regarded not so much as a legal formality but rather the 
foundation for continued friendship and trust. Consequently, they’d be hesi-
tant to sign a consent form beforehand.
Furthermore, Chinese participants have a different view on the legal sys-
tem. While Americans trust the confidentiality agreement because laws pro-
tect privileged information, in China no such laws or legal practices exist. As 
a result, Liang and Lu wrote, ‘a mere promise of confidentiality from the 
researcher to the participant would indeed raise red flags about the legitimacy 
of the research, therefore hurting rather than helping one’s research’ (2006, 
p. 166).
Tangwa (2014) exemplifies the situation of West African women, who 
because of bride-price practices, are in unequal and therefore vulnerable 
relationships. These women are required by their communities to get 
approval from their husbands if they volunteer to enlist in medical research; 
by insisting only they themselves can give consent, their cause will not be 
furthered.
Castellano (2014, p.  278) argues that the interests of Aboriginal 
peoples are not served with individualized consent procedures. The imple-
mentation of ethical standards for Aboriginal research should be in the hand 
of Aboriginal peoples. National committees should be formed, consisting of 
Aboriginal experts, who could develop such standards, and help prevent mis-
representation and stereotyping, and ensure that environmental research is 
included.
In these and similar cases, individualized informed consent procedures 
are all but appropriate. Instead, consent extends to communities, experts, 
or special committees, who oversee that interests of certain groups are 
served.
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10.8  Fieldwork and Data Collection
10.8.1  Entry Strategy and Conflicting Loyalties
When planning data collection, some considerations must be taken into account regard-
ing strategies to access the ‘field’ (be that a school, a municipality, an internet com-
munity, or any another institute that houses participants) (Eysenbach and Till 2001).
Sometimes formal approval is required, other times approaching participants 
necessitates little more than the go-ahead from the head of an institute. Particularly 
when studying relatively small, tightly-knit communities or groups, caution is 
required. In those cases, researchers make use of gatekeepers, such as institutions or 
persons who have (direct) access to potential study participants. While gaining 
access to a field via gatekeepers has its obvious advantages, it may also involve 
some moral dilemmas.
Gatekeepers, just like research sponsors and research participants, usually have 
their own stake in research. When offering access to their networks, gatekeepers 
show trust and expect loyalty. Researchers thus engage in what is called relational 
ethics, which builds on mutual respect, dignity, and connectedness between the 
researcher and researched (Ellis 2014, p. 4), although the researcher often cannot 
avoid politically embedded issues of power that require a ‘delicate balancing act’ 
(McAreavey and Das 2013).
10.8.2  Cooperation and Non-Cooperation
Once people agree to participate in a study, the researcher may count on their coop-
eration and benevolence. At a minimum, participants should not feel deceived, 
intimidated, or otherwise uncomfortable with the research, but there can be many 
other valid reasons why participants decide to leave a study. In some cases, such as 
in evaluation studies that involve a researcher’s prolonged presence in the field (per-
haps even against the wish of some of the actual study participants), participants 
may become reluctant, mistrustful, or even non-cooperative. In other cases, partici-
pants my leave studies for no apparent reason at all (as they are free to do).
Research using large databases of raw, unstructured public data (‘big data’) 
poses its own ethical considerations, in particular with regard to privacy. In con-
sumer behavior research, for example, Numan and Di Domenico (2012) observe 
that the volume and speed with which data must be analyzed often requires data 
collecting and analysis without an individual providing specific consent. This raises 
ethical concerns ‘relating to the extent to which organizations can control the col-
lection and analysis of data when there is limited human involvement’ (2012, p. 51).
Finally, there is the question of non-cooperation (or counter-cooperation), which 
can occur in a variety of ways. Researchers may find that participants avoid 
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answering certain questions, are purposefully manipulative, or even lie about 
 particular issues (because of shame or to protect their dignity).
All these forms of non-cooperation will pose researchers with a challenge, and it 
is therefore advisable to think ahead to strategies for what to do in case there are not 
sufficient data points to work with.
10.8.3  Interpersonal Dynamics
Ethical dilemmas may also arise as a consequence of interpersonal dynamics, both 
between the researcher and the study participants and (or) among study participants. 
In any case study that involves participant observation or repeated interviews with 
participants, continued interaction is likely to result in emotional and social engage-
ment on the part of the researcher. This may lead to the formation of alliances and 
conflicting loyalties. As a result, the role of the researcher as an ‘objective observer’ 
of social life might be challenged.
In the course of any study, the researcher’s relationship with the gatekeepers or 
sponsors may also need to be renegotiated, for example, when gatekeepers try to 
influence the direction of the study. Commitments related to confidentiality and 
anonymity may need to be re-affirmed or redefined. Finally, in cases of intensive 
ethnographic observations, the prolonged presence of the researcher is also likely to 
re-define the community or group or organization studied, and may raise (moral) 
questions related to the role of the researcher and their relationship with the object 
of investigation (Mikesell et al. 2013) (Box 10.8).
Q7: How do you enter the ‘field’?
• Which formal or informal agreements have you made and with whom?
• Which expectations have been created when an agreement on cooperation has 
been made?
• How do you deal with non-cooperation on the part of study participants?
• How do you deal with competing loyalties?
10.9  Incidental Findings
10.9.1  Incidental Findings in Clinical Research
Any research, including the most non-invasive varieties, can unearth Incidental 
Findings (IFs). For example, brain imaging research may bring to light undetected, 
clinically relevant abnormalities that are unexpectedly discovered and although 
unrelated to the purpose of the study, they may require urgent or immediate referral 
(Vernooij et al. 2007).
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This raises the question of what to do with these findings. Is it in the interest of 
the participant that the researcher notifies them? The intuitive answer may be yes, 
but some argue that this is not evidently the case, as participants have a right not 
to know.
On the one hand, Miller et al. (2008) argue that clinical investigators do have an 
obligation to respond to incidental findings. They argue this point because the 
researcher entered into a professional relationship with the research participants, 
and thus they are granted privileged access to private information with potential 
relevance to the participants’ health. Appelbaum et al. (1987) on the other hand, 
warn against the false hopes that a confusion of roles might create, when partici-
pants feel that research protocols are designed to benefit them directly rather than to 
test or compare treatment methods.
Incidental findings call for the weighing of false positives (potential harm due to 
findings that have no clinical significance) against false negatives (failure to report 
Box 10.8: Alice Goffman – What are the Limits of a Researchers’ 
Involvement?
Sociologist Alice Goffman’s 2014 ethnographic study On the Run: Fugitive 
Life in an American City details the careers of poor black men in West 
Philadelphia. She paints a bleak picture of these men who follow ‘the other 
path into adulthood,’ leading them invariably to crime and eventually 
incarceration.
In the wake of the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement, the book was received 
with ample praise. Goffman’s central claim, that it is the legal system itself 
creating crime and dysfunction in poor black communities, was supported by 
her critics, although some reviewers would argue that Goffman’s views are 
rather one-sided. For example, Heather Douglas (2014) wrote that Goffman 
refused to acknowledge that her participants create their own predicament 
through deliberate involvement in crime.
From a research ethics viewpoint, On the Run raises an alarming question 
about the limits of a researchers’ involvement. Some accounts in the book 
suggest that Goffman was so thoroughly involved with her participants that 
she became complicit in criminal activity herself, including even conspiring 
to commit murder (as one participant confided in his plans to kill someone). 
She thus violated perhaps the most basic precept of scholarly (and personal) 
responsibility  – not to endanger somebody else’s life, and to do no harm 
(Lubet 2015). Whether she committed any crimes cannot be established, as 
she had carefully concealed the true identity of the participants involved and 
destroyed her field notes, which from an ethical viewpoint is also 
questionable.
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a finding linked to a serious health problem). In an attempt to solve at least part of 
this quandary, IRBs often suggest that participants be offered an ‘opt-in’ / ‘opt-out’ 
choice in the informed consent. ‘Opt-in’ necessitates the researcher to communicate 
any accidental findings relevant to the participant, ‘opt-out’ prohibits the same.
However, even with such clear-cut arrangements, the researcher may still find it 
ethically problematic to remain silent when the participant chooses to ‘opt-out’ and 
a clearly identified, life-threatening, treatable condition is discovered (for further 
discussion see Illes et al. 2006).
10.9.2  Incidental Findings in Non-Clinical Research
DNA analysis is increasingly utilized in forensic anthropology, for example to iden-
tify damaged or fragmented human remains, for which DNA of family members is 
required for proper identification. Parker et al. (2012) argue that the increased prev-
alence of incidental findings (IFs) in non-clinical research (such as misattributed 
paternity or false beliefs about sibling relationships), calls for new policies to 
focused on minimizing the discovery of IFs.
Q8: How should you deal with incidental findings?
• Which agreements have you made with your participants regarding any potential 
incidental findings?
• Do you offer an opt-in/opt-out option in your informed consent?
• How do you check for any unintended consequences of discovering incidental 
findings?
10.10  Analysis and Interpretation
10.10.1  Analyzing Results
While fraud among academics is rare, questionable research practices do occur, 
leading to multiple forms of bias. These include (among others): publication bias 
(non-publication of null results), confirmation bias (tendency to look for confirma-
tive results, disregarding of contradictory information), and funding bias (tendency 
to support the study’s financial supporter) (Box 10.9).
We believe that it is vitally important that researchers are aware of the forms of 
bias that lie in wait and operate as transparently as possible (see Chaps. 5 and 6 of 
this book for an extensive discussion). Below, we discuss three issues related to 
bias, namely significance, plausible objection, and limits of interpretation.
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10.10.2  Significance
After having collected data, the main concern of a researcher is whether or not the 
data has a story to tell. Are the results indeed significant? Is the effect a sizeable 
proportion? Is there a convincing narrative pattern discernable in the interviews?
Given the study produced at least some results worthy of discussion, then the 
ethical question is: are the results significant and unique enough to warrant publica-
tion? This is not self-evident nor easily established. What is ‘significant’ in this 
context does not depend on a statistical or discursive measure, but on an overall 
evaluation of the results. This evaluation would also include the question of whether 
the phenomena observed was properly accounted for by available theories. Finding 
(statistically) significant results is one thing, finding something that is substantial is 
something else. It is the task of the researcher to carefully assess the weight of their 
findings.
10.10.3  Plausible Objection
Complementary to the question of significance is the question of plausible objec-
tion. One must ask themselves, if a study produces data containing significant 
results, how do those results line up with rivalling theories or other plausible expla-
nations and objections? How do we know that novel findings were truly revealed, 
and not merely an exception to the rule, chance findings, or even false positives?
Again, the answer to these questions cannot be established on the basis of the 
data alone, but they need full consideration, nonetheless. The place to address these 
Box 10.9: Transparency: Steps Researchers Can Take to Reduce the 
Risk of Bias
Dr. Daniele Fanelli: ‘The way out of [bias], generally speaking, is to be trans-
parent about what you did. I’m not naive enough to think that this is going to 
be the whole story, because publication space in journals is limited, and you 
will never be allowed to tell precisely everything that you have done. So in 
part, the system does need other ways also to allow researchers to make fully 
public their data, you know, all the results they obtained, etc.
Again the ideal to follow, I think, in any kind of research, is as much as 
possible, be transparent of the whole procedure. What were your original 
research questions, how you collected the data, what eventually was the data 
that went into this particular study, and so on.
(From online course site Epigeum, Research integrity: arts and humanities,
module 3).
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considerations is often in the discussion section of a scientific paper or as an adden-
dum to the findings, although in reality they should precede any discussion of the 
findings.
10.10.4  Limits of Interpretation
Findings worthy of publication need to be framed such that their significance can be 
understood and eventually be communicated to others. But how far can our interpre-
tation go?
In 2002, the then United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, con-
ceived of a way to interpret uncertain knowledge. He invented a concept that since 
found its way into scientific parlor: the ‘unknown unknowns.’ It plays a role in a 
distinction between ‘known knowns’ (the results of a study; certain evidence) and 
‘known unknowns’ (certain variables not researched; certain contexts not taken into 
account). ‘Unknown unknowns’ are possible risks, future outcomes, or conse-
quences one is not aware of.
While ‘known unknowns’ may point to the direction of future research, ‘unknown 
unknowns’ point to the fundamental uncertainty in scientific research. By imagining 
possible events and occurrences, certain ‘unknown unknowns’ may become ‘known 
unknowns.’ Similarly, by pointing out certain ‘blind spots’ in a frame of reference, 
‘unknown unknowns’ may become ‘known unknowns,’ or even ‘known knowns’ 
once they are researched (Box 10.10).
Q9: What is the significance of your data?
• What do your findings say in respect to alternative explanations and plausible 
objections?
• What are the limits of interpretation of your study?
10.11  Reporting and Dissemination of Research Findings
10.11.1  Dissemination and Responsibility
Research findings are commonly reported in scientific outlets, such as peer reviewed 
journals and scholarly books, or at international congresses and academic confer-
ences. Alternative ways to reach various other audiences may include: articles in 
popular journals and newspapers; brochures and leaflets tageting certain lay audi-
ences; appearances in seminars for professionals; participation in think tank 
research; radio and television performances; hosting of podcasts; involvement in 
internet forums; providing training sessions; and individual or group counseling 
(for further discussion see Oliver 2010).
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Fig. 10.4 Considerations when planning a research project (Damianakis and Woodford 
2012, p. 715)
Box 10.10: Qualitative Research
In qualitative research, many of the steps described in this chapter cannot be 
separated clearly, but rather merge under certain conditions. The following 
flowchart, borrowed from Damianakis and Woodford (2012, p. 715) details 
various considerations when planning a research project in small connected 
communities, recruiting participants, collecting data, and disseminating 
results (Fig. 10.4).
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We shall not discuss all of these individual forms of communicating research 
findings, but instead we will flesh out the ethical implications of three different role 
responsibilities (Mitcham 2003) inherent in the task of a researcher engaging with 
their audiences.
10.11.2  Responsibility to Participant
Researchers carry a responsibility to inform their participants about the results of 
their work. How do they fulfill this requirement? Often they suffice to just offer the 
possibility to learn about the findings of their research projects, and this usually 
entails no more than notifying the participants when the report is published.
In many cases, this may be sufficient, especially when participants have simply 
filled out a questionnaire or took part in an experiment, and were not otherwise 
involved in the research project. Considering that oftentimes research participants 
are not typical readers of academic journals, no further action may be required on 
the part of the researcher.
However, if, as in qualitative research, or in action research, respondents have 
dedicated time and energy into research projects, or are involved in it to some 
degree, the responsibility of the researcher to inform them of their research findings 
would not end there.
In either case it may be worthwhile to consider how respondents are affected by 
the research, and whether or not some ‘aftercare’ is needed in the form of ad hoc 
reevaluation or debriefing (Box 10.11).
10.11.3  Responsibility to the Research Community
There is also an obligation to communicate research findings to the scientific com-
munity, and this obligation goes hand in hand with the requirement to be critical of 
one another’s work in service of furthering scientific knowledge. There are a few 
issues that can be raised here too.
Academic engagement with private industry is rapidly growing, and this is 
impacting academic research, as a literature review by Perkman et al. (2013) reveals. 
Commercialization may enhance productivity (on the short run), but it also impacts 
the agendas of researchers and promotes an environment of secrecy.
Although research commissioned by third parties is becoming more prevalent, it 
should be made perfectly clear whose interests are at stake. It has therefore become 
common practice for researchers to be required to disclose any affiliations with 
outside institutions; reveal specific financial arrangements, including arrangements 
concerning intellectual property; as well as divulge any other ties of a social, politi-
cal, or personal nature that might indicate a conflict of interest. In short, researchers 
must be hyper-transparent (for further discussion, see Chap. 8).
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10.11.4  Responsibility to Civic and Professional Communities
Disseminating knowledge to civic and professional communities entails a different 
focus than those of academic communities. Inasmuch as sharing knowledge is 
geared towards the application of theoretical insights, the information provided 
needs to be of practical value, which can be used for the purpose of training, evalu-
ation, risk assessment, or other needs (Fig. 10.5).
Box 10.11: Whose Perspective Prevails?
Reporting research findings can be precarious, as the following example of an 
unpublished qualitative study reveals. The research project, financially sup-
ported by several municipalities, aimed to analyze the perspectives of policy 
makers, healthcare providers, and their clients on homeless shelters.
In several interviews, some of the clients (homeless individuals) com-
plained about the poor living conditions in one of the shelters, and the inade-
quate support offered by one of the healthcare providing parties therein. One 
interviewee said: ‘It’s a mess. At least that’s how I see it. If you want to help 
people, you should do it completely different.’ Several of these complaints 
were included in the first report released, which was subsequently sent to the 
parties involved in the research project, including the healthcare providers.
Shortly thereafter, an argument arose between the researcher and the 
healthcare provider that had been criticized. The healthcare provider objected 
to the ‘uncritical publication’ of these complaints, which they believed were 
baseless and even harmful.
The researcher offered the healthcare provider an opportunity to contradict 
the complaints in a separate section, which would be inserted as an addendum 
in the next report sent to the relevant parties. The healthcare provider declined, 
insisting that it should be the researcher themselves that rectified what they 
considered to be a ‘grave mistake.’ The researcher’s supposed portrayal of a 
‘crooked image’ of the organization would cause them serious damage, the 
healthcare provider argued.
The researcher objected, contending that it was their academic duty to 
report all research findings and not to favor one party. The healthcare provider 
thereupon threatened to file an official complaint against the researcher, with 
whom they would no longer collaborate if the researcher would not concede.
How would you advise this researcher? Should they:
 1. Back down, revise the text, and omit the complaints to rescue the working 
relationship with the healthcare provider?
 2. Persevere as a scientist who has the duty to report findings as objectively 
as possible, even at the cost of a working relationship?
Which option would you choose, and why?
(Case was communicated to one of the authors of this chapter.)
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Fig. 10.5 ‘Vaxxed’, the 2016 documentary defending Wakefield and his followers
This means a shift away from asking whether research conclusions are true (the 
focus of academic knowledge dissemination), toward asking under what conditions 
and assumptions the findings are valid (the focus of civic and professional knowl-
edge dissemination), and this task has a number of ethical implications. This is 
especially true when vulnerable communities or developing countries are involved 
and questions of social responsibility emerges. What are the researchers’ 
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obligations towards these communities? Due to their economic, political, and intel-
lectual power, what are the duties of the scientist in relation to society and public 
interests (Payne, 2000) (Box 10.12)?
Q10: Which information are you obliged to share with your research participants?
• Which ties, commitments, and affiliations are of importance to the understanding 
of your research?
• Which moral responsibilities do you have towards others, specifically to those 
with a stake in your research?
Box 10.12: The Anti-Vax Movement. Who is Responsible for What?
A 1998 paper published in The Lancet (a high-ranking peer reviewed medical 
journal) connecting MMR (Measles, Mumps and Rubella) vaccination and 
the onset of autism sparked a worldwide anti-vaccination movement, raging 
still today.
The paper describes twelve children, most of whom were diagnosed with 
autism, who had bowel and behavioral problems. Eight of those children were 
purported to have developed autistic symptoms within a few days after they 
had been given the MMR vaccine. The story was picked up by several large 
UK newspapers and became the center of a nationwide debate in the subse-
quent years. This fervor eventually spread to other countries, which brought 
the paper’s principal author, Andrew Wakefield, considerable fame but also 
substantial criticism.
The scope of the paper was very limited (it was merely a series of ‘case 
reports’ and the sample size was only twelve). Based upon scientific norms, it 
would not have led to any reputable conclusion about a relationship between 
the MMR vaccination and autism. In fact, subsequent studies failed to find 
any such connection. These later studies, that did systematically probe the 
relationship between MMR vaccines and autism, received far less media cov-
erage than the original Wakefield paper (see Ben Goldacre’s 2009 Bad Science 
for details about the study and its media reception).
The Lancet study was retracted when it was found to be seriously flawed 
on several accounts. Data had been falsified and the research was deemed 
unethical because of Wakefield’s ‘callous disregard for any distress or pain the 
children might suffer.’ Additionally, it was argued that the author himself was 
compromised because of undisclosed financial conflicts of interest. 
Wakefield’s medical license was revoked in 2010.
All of this did nothing to deter the anti-vax movement (of which Wakefield 
was, and still is, the poster child) or halt its momentum. There was even a 
2016 documentary with a pro-Wakefield spin, called Vaxxed, which in the 
tradition of conspiracy theories, was advertised: ‘from cover-up to catastrophe.’
The number of people who refuse to vaccine their children has now risen 
to dangerous levels. These individuals believe, misinformed as they may be, 
that measles is harmless, vaccines are dangerous, and that the government has 
(continued)
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10.12  Data Management and Storage
10.12.1  Secure Storage
Secure storage of research data is at the core of research ethics, especially today, in 
the age of hacking and data breaches, and is subject to expanding regulation world-
wide. It serves two basic purposes: verification and reuse (for secondary analysis).
At first sight, it may appear desirable to simply preserve all data collected during 
research and to make it available to any and all researchers, in order to prevent fraud 
and render science more efficient. However, the issue in preserving research data 
touches on its confidential nature (see Chap. 7). Additionally, the competing 
no business interfering in their lives. Even worse, some believe that the gov-
ernment conceals ‘the truth’ for the sake of a ‘powerful medical-industrial 
complex.’ The result of this flood of misinformation? Rates of this deadly 
disease have begun increasing yet again.
The anti-vax case raises the serious question of who is to blame and for 
what are they to be blamed. Framed differently, where does a researcher’s 
responsibility begin and where does it end? And when do outside parties 
begin to share in this responsibility?
How would you define the responsibilities of the following actors in this 
anti-vax case, with regard to their obligation to communicate scientific 
findings?
Start with Wakefield, as the Principal Investigator (PI) of the study, who 
has an obligation to report not only truthfully but also responsibly about his 
research findings. Given that he honestly believes that MMR vaccines relate 
to (or even cause the onset of) autism, what responsibilities do you think he 
has as a scientist to communicate his findings? Is he to be blamed for what 
some consider a dangerous hoax? And how about the other parties involved in 
this case? Flesh out the responsibilities of all the parties involved as best as 
you can.
Actor  Responsibility
Wakefield (as PI of the study)
Editor of The Lancet
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interests of researchers, research participants, and other stakeholders presents a 
number of challenges. To deepen the challenge, conflicting database legislation in 
different countries makes the preservation of all research data near impossible.
Decisions have to be made as to whether or not data will be made available, to 
whom will have access, how it will be accessed, where it will be stored, and how 
long it will be stored (for an overview of these considerations, see Johnson and 
Bullock 2009). We will briefly discuss the main aspects of these questions below.
10.12.2  Sensitive Data
Before decisions are made about whether data should be archived and shared, the 
data’s sensitivity should be assessed first. What is deemed ‘sensitive’ in a legal 
sense may differ from country to country, though many would agree that any data 
containing personal information would classify as such. Sensitive data would thus 
include a participant’s identity, information about their ethnicity, gender, political 
opinions, medical history, sexual orientation, religious background, and philosophi-
cal beliefs.
How should researcher’s deal with sensitive data? Several strategies have been 
developed to confront this important issue.
Anonymization Data is stripped of its identifying properties by assigning a code to 
specific pieces of information. For example, the name of the participant is replaced 
by a number. If a key is preserved that enables re-identification (linking names to 
number, for example), privacy policy requires that the key be stored separately, and 
shall not be shared.
Other policies insist, however, that no key be kept at all, and that data collection 
be anonymized right from the beginning, such that all data effectively becomes 
anonymous the moment it is collected, and can never be linked to individual partici-
pants. This strategy is most fitting for quantitative research practices.
Pseudonymization The true identity of the research participant or interviewee is 
concealed by giving them a pseudonym (an alias) and by changing other identifying 
details that might make identification possible. This strategy is more commonly 
practiced in qualitative studies, such as ethnography and case histories.
Some regard pseudonymization as an insufficient guarantee of privacy, as clever 
detective work may enable the identification of participants. For example, almost all 
of Freud’s patients have since been identified, even though he went to great lengths 
to hide their identities. Destroying field notes to protect a respondents’ privacy 
might seem to be a solution to this issue, though in practice, it raises questions of 
its own.
Co-ownership In some research practices, respondents define the goals of the 
research project in close collaboration with the researchers and remain actively 
involved in other stages of the project, including the interpretation and dissemina-
10.12  Data Management and Storage
264
tion of the results. Typically, this is the case in ‘action research’ or ‘community 
engaged research’ (see Friedman Ross et al. 2009).
By becoming closely involved, research participants become co-owners of the 
research project, but this often means that the researcher cannot offer the same ethi-
cal guarantees concerning confidentiality and anonymity, informed consent, and 
protection from harm as in other research methodologies (Williamson and Prosser 
2002). For example, when school professionals conduct action research, confidenti-
ality will be much more difficult to secure (Nolen and van der Putten 2007).
10.12.3  Making Data available to Whom?
There appears to be a near consensus that data should be archived (if only for rea-
sons of verification). There is dissent, however, over whether secondary researchers 
or other parties should be allowed access to said archived research data, even after 
anonymization or pseudonymization.
Large longitudinal research projects almost by definition require the sharing of 
data, if only for reasons of efficiency. However, legislation in many countries has 
become much more stringent about protecting the rights of research participants, 
and this can become an obstacle in these projects.
Legislation safeguards the rights of participants to:
Have access to their own data
Have their data corrected or removed at their request
Refuse any other use of their data than agreed upon
Should the foundational principles of privacy be followed strictly, as some argue, 
no other researchers should be allowed access to data unless participants consent to 
secondary analysis. Others, however, maintain a more liberal perspective, arguing 
that if data is entirely anonymized, then these restricting conditions need not apply. 
But even if that is the case, collaboration between teams of researchers from differ-
ent countries can become quite difficult given that each country may possess 
 different privacy rules.
10.12.4  Storing Data Where?
Securing data implies storage in a safe place. This could be an encrypted university 
hard drive, or the implementation of encryption software. Agreements must be 
made in advance as to who has access, and to which parts of the hard drive. 
Additionally, the question is who will maintain the data once it is stored.
For security reasons, data should never be kept on personal computers, laptops, 
or other information carriers. Similarly, hardcopy receptacles of sensitive 
10 Research Ethics Step by Step
265
information should be kept in safe places, such as a vault or a locker that can opened 
by designated people only.
Finally, some considerations must be given to possible data breaches, data leak-
ages, and the accidental loss of sensitive data. What are the procedures that must be 
followed in the event that sensitive information is lost, or even made public by 
accident? Who needs to be informed, and who has which responsibilities?
10.12.5  Archiving Data for How Long?
Lastly, decisions must be made as to how long data should be stored. Some conflicts 
of interest may arise here. Some universities and research institutions insist on the 
extended storage of data (at least 10  years) for verification purposes, to prevent 
fraud and/or uncover forms of misconduct. This requirement, however, conflicts 
with certain privacy laws, which may demand the destruction of unnecessary data 
as soon as possible. It may also conflict with contractual obligations made with 
study participants (for example, when consent to participate in a study is given 
under the condition that collected data is destroyed immediately after the study 
report has been published).
Q11: How should you ensure that any sensitive data is rendered in a form that is 
fitting for the research purpose and stored in a safe manner?
• With whom can your data safely be shared?
• What are the data security and safe storage procedures at your institute or univer-
sity? How do they differ from the agreements you’ve made with you research 
participants?
• What is a safe amount of time to archive sensitive data?
10.13  Conclusions
10.13.1  Summary
In this chapter, we followed a step by step approach to the ethical questions you 
need to answer when planning a research project. The objective was to learn what 
questions to ask, and to reflect on the answers as you plan and design a research 
project (see Box 10.6).
First, we discussed what research questions must be asked, to consider how 
important they are, and to think about what your research can contribute to. This 




Second, we examined the various implications in using a variety of research 
techniques, including the invasion of integrity and the risks of deception. We fol-
lowed this with a brief outline of informed consent protocols and how you can avoid 
harm and do good.
Third, we considered the ethical issues involved in collecting, analyzing, and 
interpreting data. What (un)intended consequences does your presence in the field 
have on the participants and research outcomes? What promises do you have to 
live up to?
Finally, we reviewed the responsibilities that come with being a researcher, spe-
cifically when sharing your findings with others. We concluded with a discussion of 
the various issues involved in safely storing data.
Followed from start to finish, this chapter aimed to ensure social science research-
ers were made aware of any potential ethical pitfalls that may be encountered. Are 
you ready now to submit your research proposal? (Fig. 10.6)
Suggested Reading
We highly recommend Research Ethics and Integrity for Social Scientists (Israel 
2015) and The Student’s Guide of Research Ethics (Oliver 2010) as excellent 
reference books for students who want to learn more about the principles and 
philosophies of research ethics. Israel in particular gives an overview of the vary-
ing ethical policies found throughout the world. The Handbook of Social Research 
Ethics (edited by Mertens and Ginsberg 2009) offers an excellent selection of 
essays on a wide variety of topics in the history, theory, philosophy, and imple-
mentation of applied social research ethics. Especially worth mentioning is 
Chap. 8, on IRBs, written by Spiegelman and Spears. Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics (Beauchamp and Childress 2001) is a classic in the field of research eth-
ics. Diener and Crandall’s Ethics in Social and Behavioral Research (1978) 
offers an older yet still relevant insight into the field of research ethics as it first 
emerged.
Fig. 10.6 Ready to submit 
your research proposal?
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10.14  Ethics Checklist
The following checklist may be useful when designing a research project. It is 
designed for students who do research under the supervision of a qualified researcher 
and can be adjusted at will and according to their own needs. It is emphatically not 





Email address / student id number
University / department
Course name (if applicable)
Supervisor’s name
Duration (from / to)
Research project
Please provide a brief outline of your study. What is its purpose? What are the main theoretical 




Please answer the following questions to the best of your knowledge. Consult supervisor if 
needed.
1. Participants
What is the (estimated) number of participants. What is the power analysis to determine sample 
size, if relevant?
Does the study involve participants who are unable to give informed consent (i.e. people with 
learning disabilities)? If yes: Explain why and what measures you will take to avoid or minimize 
harm.
Does the research involve potentially vulnerable groups (i.e. children, people with cognitive 
impairment, or those in dependent relationships)? If yes: Explain why and what measures you 
will take to avoid or minimize harm.
Will the study require the cooperation of a gatekeeper for initial access to the groups or 
individuals to be recruited? (i.e. students at school, members of self- help group, residents of 
nursing home)? If yes: Who is the gatekeeper? What agreement have you made, and which 
expectations do you share?
Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without their knowledge and 
consent at the time (i.e. covert observation of people in non-public places)? If yes: Explain why 
and how, and provide a risk analysis if applicable.
Will any dependent relationships exist between anyone involved in the recruitment pool of 
potential participants? If yes: Explain why and how, and provide a risk analysis
2. Research design and data collection
Will the study involve the discussion of sensitive topics? (i.e. sexual activity, drug use, politics) 
if yes: Which topics will be discussed or investigated, and what risk is involved? What measures 
have you taken to minimize any risk, if applicable?
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Are drugs, placebos, or other substances (i.e. food substances, vitamins) to be administered to 
the study participants? If yes: Explain the procedure and provide a brief cost-benefit analysis. 
What measures have you taken to minimize any risk, if applicable?
Will the study involve invasive, intrusive, or potentially harmful procedures of any kind?
If yes: Explain the procedure and provide a brief cost-benefit analysis. What measures have you 
taken to minimize any risk, if applicable?
Could the study induce psychological stress, discomfort, anxiety, cause harm, or have negative 
consequences beyond the risks encountered in everyday life? If yes: Clarify the procedure and 
explain why no alternative method could be used. Provide a brief cost-benefit analysis if 
necessary. What measures have you taken to minimize any risk, if applicable?
Will the study involve prolonged or repetitive testing? If yes: Explain the procedure and clarify 
how the interests of the participants are safeguarded.
Is there any form of deception (misinformation about the goal of the study) involved?
If yes: Explain the procedure and provide a rationale for its use.
Will you be using methods that allow visual and/or vocal identification of respondents? If so: 
What will you do to guarantee anonymity and confidentiality?
Will you be collecting information through a third party? If yes: Who is that party? Provide a 
brief outline of the procedure.
Will the research involve respondents on the internet? If yes: How do you plan to anonymize the 
participants?
How will you guarantee anonymity and confidentiality? Outline your procedure and give an 
estimate of the risk of a breach of confidentiality.
What information in the informed consent will participants be given about the research? Provide 
a brief summary or upload the consent form. Which procedures are in place in case participants 
which to file a complaint?
Will financial compensation will be offered to participants? Provide a short accounting of any 
compensation being offered.
If your research changes, how will consent be renegotiated?
3. Analysis and interpretation
What is the expected outcome of your research? What would you consider a significant result?
During the course of research, how will unforeseen or adverse events be managed (i.e., do you 
have procedures in place to deal with concerning disclosures from vulnerable participants)?
4. Dissemination
How do you plan to share your research findings? Which audience to you intend to target?
5. Data storage
Where will your data be stored? Which measures have you taken to make sure it is secure?
Which safety precautions have you arranged for in case of data leakage?
Will your data be disposed of? If yes: When? (date) if no: Why not?
Will your research involve the sharing of data or confidential information beyond the initial 
consent given (such as with other parties)? What specific arrangement have you made and with 
whom?
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10.15  Sample Informed Consent Form
[Adapt this form to your proposed research project].
Information about Participation in a Research Study at [your university or 
research institute]
[Title of the study:]
INTRODUCTION: Thank you for taking part in this study about [give brief 
explanation of the study]. Below is a description of the research procedures and an 
explanation of your rights as a research participant. In accordance with the ethics 
code of the [local institution], you are asked to read this information carefully. You 
are entitled to receive a copy of this form should you agree to proceed under the 
terms stated.
GENERAL INFORMATION: The purpose of this research is [give brief descrip-
tion of study purpose here]. This research is funded by [insert here, if applcable]. 
The potential conflicts of interest are [describe any that are known]. [OR] There are 
no known conflicts of interest in the conducting of this research study.
Your participation will last for approximately [duration estimate] and will take 
place at [location] at the following times [dates/times]. You will receive [insert 
reimbursement, i.e.. number of PPU, amount of money, a chance to win a voucher 
or, ‘no reimbursement’] for your participation in this study.
PROCEDURE: During this study, you will be asked to [insert brief description 
of what the participant will do]. You are aware that [describe any risks that are 
known]. [OR] There are no known or anticipated risks associated with participation 
in this study.
You have the right to end your participation at any moment, without citing a 
reason. If you choose to end your participation before the study terminates, you 
[will / will not] be reimbursed.
Regarding the use of your data, the following conditions apply:
• Your data will be used for scientific purposes, including publication. Only the 
researchers have access to the data [OR] The data will be made available for 
other researchers on condition of confidentiality.
• Your data will be handled and stored confidentially. This means that your data 
cannot be traced back to you. Specifically, the researcher will use a code number 
instead of your name to save your data.
• [If the data from the study will be personally identifiable] The code number and 
other personally identifiable information, such as names, will be saved separately 
from each other in a secure location.
• After publication, only the data that is necessary for the verification of the study 
results will be kept and stored safely for a minimum of 10 years and deleted once 
it is no longer needed. [OR] Personally identifiable data will be shared only if it 
is scientifically required to verify reported results.
• You have the right to withhold any responses you have provided from subsequent 
analysis. This means we will not use your data for this or any follow-up research, 
nor will we share it anonymously for open science purposes. You can decide to 
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withdraw your data until the study results are accepted for publication, or until 
the data is cleared of any and all identifying information, such that no-one will 
be able to trace you.
OFFER TO ANSWER QUESTIONS: You are now given the opportunity to ask 
questions. If you have any further questions or complaints about this study, you may 
contact the researcher, [name(s) of researcher(s) and email(s)—phone number(s) 
can be added if researchers prefer to use that method], of [your university or research 
institute].
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